UCL Class Action Defense Cases-Ticconi v. Blue Shield: California Court Reverses Denial Of Class Action Motion Holding Trial Court Erred In Refusing Class Action Treatment Based on Equitable Defenses To Unfair Competition Law (UCL) Claims Against Insurer

Denial of Class Action Certification Motion Improper in Class Action Case Against Insurer Alleging Violations of State Unfair Competition Law (UCL) because Equitable Defenses of Fraud and Unclean Hands cannot be used to Defeat UCL Claims so Individual Issues Related to such Defenses will not Predominate over Common Issues California Appellate Court Holds

Plaintiff filed a putative class action complaint against his health insurer, Blue Shield of California, alleging inter alia that Blue Shield violated California’s unfair competition law (UCL) and state insurance code “by failing to attach his application to or endorse it on the insurance policy when issued, and later rescinding the policy on the ground he had made misrepresentations in that application.” Ticconi v. Blue Shield of Cal. Life & Health Ins. Co., 157 Cal.App.4th 707, 68 Cal.Rptr.3d 785, 788-89 (Cal.App. 2007). Plaintiff moved the trial court for class action treatment; defense attorneys opposed the class action certification motion on the ground the individual issues related to Blue Shield’s fraud and unclean hands defenses would predominate over common issues. Id., at 789. The trial court agreed with defense counsel and refused to grant class action status. Id. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the class action certification motion because “[e]quitable defenses cannot be used to defeat a UCL cause of action and Blue Shield Life may not raise the defense of fraud based on statements that insureds made in an application for insurance where the application had been neither attached to nor endorsed on the policy when issued,” id. (citations omitted).

According to the class action complaint, plaintiff applied for a short-term health and accidental death insurance policy from Blue Shield. Ticconi, at 789. The application completed by plaintiff “was neither attached to the policy nor endorsed onto it when the policy was issued.” Id. Blue Shield issued the policy, and plaintiff paid the premiums as required, id. During the policy period, plaintiff’s health care bills exceeded $100,000, but upon receiving the bills Blue Shield refused payment and rescinded the policy on the ground that plaintiff “made material misrepresentations in his application for insurance about the condition of his health.” Id. Plaintiff denied this claim, insisting that he “answered truthfully all health questions posed on the policy application” and that “a reasonable investigation would have shown this.” Id. The class action further alleged that Blue Shield violated California law because it failed to attach or endorse a copy of his application to the policy, and Insurance Code section 10113 forbids incorporation of the application by reference, and that even if his statements were false, plaintiff “not bound by any statement made therein because that document had not been attached to or endorsed on the policy when issued.” Id., at 789-90. Plaintiff filed his lawsuit as a class action alleging that Blue Shield similarly “had rescinded a large number of policies that did not have the applications attached to or endorsed on the policies” in violation of Insurance Code sections 10113 and 10381.5, and that as such the rescissions represented an unlawful business practice under the UCL. Id., at 790.

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases-Wernikoff v. Health Care Service: Illinois Appellate Court Reverses Order Decertifying Class Action But Affirms Summary Judgment As To Plaintiff’s Claims Thus Requiring Appointment Of New Class Representative

In Class Action Lawsuit Alleging Fraud, Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Decertifying Class Action because Subsequent Discovery did not Amount to “Changed Circumstances” Necessary to Support Decertification of Class Action, but Summary Judgment in Favor of Defense Properly Granted because Class Action Representative could not Establish Reliance thus Requiring Appointment of New Class Representative Illinois Appellate Court Holds

Plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit against her insurer, Health Care Service Corporation (dba BlueCross BlueShield of Illinois), alleging common law fraud and violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act arising out of the company’s allegedly fraudulent business practices in the setting and revising of its policyholders’ premium rates. Wernikoff v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 877 N.E.2d 11, 13-14 (Ill.App. 2007). Specifically, the class action complaint alleged that defendant “failed to disclose to policyholders the option of reapplying as a new policyholder and, if approved, paying the new business rate premium.” Id., at 14. Plaintiff filed a class action certification motion in 2003, which the trial court granted, id., at 13. In 2006, after the case had been reassigned to a new judge, defense attorneys moved to decertify the class action and for summary judgment; the trial court granted both motions. Id., at 14. The appellate court reversed the order decertifying the class action, but affirmed the order granting summary judgment.

Addressing the order decertifying the class action, the appellate court explained that “an order setting aside an earlier determination of class certification would be proper if clearly changed circumstances or more complete discovery warranted it, rather than mere feelings of error regarding the original certification order.” Wernikoff, at 14 (citing Barliant v. Follett Corp., 74 Ill.2d 226, 231 (Ill. 1978)). An order decertifying a class action is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id., at 14-15 (citation omitted). Plaintiff argued that the trial court abused its discretion because there were no “changed circumstances” and because the additional discovery did not warrant decertification; defense attorneys countered that more than 24 additional depositions had been taken and that the circumstances had changed. Id., at 15. “Specifically, defendant points to plaintiff’s second deposition, which occurred after the class was certified, in which plaintiff admitted that he knew about the option to reapply to receive the new business rate but chose not to do so for several years. Defendant also points to the fact that the depositions of many policyholders revealed that not all policyholders relied on the ‘standard written materials’ but relied on the statements made in oral communications with defendant’s customer service representatives.” Id.

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized

State Farm Class Action Defense Cases-Alleman v. State Farm: Pennsylvania Federal Court Refuses To Certify Breach Of Contract Class Action Challenging Calculation Of Insurance Premiums And Grants Defense Summary Judgment Motion On Contract Claim

Plaintiff is not an Adequate Class Representative if She does not have a Viable Claim Against Defendant thus Compelling Denial of Class Action Certification Motion in Breach of Contract Class Action Against Life Insurer Pennsylvania Federal Court Holds

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against life insurance company for breach of contract, constructive fraud and unjust enrichment alleging that State Farm the premiums it charged for the insurance policies covering the lives of her two minor children “was based on an aggregate of mortality rates for both smokers and non-smokers, rather than a premium based solely on the mortality rate of non-smokers.” Alleman v. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 508 F.Supp.2d 452, 453 (W.D.Pa. 2007). Plaintiff moved for certification of a class action on the breach of contract claim only; defense attorneys opposed class action treatment and moved for summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiff did not have a viable breach of contract claim. Id. The district court agreed with the defense, denied the class action certification motion, and granted summary judgment in favor of the defense.

The federal court began its analysis by explaining the need to consider the class action certification motion and summary judgment motion as one – a point that often puzzles inexperienced state and federal courts that are concerned with ruling on the “merits” prior to class certification. As the district court explained at page 453, “Because the issue of whether plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class and whether plaintiff is an adequate representative as required by [Rule 23] and defendant’s summary judgment motion turn on whether plaintiff has a viable breach of contract claim we will address the two issues as one.” In other words, a court must determine as a threshold matter whether a particular putative class representative may assert a valid claim against the defendant in his or her own name; if not, then class action treatment is inappropriate because there is no adequate class representative to pursue the claim. As the Third Circuit explained, “Depending on the circumstances, class certification questions are sometimes enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff’s cause of action and courts may delve beyond the pleadings to determine whether the requirements for class certification are satisfied.” Beck v. Maximus Inc., 457 F.3d 291, 297 (3d Cir. 2006) (citations and internal quotations omitted). Here, for example, because the plaintiff did not herself have a viable breach of contract claim, she was not an adequate class representative (compelling denial of the class action certification motion) and supporting the defense motion for summary judgment. Id., at 453-54.

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized

Wal-Mart Class Action Defense Case-Dukes v. Wal-Mart: Ninth Circuit Again Upholds Class Action Certification Order In Nationwide Sex Discrimination Lawsuit Against Wal-Mart Finding Class Action With 1.5 Million Members Was Nonetheless Manageable

Ninth Circuit Reaffirms that District Court did not Abuse its “Broad Discretion” in Certifying Nationwide Sex Discrimination Class Action Against Wal-Mart Creating “the Largest Certified Class in History”

In June 2001, plaintiffs filed a putative class action against Wal-Mart in the San Francisco federal court alleging sex discrimination in the payment of wages and in promotions. In April 2003, plaintiffs moved to certify a nationwide class action on behalf of 1.5 million former and present female employees “employed in a range of Wal-Mart positions – from part-time, entry-level, hourly employees to salaried managers.” Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 474 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2007). Defense attorneys argued that the requirements of Rule 23 had not been satisfied, stressing in particular several problems inherent in litigating a class of record size. More than a year later, in an 84-page decision handed down in June 2004, the district court rejected all but one of the defense arguments and, save for that one point, certified the class action as requested by plaintiffs. Both sides appealed and on February 6, 2007 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court order in all respects; our article discussing that opinion may be found here .Defense attorneys asked the Panel to reconsider its decision, and on December 11, 2007 the Ninth Circuit again affirmed class action treatment of the claims against Wal-Mart. Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. December 11, 2007) [Slip Opn., at 16207 et seq.] The Panel denied rehearing, withdrew its February 6, 2007 opinion, and filed a new Opinion and Dissent affirming the class action order. _Id._, at 16212.

Plaintiffs’ motion sought certification of a nationwide class action on behalf of “All women employed at any Wal-Mart domestic retail store at any time since December 26, 1998, who have been or may be subjected to Wal-Mart’s challenged pay and management track promotions policies and practices.” Dukes, at 16213. Wal-Mart stressed the “‘historic’ nature of Plaintiffs’ motion, inasmuch as it concerns a class of approximately 1.5 million women who work or worked in one or more of Wal-Mart’s 3,400 stores in 41 regions at any time since 1998.” Id., at 16214. The district court recognized Wal-Mart’s concerns but concluded that “while the class size was large, the issues were not unusual.” Id. The Ninth Circuit summarized the district court’s order at page 16214 as follows:

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases-John v. National Security: Second Circuit Reverses District Court Approval Of Class Action Settlement Holding Lower Court Lacked Jurisdiction Over Class Action Claims For Unregistered Copyrights

Copyright Act Section 411(a) Limits Federal Court Jurisdiction to Registered Works and District Court Lacked Jurisdiction to Approve Class Action Settlement that Included Unregistered Copyrights Second Circuit Holds

Plaintiffs filed a class action on behalf of a class that consisted primarily “of freelance writers who contracted with publishers to author the works for publication in print media, and retained the copyrights in those works,” but whose work had been reproduced without their consent on various electronic databases. In re Literary Works In Electronic Databases Copyright Litig., ___ F. 3d ___ (2d Cir. November 29, 2007) [Slip Opn., at 3]. The legal foundation of the class action rested on _New York Times Co. v. Tasini_, 533 U.S. 483, 488 (2001), which “held that § 201(c) of the Copyright Act does not permit publishers to reproduce freelance works electronically when they lack specific authorization to do so.” _Id._, at 4. Essentially, _Tasini_ requires publishers obtain a separate license to reproduce written works electronically. Defense counsel argued, however, relying on section 411(a) of the Copyright Act, that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the class action because putative members of the class action generally failed to register their copyrights. _Id._, at 5. The Circuit Court noted at page 3 that “The overwhelming majority of claims within the certified class arise from the infringement of unregistered copyrights.” Nonetheless, based on _Tasini_ the district court ordered the parties to mediation, and after three years a settlement was reached, _id._, at 6. The district court eventually approved the class action settlement, and several objectors appealed. _Id._, at 7-8. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to approve the settlement.

We do not here discuss the details of the class action allegations or the terms of the class action settlement. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that class was defined so as to include works that had not been registered, In re Literary Works, at 6, and that defense counsel argued “that this litigation possessed scant settlement value because the District Court could never certify the vast majority of the claims for inclusion in any proposed class” because section 411(a) of the Copyright Act provides that “no action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title,” id., at 5 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 411(a)). Defense counsel introduced survey evidence suggesting that less than one percent of the works had been registered; thus, according to the defense the jurisdictional defect exited as to “more than 99 percent of the claims at issue.” Id., at 5-6. Plaintiffs’ lawyers did not concede the precise number at issue, but admitted that “the large majority of ‘subject works’ have not been registered with the U.S. Copyright Office.” Id., at 6. “The District Court never considered whether it had jurisdiction to certify a class consisting mostly of claims arising from unregistered copyrights, or to approve a settlement resolving those claims.” Id., at 8.

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized

Intel Class Action Defense Cases-Barbara’s Sales v. Intel: Illinois Supreme Court Applies Illinois Law To Fraud Class Action And Reverses Certification Of Class Action Against Intel

Trial Court Properly Held Illinois Law Applied to Class Action Certification Motion but Improperly Certified Statewide Fraud Class Action Against Intel because Company’s Allegedly Deceptive Statements were not Actionable Illinois Supreme Court Holds

Purchasers of computers run by Intel’s Pentium 4 processors filed a putative nationwide class action in Illinois state court alleging claims for unfair business practices under California law and Illinois law based on the allegation that, contrary to its billion-dollar marketing campaign that “4 is better than 3,” the Pentium 4 performed no better than the Pentium III. Barbara’s Sales, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 879 N.E.2d 910 (Ill. 2007) [Slip Opn., at 1-2]. The class action complaint essentially alleged that the Pentium 4 was not “better” than its predecessor and did not necessarily make programs run faster than its predecessor, id., at 5-6. Defense attorneys opposed class certification in part on the grounds that Illinois law applied and further argued that the decision to purchaser a Pentium 4 was not made “simply based on the number 4 being higher than the number 3.” Id., at 7. The parties’ experts disagreed on whether Pentium 4 outperformed the Pentium III, id., at 6-8. The trial court agreed that Illinois law applied and denied class certification on the California-law claims. The trial court also found that Illinois law could not be applied to a nationwide class action and so certified only a statewide class under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act claim, id., at 8. Our previous article summarizing the July 2006 Illinois appellate court opinion that had reversed the trial court statewide class certification order – holding that California law applies and a nationwide class action should have been certified – may be found here. Defense attorneys appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court, which held that Illinois law applied and that class action treatment should have been denied.

The Supreme Court explained that it certified review only of (1) whether Illinois or California law applied to the nationwide class action complaint, and (2) whether the lawsuit should have been certified as a class action. Intel, at 10. The class action sought relief on behalf of ‘a nationwide class of consumers who have made purchases and received representations in all 50 states and the District of Columbia,” and the Illinois High Court recognized “substantial differences” among the fraud laws of the 50 states, id., at 11. As “the masters of their complaint,” however, plaintiffs limited the class action to “relief only under Illinois or California,” id. After a detailed analysis, see id., at 11-20, the Supreme Court concluded that Illinois law applied, id., at 20-21. The Court noted also that plaintiffs did not argue that Illinois law should be applied to a nationwide class, so the only remaining inquiry was whether a statewide class action should have been certified, id., at 21.

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized

Securities Class Action Defense Cases-Levine v. AtriCure: New York Federal Court Denies Defense Motion In Securities Fraud Class Action To Dismiss Claims Of Class Action Plaintiff On Ground That He Suffered No Loss

Determination of Loss Causation Inappropriate at Pleading Stage and Plaintiffs Satisfied PSLRA (Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995) Standard for Lead Plaintiff New York Federal Court Holds

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against AtriCure, Inc. alleging violations of the federal securities laws in connection with its initial public offering (IPO) for allegedly failing to disclose material facts in the company’s Registration Statement. Levine v. AtriCure, Inc., 508 F.Supp.2d 268, 270-71 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). Defense attorneys moved to dismiss plaintiff Levine’s claims in the class action complaint, and plaintiffs James Duncan and Jackie Byrd moved to be appointed lead plaintiffs; the district court denied the defense motion and granted the plaintiffs’ motion, id., at 270.

The only relevant facts for purposes of this article’s discussion are (1) Duncan purchased 200 shares of stock in October 2005 for an average of $12.85 and sold the stock in March 2006 when it was trading at $7.36; (2) Byrd purchased 100 shares of stock in August 2005 for $14.19 a share and sold most of her stock in May 2006 when the stock was $7.90, and the rest in December 2006 for $9.28 a share; and Levine purchased 250 shares of stock in August 2005 for $12 a share and sold them in November 2005 at $11.80 a share for a total loss of $50. Levine, at 271 and n.3. The defense motion to dismiss was based on the insignificant loss suffered by Levine and on the fact that he sold his shares prior to the publication of a Wall Street Journal article that purportedly misled class members into purchasing the company’s stock. Id., at 271.

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions PSLRA/SLUSA Class Actions Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases-Capitol People v. Dep’t of Developmental Services: California Appellate Court Reverses Court Order Denying Class Action Certification And Affirmatively Holds Class Action Treatment Warranted For Lanterman Act Claims

In Denying Class Action Certification Motion, Trial Court Erred in Examining Commonality from Perspective of Individual Class Member Claims rather than Overarching Conduct of Defendants Applicable to Entire Class California Court Holds

A wide array of plaintiffs filed a putative class action for injunctive and declaratory relief against various State of California defendants for failure to provide community living arrangements under California’s Lanterman Developmental Disabilities Services Act and alleging a “systemic failure of the state agencies and regional centers to provide proper oversight and enforce constitutional, statutory and regulatory mandates to place individuals in less restrictive community settings when appropriate.” Capitol People First v. Dep’t of Developmental Services, 155 Cal.App.4th 676, 66 Cal.Rptr.3d 300, 304-05 (Cal.App. 2007). Plaintiffs sought class action certification; defense attorneys opposed class action treatment on the ground that commonality did not exist, that plaintiffs were not adequate class representatives, and that a class action was not the superior means of resolving the issues in dispute. Id., at 305. The trial court agreed with defense counsel and denied class action certification; the Court of Appeal reversed and affirmatively instructed the trial court to grant plaintiffs’ motion for class action treatment.

California’s Lanterman Act, enacted in 1977, “establishes a comprehensive scheme for providing services to people with developmental disabilities” and provides that “[t]o the maximum extent feasible, services and supports should be available throughout the state to prevent the dislocation of persons with developmental disabilities from their home communities.” Capitol People, at 305 (citation omitted). The theme underlying the class action was that individuals were being institutionalized in violation of the Lanterman Act, and sought to enforce the right of developmentally disabled individuals “to live, with appropriate supports, in [their local] neighborhoods.” Id., at 308. The class action complaint challenged the State’s pattern and practice of “under-funding” of community services so as to require institutionalization, id., at 308-09. Importantly, ten institutionalized individuals and two organizations sought leave to intervene on the ground that the named plaintiffs’ interests were “hostile” to their own, and that “the relief they sought would impair the rights of those persons whose needs are best met in a developmental center.” Id., at 310. The trial court granted limited intervention, id.

In response to plaintiffs’ motion for class action certification, the trial court held that (1) commonality did not exist, (2) plaintiffs were not adequate class representatives, and (3) class action treatment was not the superior means of redress; rather, the fair hearing procedure provided under the Lanterman Act adequately redresses individual grievances. Capitol People, at 310. With respect to commonality, the appellate court held that the trial court failed to appreciate the difference between the “system relief” sought by the class action complaint and the “individual solutions to individual problems” that were at the heart of the interveners’ objections. Id., at 311-12. The trial court focused in “discrete wrongs,” and concluded that “common issues of fact would not predominate because the deficiencies, variables and pertinent lines of inquiry would be individualized.” Id., at 312. The Court of Appeal recognized that legal authority existed in support of the trial court’s holding, see id., at 312-13 and J.B. ex rel. Hart v. Valdez, 186 F.3d 1280 (10th Cir. 1999), but held that under California law “courts can take an aggregate approach to plaintiffs’ claims,” id., at 313. Thus viewed, the question was not whether differences existed among the various claims of putative class members but rather whether the defendants utilized “common policies and practices generally applicable to all putative class members.” Id. The Court of Appeal held that commonality did exist, explaining at page 315: “The overarching theme is that there is a pattern and practice of failure to meet constitutional, statutory and regulatory mandates to provide services and place class members in less restrictive settings, and the systemic effect of this failure is to impinge plaintiffs’ rights under state and federal law.” Such “systemic relief” could not be sought or obtained on a case-by-case basis. Id.

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases-Howard v. Gutierrez: District Of Columbia Federal Court Denies Motion To Reconsider Ruling Striking Class Action Allegations Holding Delay In Seeking Class Action Certification Was Not Excusable

Local Rule Requiring Class Action Certification Motion be Filed Within 90 days of Class Action Complaint runs from Filing of First Class Action Complaint not from any Subsequent Amended Class Action Complaint and District of Columbia Federal Court Holds Contrary Interpretation to be “Untenable” and “Unreasonable”

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against the Department of Commerce (DOC) and its Secretary for violations of Title VII alleging that the performance-review system resulted in systemic racial discrimination. Defense attorneys moved to dismiss the individual claims and to strike the class action allegations. The district court granted the motion in part, striking the class action claims. See Howard v. Gutierrez, 474 F.Supp.2d 41 (D.D.C. 2007). Plaintiffs sought reconsideration and certification of an interlocutory appeal. Howard v. Gutierrez, 503 F.Supp.2d 392, 393-94 (D.D.C. 2007). The district court denied the motion for reconsideration and refused to certify an interlocutory appeal.

With respect to the motion for reconsideration, the district court noted that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly authorize such motions and that they are “typically treat[ed]…as motions to alter or amend a judgment” under Rule 59(e). Howard, at 394. Reconsideration motions are addressed to the sound discretion of the court, are not “lightly” granted, and are not to be used to present arguments “that could have been advanced earlier.” Id. (citations omitted). With that background, the district court first rejected plaintiffs’ attempt to “rehash” arguments made previously with respect to their failure to file a motion for class action certification within 90 days of the filing of the class action complaint, and held that any new arguments in support of this old theme could have been raised earlier. Id. The district court concluded at page 394, “There has been no intervening change in controlling law, nor have plaintiffs advanced new evidence not previously available to them. Finding nothing in plaintiffs’ motion that warrants revisiting its prior holding, the Court now reaffirms that the ninety-day period in Local Rule 23.1(b) applies from the date of the filing of the first complaint to assert class claims.”

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases-Hall v. Sprint: Illinois State Court Upholds Class Action Treatment Of Class Action Challenging Early Termination Fees Charged Cellular Phone Customers

Class Action Certification of 48-State Class Proper because Sprint-Drafted Choice-of-Law Provision Selected Kansas Law to be Applied to Class Action Claims Illinois State Court Holds

Plaintiff filed a putative class action in Illinois state court against her wireless communications provider, Sprint, alleging various state law claims for relief each premised on the theory that early termination fees are unlawful penalties. Hall v. Sprint Spectrum L.P., 876 N.E.2d 1036 [Slip Opn., at 1-2 (Ill.App. 2007). The class action complaint alleged in part violations of Illinois’s Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act and sought to prosecute a state-wide class action under the statute, but alleged further violations of other state consumer protection statutes and sought to prosecute a nation-wide class action as to those claims. Id., at 2. Defense attorneys opposed plaintiff’s motion for class action certification, but the trial court granted the motion. Id., at 1. The defense appealed, and the Illinois appellate court affirmed the order granting the lawsuit class action treatment.

The class action complaint alleged that plaintiff had entered into a one-year contract with Sprint for two separate lines and agreed to pay a $150 early termination fee if she canceled service within that year: Within the one-year period, Sprint canceled plaintiff’s service because of nonpayment but refused her request to cancel her contract unless she paid the amounts owed, including the early termination fee. Hall, at 1-2. Plaintiff paid the entire amount demanded by Sprint on one of her lines, including the $150 early termination fee, but she could not afford to pay the termination fee on the second line and “Sprint refused to cancel the account and stop the accrual of charges unless [she] paid the early termination fee for the second cell phone number.” Id., at 2. This amount was never paid, id. Instead, plaintiff filed her class action lawsuit challenging the early termination fees as “unlawful penalties.” Id. Ultimately, the trial court granted plaintiff’s request for class action certification of a 48-state class action, id.

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized