CLASS ACTION DEFENSE BLOG
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Federal Securities Class Action Satisfied Rule 23 Requirements for Class Action Treatment but Duration of Class Period must be Limited as Requested by Defense District of Columbia Federal Court Holds
Several federal securities class action lawsuits were filed against various defendants Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and its former accountant KPMG, as well as various officers and directors of Fannie Mae alleging that they “intentionally manipulated earnings and violated Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (‘GAAP’), causing losses to investors.” In re Federal Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n Securities, Derivative, & “ERISA” Litig., 247 F.R.D. 32, 33-34 (D.D.C. 2008) (footnote omitted). The class actions were consolidated, and the consolidated class action complaint alleged accounting discrepancies at Fannie Mae in violation of GAAP and inadequate internal controls, id., at 34-35. The class action cited to an SEC investigation and to the Paul Weiss report, each of which confirmed accounting problems at Fannie Mae. Id., at 35-36. The class action alleged that Fannie Mae was ordered to restate its financial statements, and that concerns with these financial reports caused the stock to drop dramatically. Id., at 35. Plaintiffs moved for certification of the litigation as a class action and for appointment of class counsel, id., at 33. Defense attorneys apparently did not oppose class certification per se, id., at 36, but rather objected to the proposed duration of the class period (April 2001 to September 2005) and the identity of the putative class members, id., at 33-34. The district court granted the motion in part.
In addressing whether to grant class action treatment, the district court noted that “[t]he requirements of Rule 23(a) are so clearly met in this case that the defendants raise no opposition to this requirement being satisfied.” In re Federal Nat’l Mortgage, at 37. Defense attorneys did oppose, however, the relevant class period: The parties (other than KPMG) agreed that the start date was April 17, 2001, but while plaintiff sought an end date of September 27, 2005, the defense (except KPMG) sought an end date of December 22, 2004. Id. The defense argued that after December 22, 2004, “it was unreasonable, as a matter of law, for any investor to rely on Fannie Mae’s financial statements as a basis to allege that they were a victim under a fraud on the market theory.” Id., at 37-38. The defense selected that date because Fannie Mae issued a corrective disclosure warning on December 22, 2004 that disavowed its earlier financial reports; accordingly, the defense argued that “any purchasers who acquired stock after December 22, 2004, cannot rely on that presumption because Fannie Mae’s corrective disclosure cured the fraud on the market and thus rebutted the presumption of reliance, leaving only individual issues of reliance to predominate thereafter.” Id., at 38. The district court agreed.
Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions PSLRA/SLUSA Class Actions Uncategorized
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Class Action Alleging Companies Erroneously Advised Lenders that Homes were Outside Flood Zones Properly Dismissed because (1) Plaintiff Lacked Standing to Pursue Class Action Claims Against Companies that did not Provide Plaintiff’s Lender with Flood Zone Determination and (2) Company that Provided such Determination on Plaintiff’s Property owed Duties Only to Lender not Plaintiff Fifth Circuit Holds
After his home suffered floodwater damage from Hurricane Katrina, plaintiff filed a putative class action in Louisiana state court against numerous defendants that provide flood zone determinations to lenders; the class action alleged that defendants failed to properly determine whether homes were located within a Special Flood Hazard Area (SFHA), and sought damages under state law based on theories of negligence, failure to warn, detrimental reliance, and breach of guaranty or warranty. Audler v. CBC Innovis Inc., 519 F.3d 239, 2008 WL 509323 (5th Cir. 2008). Each claim in the class action complaint was “separate and apart from the federal flood insurance legislation governing lenders and… none of [the] claims arise under that legislation.” Id., at *3. In essence, the class action alleged that the class members failed to secure flood insurance because defendants erroneously advised them that their homes were outside a SFHA, so they were uninsured when Hurricane Katrina struck. Id., at *2. Defense attorneys removed the class action to federal court on the ground of diversity jurisdiction and under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), id., at *3. The defense then moved to dismiss the class action complaint for failure to state a claim and for lack of standing, id. The district court agreed with the defense arguments and dismissed the class action. Id. The Fifth Circuit affirmed.
