Class Action Defense Cases: Knudsen v. Liberty Mutual

Changing Class Definition in Class Action Does Not Constitute New Case Permitting Removal Under CAFA (Class Action Fairness Act) Seventh Circuit Holds

Congress enacted CAFA (Class Action Fairness Act of 2005) for the purpose of expanding defense access to federal courts in class action cases. CAFA applies only to class actions filed after its effective date (February 18, 2005), but federal courts have held that certain pleading amendments – such as adding a new party-defendant – constitutes the commencement of a “new case” thus permitting removal by defense attorneys to federal court. Class action defendants often benefit if they can remove the case to federal court, and many have tested the limits of CAFA by removing class action cases on the grounds that different actions by the plaintiffs’ lawyer commenced a new suit.

Class Action Court Decisions Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) Removal & Remand Uncategorized

Experian v. Superior Court: Successful Defense of Class Certification Bars Letter to Potential Class Action Members Informing Them Of Their Possible Legal Rights California Court Holds

After a California state court denied a motion for class certification in a putative class action brought under the Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act (CCRAA), California Civil Code §§ 1785.1 et seq., plaintiff’s lawyer convinced the trial judge to allow communication by letter with potential class members that advised them of their potential legal rights against the defendant in the class action and sought their cooperation in pursuing the plaintiff’s damage claim in her lawsuit.

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Class Actions In The News Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases–Kristian v. Comcast: Class Action Waiver In Arbitration Clause Unenforceable

Arbitration Agreements Retroactive and Enforceable But Class Actions And Attorney Fees Waiver Unenforceable First Circuit Holds

Circuit Courts of Appeal continue to struggle with whether class action waivers in arbitration agreements are enforceable. On April 20, 2006, the First Circuit addressed that issue, and several others, in Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2006). Subscribers filed putative class actions against cable TV giant Comcast alleging violations of state and federal antitrust laws. Comcast moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause first added to the subscription service agreements in 2001. This motion was critical to Comcast’s defense of the class action for several reasons, chief among them that the arbitration agreements barred class action arbitration and barred recovery of attorney fees and costs. The district court concluded that the arbitration provisions did not apply retroactively and refused to compel arbitration. Id., at 29-30. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, but severed the class action waiver provision, as well as the provision barring recovery of attorney fees and costs, holding that those provisions “prevent the vindication of statutory rights under state and federal law.” Id., at 29. Kristian spans 40 pages in the Official Reports and so cannot be explored in detail here. It will be discussed at length in a separate article concerning the enforceability of class action waivers in arbitration agreements. We provide here but a brief overview of the highlights of Kristian.

• Comcast provided adequate notice of the arbitration agreements and the provision waiving class actions, provided as a “billing stuffer” with the subscribers’ November 2001 invoices, Kristian, at 30, 36-37. The arbitration provision – including the waiver of class action claims – was set forth in bold face and capital letters, id., at 31-32.

• While none of the plaintiffs’ initial service agreements contained arbitration clauses or the class action waivers, the arbitration agreements nonetheless applied retroactively. Id., at 30, 31-36.

Arbitration Class Action Court Decisions Class Actions In The News Uncategorized

Violante v. Communities Southwest — California Class Action Defense Cases

California Holds in Class Actions Case That Liability for Failure to Pay Prevailing Wages on Public Works Projects is Limited to Direct Employer

On April 18, 2006, a California court published its opinion in a class action case that addressed an issue of first impression in California: whether employees on public works projects may sue parties other than their direct employer for alleged violations of the prevailing wage law. Violante v. Communities Southwest Dev. & Constr. Co., 138 Cal.App.4th 972 (Cal.App. 2006). There, construction workers filed a putative class action in California state court for recovery of prevailing wages, alleging that perhaps thousands of workers “were paid less than prevailing wages as required by California Labor Code section 1770 et seq. for public works projects.” The class action complaint alleged violations of Labor Code section 1774, breach of contract and unfair business practices against numerous defendants including S. J. Burkhardt, Inc., the contractor that hired Raymond David Paci, doing business as Pacific Structures; Pacific Structures had employed plaintiffs directly. The trial court sustained the demurrers of three other defendants – Chapman Heights (a contractor), Communities Southwest Development and Construction Company (a developer and general partner of Chapman Heights), and Yucaipa Valley Acres (a developer and contractor) – without leave to amend and plaintiffs appealed. 138 Cal.App.4th at 975-76.