Preliminarily, it bears noting that “[a] determination…that a property is not located within a SFHA does not prevent a borrower from purchasing private flood insurance.” Audler, at *2. The defendant involved in plaintiff’s loan (CBC) argued that it prepared flood zone determinations for the lender and that it owed no duties to the borrower in the loan transaction. Id., at *3. The other class action defendants argued that they were not involved in plaintiff’s loan and thus he lacked standing to prosecute any claims against them, id. Following dismissal of the class action complaint, plaintiff appealed to the Fifth Circuit; two defendants moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of standing. Id.
Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized
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District Court Order Striking Class Action Allegations but Permitting Named Plaintiffs to Pursue Individual Claims not Appealable thus Requiring Dismissal of Appeal from Class Action Order Fifth Circuit Holds Plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit against various defendants alleging that the Army Corps of Engineers had defectively designed and constructed various levee and floodwall systems that failed during a hurricane, resulting in flood damage. In re Complaint of Ingram Barge Co.
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Trial Court Order Denying Class Action Certification Barred Subsequent Class Action Filed by Absent Class Member of Prior Class Action Oklahoma State Court Holds, Otherwise “Plaintiffs [could] Continue Filing Broad Class Actions…Until a Trial Court Grants Class Certification, Rendering Ineffective the Previous Denials of Other Courts”
Plaintiff filed a putative class action in Oklahoma state court (LeFlore County) against BP America alleging “BP underpaid royalties by wrongfully charging marketing fees and costs of making the gas marketable, including costs for gathering, treatment, compression, and dehydration, to royalty owners.” Rees v. BP America Prod. Co., ___ F. 3d ___ (Okla.App. February 22, 2008) [Slip Opn., at 2]. The complaint purported to be a class action, brought on behalf of “all similarly situated persons and entities who have received royalty payments from [BP] on Gas Substances produced from the Red Oak-Norris Field.” _Id._ Defense attorneys moved to dismiss the class action on the ground that two other class actions were pending against BP alleging underpaid royalties (_Watts_ and _Chockley_); alternatively, defense attorneys requested that the _Rees_ class action litigation be stayed or transferred to the county in which the _Watts_ class action was pending (Pittsburg County). _Id._ The basis for the defense motion was that the _Watts_ class action purported to represent a class of royalty owners in several counties, including LeFlore, _id._, at 2-3. The _Chockley_ class action also was defined broadly enough to arguably include plaintiff’s claims within its scope, _id._, at 3.
The plaintiffs in the Watts class action had moved the court to certify that litigation as a class action, but the trial court denied the motion. Rees, at 3. The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the denial of class action treatment, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court denied certiorari. Id., at 3-4. The trial court in the Rees class action granted a stay, over plaintiff’s objection, pending the appellate court decision in Watts, id., at 3, and then granted BP’s motion to dismiss the Rees complaint, id., at 4. Specifically, “the trial court applied the principle of issue preclusion in ruling Rees, as an unnamed member of the proposed class in Watts, was bound by the decision in Watts denying class action certification.” Id. (citing In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Products Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2003)).
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Class Action Challenging Labeling PCs as “Windows Vista Capable” even if PCs could not Run Premium Vista Properly Certified as Nationwide Class Action and Washington State Law may be Applied to Claims of All Members of Class Action Washington Federal Court Holds
Plaintiffs filed a putative class action lawsuit against Microsoft challenging the marketing of its new “Windows Vista Capable” and “Express Upgrade” programs; specifically, the class action complaint alleged that almost a year before its release of the new Vista operating system, Microsoft “authorized original equipment manufacturers…to place a sticker on personal computers… indicating that the PCs had been certified by Microsoft as ‘Windows Vista Capable.’” Kelley v. Microsoft Corp., ___ F.Supp.2d ___ (W.D. Wash. February 22, 2008) [Slip Opn., at 1]. The class action alleged further that a substantial number of PCs that were advertised as “Windows Vista Capable” were limited to “Vista Home Basic” which, according to the complaint, “does not include any of the enhanced features unique to Vista and which make Vista attractive to customers.” _Id._, at 2. Some PCs were labeled as “Premium Ready” rather than “Windows Vista Capable,” _id._, but at that time consumers were unaware of the various Vista operating systems that would be available or the differences between them. The class action also alleged that Microsoft offered an “Express Upgrade Guarantee Program” to PC customers that would allow purchasers to “Windows Vista Capable” PCs to upgrade to Vista for little or no cost, but failed to disclose that the upgrade generally would be limited to Vista Home Basic. _Id._ Plaintiffs moved for the district court to certify the litigation as a nationwide class action and to apply Washington law to the class action. _Id._, at 1. Defense attorneys opposed both motions. The district court granted class action certification and agreed that Washington law governs the lawsuits.
The gravamen of the class action complaint was that “Microsoft eventually released four versions of Vista – Basic, Premium, Business, and Ultimate” – but that “the Premium version that is the ‘real’ Vista.” Kelley, at 2. Computers were advertised as “Windows Vista Capable,” the class action alleged, in order to “boost holiday sales of personal computers after delaying the release of Vista from March 2006 to early 2007” because Microsoft was “concerned that consumers looking to buy a new computer would delay their purchases until the release of Vista (and therefore after the holiday season).” Id. Thus, Microsoft allegedly engaged in the false and deceptive business practice of advertising PCs as “Windows Vista Capable” even if they could only run the Basic version “because Microsoft was concerned that few PCs on the market at the time could run the more premium versions of Vista” and so it “endeavored to assure consumers that their new computers would run the soon-to-be released Vista operating system.” Id. Microsoft countered that while Vista Home Basic “lack[ed] some of the capabilities of the premium versions of Vista, [it] still provides material improvements over Microsoft’s earlier operating system, Windows XP,” id., and pointed to various “marketing materials, sales aids, and training materials that described what features the different Windows Vista editions would provide and explained that not every ‘Windows Vista Capable’ computer would be able to provide every advanced feature available in every edition of Windows Vista,” id., at 3.
At the time plaintiffs sought class action treatment, the complaint sought relief for unjust enrichment and for violation of Washington’s Consumer Protection Act (CPA) or other state consumer protection acts. Kelley, at 4. Plaintiffs sought to certify a nationwide class action, and argued that Washington law applied to the claims of all class members. Id. The district court began its analysis by addressing the choice of law question, id. Defense attorneys argued that “the laws of all 50 states are relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims,” id., at 5. The federal court explained that it must first determine whether applying Washington law would be unconstitutional, and if not, whether applying Washington law would be “appropriate under Washington’s choice of law rules.” Id. (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985)). The district court easily concluded that applying Washington law would not violate the Constitution because “[a]lthough the injury to Plaintiffs and the potential class members may have occurred outside of Washington, application of Washington law is not arbitrary, unfair, or unforeseeable.” Id., at 5-6 (citation omitted). The court’s analysis of Washington’s choice of law rules was much more extensive, see id., at 6-11. Washington law requires a determination first of whether an actual conflict exists between the laws of Washington and other states, and if so, “the forum or fora that have the ‘most significant relationship’ to the action to determine the applicable law.” Id., at 6 (citation omitted).
Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized
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Class Action Plaintiff must Suffer Loss of Money or Property to have Standing to Prosecute UCL (Unfair Competition Law) Class Action and must Establish Causal Connection Between Alleged Loss and Defendants Conduct California State Court Holds
Plaintiff filed a putative action lawsuit against various Time Inc. entities for violations of Californias unfair competition law (UCL) by allegedly tricking people into buying books as part of a free trial period program. Hall v. Time Inc., 158 Cal.App.4th 847, 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 466, 467 (Cal.App. January 28, 2008). The gravamen of the class action was that Time engaged in a scheme by which it induced consumers to purchase books by offering a free preview period during which the consumer had 21 days in which to review the book and return it to Time with no obligation to buy. Id. The class action complaint alleged that after the consumer reviews the book pursuant to an ostensible no obligation free trial basis, Time employs a scheme to obtain immediate payment from the consumer throughmisleading and deceitful tactics. Id. Defense attorneys moved to dismiss the class action on the ground that plaintiff did not suffer an injury in fact and thus lacked standing to prosecute the class action; the trial court agreed and dismissed the class action complaint. Id. The Court of Appeal affirmed.
Plaintiff alleged that he ordered a book from Time. Hall, at 468. The class action alleged that Time sent a bill with the book that encouraged him to pay for the book immediately but made clear that he was under no obligation to do so and that he had 21 days to return the book at Times expense, id., at 467-68. Plaintiff admits he kept the book and did not pay for it. Id., at 468. According to the allegations in the class action complaint, after the trial period ended Time began sending bills to plaintiff demanding payment; when plaintiff failed to pay, the matter was referred to collection. Id. Ultimately, plaintiff paid for the book and then filed the class action complaint alleging that Time had engaged in an ongoing, unfair and/or fraudulent and/or unlawful business practice by sending invoices before the expiration of the free trial period to obtain immediate payment for the book requested. Id. The trial court granted Times motion to dismiss the class action for lack of standing, finding that plaintiff got the book that he asked for, at the price he asked for it, and the payment schedule he wanted. Id.
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Class Action Alleging Fidelity Failed to Disclose and Provide Discounted Title Insurance Rates to Homeowners as Part of Refinance Transactions Entitled to Class Action Treatment Ohio Federal Court Holds
Plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit against their title insurance carrier, Fidelity National Title, alleging that the cost it charged insureds for insurance issued in connection with refinance transactions; specifically, the class action alleged that plaintiffs “have been injured and wronged by defendant’s failure to charge them a lower premium,” as required by Ohio law, “even though they were not named insureds under the title insurance policy.” Randleman v. Fidelity National Title Ins. Co., ___ F.Supp.2d ___ (N.D. Ohio January 31, 2008) [Slip Opn., at 1]. Of course, homeowners typically pay for title insurance, both for themselves and for their lenders, _id._, at 2. Defense attorneys filed a motion to dismiss the class action to the extent it asserted claims for breach of implied-in-fact contract and unjust enrichment, which the district court denied. _See Randleman v. Fidelity National Title Ins. Co._, 465 F.Supp.2d 812, 827 (N.D. Ohio 2007). Plaintiffs then filed a motion to certify the litigation as a class action, _id._ The trial court concluded that the matter may proceed as a class action.
Like all other title insurers doing business in Ohio, Fidelity belongs to the Ohio Title Insurance Rating Bureau (OTIRB) and files its insurance rates with the Ohio Superintendent of Insurance. Randleman, at 2. “The OTIRB files a manual of rates with the Ohio Department of Insurance (ODI), setting forth the rates title insurers will charge for policies.” Id. The rates in the manual are binding on title insurers, and the listed rates are mandatory though Ohio law provides for certain discounted rates, id., at 2-3. The class action complaint alleged that plaintiffs refinanced their Ohio home and paid a non-discounted rate for a title policy for their lender, id., at 3. The class action further alleged that plaintiffs had refinanced within the time period that would have qualified them to receive a discounted reissue rate, and that “they were overcharged $213.57.” Id., at 4. Plaintiffs’ class action certification motion argued that Fidelity systematically failed to provide discounts “despite knowledge that particular consumers are entitled to the discounted rate.” Id., at 5. Defense attorneys opposed class action treatment on the ground that “the issue of knowledge of the discount on the part of each individual class member would be determinative, and would require individualized adjudication of ‘as to the knowledge and practices of the particular lender, mortgage broker, agent, and borrower involved in the transaction’…, and thus, individual adjudication of each class member’s claim.” Id. Plaintiffs countered that Fidelity’s non-disclosure or a homeowner’s lack of knowledge is not an element of the causes of action underlying the class certification motion, so individual trials would not be required. Id., at 5-6.
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On Appeal from Order Granting Class Action Treatment Against Dow Chemical for Damages Allegedly Caused by Dioxin from Dow Plant, Defense Failure to Request or Seek to Introduce Evidence in Opposition to Motion to Certify Class Action Undermines Claim that Trial Court Erred in Failing to Hold Evidentiary Hearing Split Michigan State Court Holds
Plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit against Dow Chemical alleging toxic tort claims based on the alleged release of dioxin at Dow’s Midland, Michigan, plant. Henry v. Dow Chemical Co., Mich. Ct. App. Case No. 266433 (unpublished) (Mich.App. January 24, 2008) [Slip Opn., at 1]. In part, the class action complaint “presented an issue of first impression” in that plaintiffs sought certification of a class action to create a medical monitoring program funded by Dow, id. In 2003, plaintiffs moved for class action certification, and defense attorneys moved for summary disposition of the medical monitoring claim, id., at 2. The trial court denied the defense motion, but the Michigan Supreme Court reversed reasoning that “[b]ecause plaintiffs do not allege a present injury, plaintiffs do not present a viable negligence claim under Michigan’s common law.” Henry v. The Dow Chemical Co., 701 N.W.2d 684, 473 Mich. 63, 68 (Mich. 2005). On remand, the trial court considered class action treatment of the remaining claims for nuisance, negligence, and public nuisance, Slip Opn., at 3, and granted the motion, id., at 6-7. Defense attorneys appealed and, in an unpublished and divided opinion, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Court of Appeals noted that the sole issue before it was whether the trial court’s order granting class action treatment was “clearly erroneous.” Henry, at 7 (citation omitted). Defense attorneys argued on appeal that individual questions of law or fact will predominate over common questions, and that the trial court erred in concluding otherwise without first holding an evidentiary hearing. Id., at 8. The lead opinion, by Judge Hood, states at page 7 that “in my view, the trial court’s decision with regard to certification of the class was not clearly erroneous.” With respect to the lack of an evidentiary hearing, the court noted that the parties made the strategic decision not to introduce evidence but, rather, to rely on case law in support of, and opposition to, the class action certification motion, id., at 8. Of course, “[w]ithout an evidentiary hearing, there are no factual findings to review,” id., and having made the tactical decision not to request an evidentiary hearing or seek to present testimony in opposition to class certification, the defense could not now be heard to complaint. And with respect to Dow’s arguments that “the properties and the dioxin levels vary,” thus creating predominantly individual questions of fact, the appellate court concluded that (1) under Michigan law, “the trial court is not required to accept the defendant’s assertions and proofs, but looks to the allegations in the complaint,” and (2) the investigation and report of the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) concluded that certain areas contained excessive amounts of dioxin and that Dow’s Midland facility was the source of the contamination. Id., at 11-12. While Dow argued that another sources of contamination existed, the MDEQ had concluded that the alternate source was not a factor so the trial court’s decision was not clearly erroneous. Id., at 12.
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District Court Erred in Holding Plaintiffs Lacked Standing to Prosecute Class Action Complaint and in Ruling on Suitability of Complaint for Class Action Treatment at the Pleading Stage of the Litigation Eleventh Circuit Holds
Plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit in Florida state court against their mobile home owner’s insurance carrier, Foremost Insurance, for underpayment of damages caused by hurricanes, and defense attorneys removed the class action to federal court. Mills v. Foremost Ins. Co., 511 F.3d 1300, 2008 WL 45806, *1 (11th Cir. 2008). The class action complaint alleged that plaintiffs tendered a claim to Foremost for hurricane damages, but that “Foremost failed to compensate the Millses for contractors’ overhead and profit charges, and for state and local sales taxes on materials, incurred by the Millses in having their hurricane-damaged property repaired or replaced.” Id. The Eleventh Circuit referred to these unpaid items as “Withheld Payments,” see id. n.2. Before either side filed a motion concerning class action certification, defense attorneys moved to dismiss the class action on the ground “that class action treatment was inappropriate because common legal or factual questions would not predominate over individual issues.” Id. The district court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiffs lacked standing to prosecute the class action claims, id. Plaintiffs appealed dismissal of the class action, and the Eleventh Circuit reversed.
The district court dismissed the class action based on its conclusion that, in order to have standing to prosecute the class action, plaintiffs had to satisfy three “preconditions” set forth in the insurance policy: “(1) they must complete the repairs or replacement of the damaged property; (2) they must actually incur overhead, profit, and sales tax in connection with the repairs or replacement; and (3) they must make a further claim for any ‘additional costs’ (including overhead, profit, and sales tax) incurred in repairing or replacing the damaged property.” Mills, at *1. Because the class action complaint sought damages for Withheld Payments, the district court reasoned that plaintiffs themselves would not be entitled to such damages unless they met these preconditions. Because plaintiffs “failed to allege that they had completed the repairs or replacement and made a claim for such repair or replacement costs,” the district court held that they lacked standing to prosecute the complaint either individually or as a class action. Id. The district court further held that class action treatment would be inappropriate because “the individual inquiry of the facts surrounding the property damage claims of thousands of Foremost policy holders under thousands of separate insurance policies would predominate and overwhelm any common issue.” Id., at *2. Accordingly, it granted the defense 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the class action complaint, id.
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Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Action Certification of FDCPA (Fair Debt Collection Practices Act) Class Action Against Law Firm Granted by New York Federal Court because the “Win-Loss” Record of Plaintiff’s Counsel did not Defeat his Adequacy to Serve as Class Counsel and because a De Minimis Recovery of $2.50 per Class Member did not Defeat Superiority
Plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit against the law firm of Karp & Kalamotousakis, LLP alleging that it violated the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). Kalish v. Karp & Kalamotousakis, LLP, ___ F.R.D. ___, 2007 WL 4048559, *1 (S.D.N.Y. November 13, 2007). The class action complaint alleged that the law firm violated the FDCPA “by sending a form letter that incorrectly informed her that she could only dispute a debt owed to Defendant in writing.” _Id._ Plaintiff’s counsel sought class action certification; defense attorneys did not dispute liability on the FDCPA claim but challenged both the adequacy of counsel and the superiority of class action treatment. _Id._ The district court rejected the defense arguments and certified the litigation as a class action.
With respect to the adequacy of plaintiff’s lawyer to serve as class counsel, the district court explained that while prior Second Circuit authority directed district courts to consider whether proposed class counsel was “qualified, experienced and generally able” to handle the class action, Kalish, at *1, under the 2003 Amendments to Rule 23, and specifically Rule 23(g), “the court must consider: (a) the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims in the action, (b) counsel’s experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and claims of the type asserted in the action, (c) counsel’s knowledge of the applicable law, and (d) the resources counsel will commit to representing the class,” and may consider as well “any other matter pertinent to counsel’s ability to fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class,” id. n.4. So viewed, the federal court found the defense argument against plaintiff’s counsel wanting because it “mistakenly conflates ‘qualified’ with ‘successful’ and thereupon undertakes a detailed description of some of [counsel’s] losses in court.” Id., at *2. The court found counsel’s “win-loss” record immaterial to a determination of his qualifications because “Rule 23 requires only that class counsel have experience in the particular type of law at issue or that she have demonstrated her competence in other ways, such as through the quality of her submissions to the court.” Id. (citation omitted). The court concluded that counsel was adequate to represent the class, id.
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