After a careful analysis of the statutory scheme, the Court held at page 979, “Plaintiffs have a right of action against the subcontractor, their direct employer [citations]. . . . But the Labor Code nowhere requires the contractor to pay prevailing wages to a subcontractor’s employee or permits a subcontractor’s employee to sue the prime contractor when the subcontractor fails to pay prevailing wages.”

Plaintiffs contend defendants violated section 1774 because plaintiffs were not paid prevailing wages by their direct employer, a subcontractor. ** This is an untenable interpretation.** The Labor Code provides a contractor and a subcontractor must pay prevailing wages **_to their respective employees_** on a public works project, not that a contractor must pay prevailing wages to a subcontractor’s employees. 138 Cal.App.4th at 978 (italics added).

Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized

Melena v. Anheuser-Busch — Class Action Defense Issues

Employment Arbitration Agreement Under FAA (Federal Arbitration Act) Enforceable By Employer Illinois Supreme Court Holds

As discussed in a separate article, Circuit Courts of Appeal and state courts do not agree on the enforceability of arbitration agreements in employment contracts. This issue may be of critical importance in the defense of class actions, because a class action waiver in an employment arbitration agreement cannot possible be enforceable if the court would refuse to enforce the arbitral forum even without a class action restriction. On March 23, 2006, in an opinion that should have direct and positive impact in the defense of class action waivers in arbitration agreements in the state, the Illinois Supreme Court cast its vote on the issue, holding that under the FAA (Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1994)), employment arbitration agreements are enforceable under “principles of fundamental contract law because we believe that approach is more faithful to the FAA.” Melena v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 847 N.E.2d 99, 107 (Ill. 2006).

In Melena, Anheuser-Busch hired plaintiff in February 1999. One year later, it mailed to employees a letter announcing a new “Dispute Resolution Program” that included a requirement for arbitration under the FAA. Employees were informed that “’by continuing or accepting an offer of employment’ with Anheuser-Busch, all employees to whom the policy was applicable ‘agree as a condition of employment to submit all covered claims to the dispute resolution program.’” 847 N.E.2d at 101. Plaintiff was injured in September 2002, and fired in March 2003. She filed suit against Anheuser-Busch in state court in May 2003. ANHEUSER-BUSCH moved to compel arbitration, but the trial court denied the motion without explanation. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that “’even if the plaintiff entered into the agreement knowingly, she did not do so voluntarily,’” and expressing doubt “about whether an agreement to arbitrate, offered as a condition of employment, ‘is ever voluntary.’” Id., at 102 (quoting appellate court opinion).

The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding: “In our view, the FAA’s plain language makes clear that arbitration agreements are enforceable except for state-law grounds for ordinary contract revocation.” 847 N.E.2d at 107 (italics added, citations omitted). Importantly, the Illinois Supreme Court did not make any distinction between arbitration agreements in an employment context or in a commercial setting, and did not suggest that a class action waiver provision would be interpreted under different contract principles.

Arbitration Class Action Court Decisions Class Actions In The News Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized

Burlington Northern v. White — Class Action Defense Issues

Supreme Court Expands Breadth of Potential Employee Claims for Alleged Retaliation

In a prior article on class actions and class action defense, we discussed the rise of employment law class actions. One area that had not yet been widely subject to class actions consists of alleged retaliation claims. Every employment law practioner knows that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination based on “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). To protect employees who seek to establish such employment discrimination, Congress included an “anti-retaliation” provision in Title VII that prohibits discrimination against one who has “made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated” in a Title VII matter, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). By their nature, such claims are “class action resistant” because they are based on the case-by-case treatment of the employee and the specific conduct against which the employer alleges seeks to retaliate. That may change.

On June 22, 2006, the United States Supreme Court fundamentally altered the landscape of employment law retaliation claims. See Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. _\_, __ S.Ct. ___ (2006). Title VII retaliation claims require proof of an “adverse employment action” but courts have disagreed on what satisfies this requirement. The Supreme Court summarized the issues presented and its answers as follows:

The Courts of Appeals have come to different conclusions about the scope of the Act’s anti-retaliation provision, particularly the reach of its phrase “discriminate against.” Does that provision confine actionable retaliation to activity that affects the terms and conditions of employment? And how harmful must the adverse actions be to fall within its scope?

We conclude that the anti-retaliation provision does not confine the actions and harms it forbids to those that are related to employment or occur at the workplace. We also conclude that the provision covers those (and only those)employer actions that would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee or job applicant. In the present context that means that the employer’s actions must be harmful to the point that they could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. Slip Opn., at 1-2.

Class Action Court Decisions Class Actions In The News Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases–Lindsay v. GEICO: District Court Erred In Refusing To Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction Over State Law Claimants Who Did Not Opt In to FLSA Class Action

Certification of Class Actions and Supplemental Jurisdiction – District Court Improperly Denied Class Certification of State Law Claimants Who Did Not Opt In to Federal Class Action Under FLSA (Fair Labor Standards Act) D.C. Circuit Holds

The FLSA (Fair Labor Standards Act) requires that potential class members affirmatively opt in to class actions based on the overtime pay provision. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 207, 216(b). Certain class actions under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23, however, require that potential class members opt out of class action cases. See Fed.R.Civ.Proc., Rule 23(b)(3), (c)(2)(B). On May 26, 2006, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held as a matter of first impression that the district court erred in refusing to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claim of, and in denying class action certification to, those state law class action claimants who did not also opt in to a FLSA overtime class action. Lindsay v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 448 F.3d 416 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action alleging that GEICO willfully misclassified certain employees as “administrative” in order to avoid paying them overtime in violation of FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a), and sought certification to pursue an opt in class action under FLSA. Lindsay, at 418. Plaintiffs also alleged that GEICO’s conduct violated New York’s Minimum Wage Act, N.Y. Labor Law, §§ 650 et seq., and sought certification to pursue an opt out class action pursuant to Rule 23. Id. As the D.C. Circuit summarized at page 418:

The district court denied certification of the state law class, concluding that the FLSA class certification procedure requiring all class members to affirmatively opt in precluded it from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over those state law claimants who did not affirmatively join the FLSA claim. We disagree and therefore reverse the order denying certification and remand to the district court.

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Class Actions In The News Uncategorized

Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo — Class Action Defense Cases

Class Action Securities Fraud Cases Must Plead Economic Loss and Causal Connection Between Alleged Fraud and Loss

Class actions alleging securities fraud are commonplace. Whenever a publicly traded stock declines in value, an investor is ready to file a class action claiming that the stock price had been inflated or that he would not have invested in the company but for misleading representations made by the company. Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) hoping, in part, to stem the “abusive” practice of “the routine filing of lawsuits . . . with only a faint hope that the discovery process might lead eventually to some plausible cause of action.” H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369, p. 31 (1995), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1995, pp. 679, 730.

Class action defendants had high hopes for the PSLRA: it imposes limits on damages and attorney fees, imposes limits on the way lead plaintiffs are selected and the amounts they can be awarded, imposes sanctions for frivolous litigation, provides companies with a “safe harbor” for certain statements, and allows courts to issue stays of discovery pending motions by a defendant to have the case dismiss. See, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4. Also, Section 21D(b)(2) of the PSLRA requires that a plaintiff alleging securities fraud “state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.” SLUSA, discussed in a separate article, represents Congress’s attempt to fill in the loopholes in the PSLRA. Other holes, however, have been left to the judicial branch. The U.S. Supreme Court filled one such hole in Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 125 S.Ct. 1627 (2005).

A class action alleging securities fraud was filed against Dura Pharmaceuticals in a California federal court. The complaint alleged that Dura falsely represented that a new product would secure FDA approval and that its drug sales would be profitable. The Supreme Court opinion sets forth the basic allegations of the complaint, which we do not repeat here. The Court stated at pages 339-40:

Class Action Court Decisions PSLRA/SLUSA Class Actions Uncategorized

Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortgage — Defense of Class Action Cases

Class Action Settlement Approval of Nationwide Class Action Reversed and Remanded for District Court Failure to Analyze Value of Class Claims Under the State Laws of Each Applicable Jurisdiction Seventh Circuit Holds

On June 19, 2006, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals considered for the second time a proposed class action settlement of a nationwide class action against Fleet Mortgage brought under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) and various state laws. Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 1667802 (7th Cir. 2006) (“_Fleet II_”). As explained below, the class action involved two classes: a “telemarketing class,” and an “information-sharing class.” The Seventh Circuit previously reversed district court approval of a proposed settlement of the class action claims because “the district court failed to consider adequately the value of the claims of the so-called ‘information-sharing class’ (a class of consumers whose privacy interests were purportedly intruded upon, but who did not suffer any out-of-pocket damages).” Slip Opn., at 1-2 (citing _Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortgage Corp._, 356 F.3d 781 (7th Cir. 2004) (“_Fleet I_”).

The class action involved claims that Fleet sold mortgage information to third-party telemarketers, and that Fleet “was an active collaborator in drafting the script that the telemarketers used and allowed direct billing of the fees for the telemarketers’ products onto the mortgage bill of its customers, without obtaining pre-approval from customers.” Slip Opn., at 2. The “telemarketing class” consisted of 190,000 people who purchased financial products from the telemarketers; the “information-sharing class” consisted of 1.4 million Fleet borrowers whose information had been sent to telemarketers but who had not purchased any services from them. Id., at 2-3.

The class action settlement approved by the district court in Fleet I provided for payments to the telemarketing class, but the information-sharing class “was left out in the cold and received nothing.” Slip Opn., at 3. (The terms of the class action settlement are detailed in Fleet I and Fleet II; we focus here only on the monetary recovery for each class.) Fleet I reversed the district court’s approval of the class action settlement because “the district court failed to consider with adequate specificity the reasonableness of an entire class receiving a ‘big fat zero’ in the settlement.” Slip Opn., at 4 (citing Fleet I, at 785). “Specifically, the district court did not canvass all potential avenues of recovery to determine whether the information-sharing class’s claims were indeed essentially hopeless (and thus worthless) under the pertinent controlling law.” Slip Opn., at 4.

Class Action Court Decisions Class Actions In The News FCRA Class Actions Multidistrict Litigation RESPA/TILA Class Actions Uncategorized

Deveny v. Entropin — California Class Action Defense Cases

California Holds In Class Actions Case That Inquiry Notice Triggers California Securities Law Claims Limitation Period And Website Posting Is Insufficient To Establish Inquiry Notice

On May 10, 2006, a California court published its opinion in a class action case that addressed two issues of first impression in California: (1) whether inquiry notice or actual notice commences the statute of limitations period for alleged violations of California’s securities laws, and (2) whether referring investors to the company website establishes inquiry notice as to all information contained on the website. Deveny v. Entropin, Inc., 139 Cal.App.4th 408 (Cal.App. 2006).

Briefly, from August 1998 through June 2002, Entropin released very reports and press releases touting the progress of its development of “a topical solution intended to treat impaired range of motion associated with shoulder and back injuries.” Id., at 810-11. The press releases issued between February and June 2002 stated that the drug “‘provided statistically significant improvement for soft tissue afflictions for both the shoulders and the lower back.'” Id., at 811-12 (citation omitted). But in September 2002, the company revealed that the clinical trials had been a failure, that the drug was “ineffective,” and that the company was “abandoning the drug.” Needless to say, “the market price of Entropin securities collapsed.” Id., at 812.

In January 2003, a putative class action alleging securities fraud was filed in California state court. The complaint alleged violations of California’s securities laws, as well as a federal law claim for violating Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933. Id., at 812. The company filed a motion for summary judgment, relying in part of the “undisputed fact” that certain information was available on the company’s website. Id., at 813. The trial court granted summary judgment and plaintiffs appealed. Id., at 814.

The California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District, Division 2, first examined whether “inquiry notice rather than actual notice applied to plaintiffs’ claims.” Id., at 815. After observing that the California securities laws at issue were governed by the statute of limitations period contained in California Corporations Code section 25506, Deveny noted that “no published California case has yet addressed whether Corporations Code section 25506 requires actual notice or inquiry notice to trigger the running of the one-year statute of limitations, and our own research has not revealed any such case.” Id. Federal courts that had addressed the issue, however, had held that inquiry notice was sufficient, id. (citations omitted). Deveny ultimately concluded that inquiry notice commenced the running of the limitations period under California Corporations Code section 25506. Id., at 815-17. (By its express terms, inquiry notice triggers the one-year limitations period under federal law, 15 U.S.C. § 77m.)

Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized