Class Action Defense Cases-Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster: Ninth Circuit Reverses Defense Summary Judgment In Class Action Holding Text Message Is A “Call” Under TCPA And Triable Issues Exist As To Class Action Plaintiff’s Consent To Receive Text Message

Summary Judgment in Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) Class Action Improper because Text Message may Constitute a “Call” within the Meaning of TCPA and because Triable Issues of Material Fact Exist as to Whether Defendants were “Affiliates” of Nextones.com and therefore Whether Plaintiff Consented to Receive Text Message Ninth Circuit Holds

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against Simon & Schuster, Inc. and ipsh!net Inc. alleging violations of the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. § 227; the class action complaint was filed after plaintiff received an unsolicited text message. Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2009) [Slip Opn., at 7329, 7332-33]. According to the allegations in the class action, plaintiff received the text message after she became a registered user of Nextones.com “in order to receive a free ringtone,” id., at 7333. Plaintiff had signed up at the request of her minor son, and his initials and first three letters of his last name, her email address, zip code, phone number and account information in order to sign up. Id., at 7333-34. Further, she affirmatively agreed to “receive promotions from Nextones affiliates and brands.” Id., at 7334. Plaintiff thereafter received a text message from Simon & Schuster, sent by ipsh!, promoting the sale of a new Stephen King novel, id. Plaintiff’s number was one of 100,000 cell phone numbers obtained by ipsh! from Mobile Information Access Company (MIA), the “exclusive agent for licensing the numbers of Nextones subscribers.” Id. Defense attorneys moved for summary judgment on the class action claims on the grounds that “(1) it had not used an ATDS [Automatic Telephone Dialing System], (2) [plaintiff] had not received a ‘call’ within the meaning of the TCPA, and (3) [plaintiff] had consented to the message and had not been charged for its receipt.” Id., at 7335. The district court granted the summary judgment “holding that (1) Simon & Schuster and ipsh! had not used an ATDS and (2) [plaintiff] had consented to receiving the message.” Id. The district court did not reach the issue of whether the text message was a “call” within the meaning of the TCPA, id. The Ninth Circuit reversed.

After summarizing the TCPA, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment because “there was a disputed issue of material fact as to whether the system Simon & Schuster used was an ATDS; (B) the text message was a ‘call’ within the meaning of the TCPA; and (C) [plaintiff] did not consent to the receipt of such a message, because Simon & Schuster is not an affiliate or brand of Nextones.” Satterfield, at 7336-37. First, the Circuit Court held that the district court erroneously limited an ATDS to a phone system that “produced, or called numbers ‘using a random or sequential number generator.’” Id., at 7337. Based on its analysis of the statute, the Ninth Circuit held that the relevant inquiry is “whether the equipment has the capacity ‘to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator,’” not whether it actually did so in the particular case at bar. Id., at 7337-38. So defined, the Court reversed summary judgment because it found “a genuine issue of material fact with regard to whether this equipment has the requisite capacity,” id., at 7338.

Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases—In re Oral Sodium Phosphate: Judicial Panel On Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) Grants Defense Motion To Centralize Class Action Litigation In Northern District Of Ohio

Judicial Panel Grants Defense Request for Pretrial Coordination of 38 Class Action Lawsuits Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, and Transfers Actions to Northern District of Ohio even though Only One of the Class Actions was Pending in that District Thirty-eight (38) class actions were filed against common defendant C.B. Fleet (Fleet) and various defendants alleging products liability claims; specifically, the class action complaints allege oral sodium phosphate solution-based (OSPS) products by Fleet were unsafe and caused personal injuries because they “high doses of OSPS products could lead to acute phosphate nephropathy, a type of kidney injury, and that Fleet knew of the risks associated with high doses of OSPS but downplayed or obscured those risks.

Class Action Court Decisions Multidistrict Litigation Uncategorized

Ford Class Action Defense Cases–Kearns v. Ford Motor: Ninth Circuit Affirms Dismissal Of Class Action Under California UCL/CLRA Holding Class Action Complaint Failed To Satisfy Rule 9(b)’s Heightened Pleading Requirements

Class Action Alleging Violations of California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) and Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) Properly Dismissed because Heightened Pleadings Requirements of Rule 9(b) for Fraud Applied to Allegations in Class Action Complaint and Plaintiff Failed to Allege Fraud with Requisite Specificity Ninth Circuit Holds

Plaintiff filed a putative class action in California state court against Ford Motor and certain dealerships (collectively “Ford”) alleging violations of California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) and Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA); specifically, the class action complaint . Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1122 (9th Cir. 2009). Defense attorneys removed the class action to federal court on grounds of diversity; the district court denied plaintiff’s motion to remand the class action to state court under the “local controversy exception” to the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). Id., at 1123. According to the allegations underlying the class action, Ford sells vehicles as either new, used, or Certified Pre-Owned (CPO) – “CPO vehicles are late model used vehicles, which Ford purports to put through a rigorous inspection process in order to certify that the vehicle’s safety, reliability, and road-worthiness surpass non-certified used vehicles.” Id., at 1122. Ford sells CPA vehicles for more than it sells non-certified used vehicles, id., at 1122-23, and the class action alleged that Ford “acted illegally to increase sales of [its CPO] vehicles, in violation of the CLRA and UCL,” id., at 1122. Defense attorneys moved to dismiss the third amended class action complaint on the grounds that the UCL and CLRA claims were premised on allegations of fraud, and that the class action complaint failed to plead fraud with the particularity required by Rule 9(b). Id. The district court granted the motion to dismiss but gave plaintiff an additional opportunity to amend the class action complaint; plaintiff refused, believing that the complaint satisfied the requisite pleading requirements, and the district court dismissed the class action, id., at 1123-24. Plaintiff appealed, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

The gravamen of the class action complaint is that “Ford makes false and misleading statements concerning the safety and reliability of its CPO vehicles.” Kearns, at 1123. According to the class action, “by making such false statements, Ford conspires to mislead class members into believing that the CPO program guarantees a safer, more reliable, and more roadworthy used vehicle.” Id. Ford allegedly charges an additional $1,000 dollars for CPO vehicles, but fails to disclose that provides “very little oversight…over the certification process.” Id. The class action complaint further alleged “that Ford misrepresents (1) the quality of the complete repair and accident-history report; (2) the level of training of CPO technicians; and (3) the rigorous certification inspection.” Id. Plaintiff claims “the inspection is not rigorous; the warranty does not cover all components; and the CPO vehicles are not any safer, more reliable, or more roadworthy than a regular used vehicle.” Id.

Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases–Utility Consumers’ Action Network v. Sprint: California Federal Court Denies Nationwide Class Action Treatment To Class Action Complaint Alleging Violations Of California Laws

Class Action Complaint Alleging Violations of California State Laws not Entitled to Nationwide Class Action Treatment because Plaintiffs Failed to Establish that California Law Applies to Non-Residents or that Nationwide Class Action Treatment would be “Superior” Means of Adjudicating Dispute or that Trial of Nationwide Class Action would be Manageable California Federal Court Holds

Plaintiffs filed a putative nationwide class action against Sprint Solutions and Sprint Spectrum (Sprint) alleging violations of various California consumer protection statutes; specifically, the class action complaint alleged inter alia claims under California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), and Public Utilities Code (for cramming), as well as under the Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §201(b). Utility Consumers’ Action Network v. Sprint Solutions, Inc., ___ F.R.D. ___ (S.D.Cal. June 23, 2009) [Slip Opn., at 1]. Plaintiffs moved the district court to certify the litigation as a class action, _id._, at 1-2. Defense attorneys opposed class action certification, in part on the ground that various states will interpret the relevant contracts differently and have different consumer protection laws such that a nationwide class action would be unworkable. _Id._, at 2. The federal court refused to grant class action treatment to the lawsuit.

In arguing in favor of a nationwide class action, plaintiffs asserted that “California law applies to non-California residents because there is a presumption California law applies absent a showing to the contrary under California choice of law principles, and that California law does not conflict with other state laws. “ Sprint, at 2. Plaintiffs further argued that a nationwide class action was the “superior” means of adjudicating the dispute “because the common issue is the misbilling practices of the Defendants,” id. Defense attorneys countered “that there are individual issues that predominate; that various states will enforce several provisions in the terms and conditions of relevant contracts in various ways; that California statutes cannot be applied to consumers outside of California; and that Plaintiffs’ proposed trial plan is unworkable.” Id. The district court cited well-settled law that the moving party bears the burden of establishing that the requirements for class action treatment have been met, id., at 2-3, and turned immediately to a “rigorous analysis” of whether the class action requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) had been met because the elements of Rule 23(a) “are not seriously in dispute,” id., at 3-4.

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized

T-Mobile Class Action Defense Cases–Smith v. T-Mobile: Ninth Circuit Dismisses Appeal In Labor Law Class Action Holding Settlement Of Individual FLSA Claims Without Opt-In Plaintiffs Rendered Appeal Moot

Settlement of State Labor Law Class Action and Federal Law FLSA Claims by Putative Class Action Plaintiffs, Following Denial of Conditional Certification of FLSA Collective Action and Before any Other Plaintiffs Agreed to Opt-In to Litigation, Rendered Moot Appeal from Denial of Motion for Conditional Certification Despite Effort to Preserve Right to Appeal Ninth Circuit Holds Plaintiffs Mentha Smith and Justin Gossett, former sales representatives of T-Mobile, filed a putative class action against T-Mobile USA purportedly on behalf of 25,000 workers alleging labor law violations; specifically, the class action complaint “alleged that T-Mobile willfully failed to pay its hourly employees for all the hours they worked, forcing employees to work ‘off the clock’ and denying pay for hours worked during breaks.

Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases–Arias v. Superior Court: California Supreme Court Holds Representative Actions Under UCL Must Comply With Class Action Requirements But Labor Law PAGA Representative Claims Need Not Meet Class Action Requirements

Employee Representative Action Under California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) Must Satisfy Class Action Requirements, but Employee Representative Actions Seeking Penalties Under California Labor Code’s Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) Need Not Satisfy Class Action Requirements California Supreme Court Holds

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against his former employer, Angelo Dairy, alleging labor law violations; the class action complaint alleged causes of action for violations of the Labor Code, labor regulations, and an Industrial Welfare Commission wage order, for .breach of contract and “breach of the warranty of habitability on the ground that defendants provided residential units in a defective and dangerous condition,” for violations of California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) “based on defendants’ failures to credit plaintiff for all hours worked, to pay overtime wages, to pay wages when due, to pay wages due upon termination, to provide rest and meal periods, and to obtain written authorization for deducting or offsetting wages.” Arias v. Superior Court, ___ Cal.4th ___, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 588, 2009 WL 1838973, *1 (Cal. June 29, 2009). In addition, the class action complaint sought enforcement under the UCL of penalties provided for in the Labor Code, and alleged under California’s Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), Labor Code § 2698 _et seq._, that “defendants had violated the Labor Code, labor regulations, and an Industrial Welfare Commission wage order by failing to pay all wages due, to provide itemized wage statements, to maintain adequate payroll records, to pay all wages due upon termination, to provide rest and meal periods, to offset proper amounts for employer-provided housing, and to provide necessary tools and equipment.” _Id._ Defense attorneys moved to strike five causes of action in the class action complaint “on the ground that plaintiff failed to comply with the pleading requirements for class actions”; the trial court granted the motion. _Id._ Plaintiff sought a writ of mandate from the Court of Appeal, which held that UCL claims brought in a representative capacity had to satisfy class action requirements, but that representative labor law claims under PAGA need not, _id._ The Supreme Court granted review and held “that an employee who, on behalf of himself and other employees, sues an employer under the [UCL]…for Labor Code violations must satisfy class action requirements, but that those requirements need not be met when an employee’s representative action against an employer is seeking civil penalties under [PAGA].” _Id._

The Supreme Court began in analysis by rejecting plaintiff’s claim that representative actions under the UCL (brought individually and on behalf of others) need not comply with the requirements for class actions. Arias, at *2. After summarizing California’s UCL, including the 2004 amendments thereto, and after noting that California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 does not mention the words “class action,” the Court addressed the issue of whether the UCL, as amended by the voters so as to require that private plaintiffs bringing representative actions comply with Section 382, “imposes a requirement that the action be brought as a class action.” Id. Based on the Supreme Court’s analysis of the statutory language, and recognizing that a “literal construction of an enactment…will not control when such a construction would frustrate the manifest purpose of the enactment as a whole,” id., at *3, the Supreme Court concluded that California voters clearly intended “to impose class action requirements on private plaintiffs’ representative actions” under the UCL, id. The Court therefore held that representative actions under the UCL must comply with class action requirements, id., at *4.

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases–Walker v. Calumet City: Seventh Circuit Reverses Attorney Fee Award To Class Action Plaintiff Holding Dismissal Of Class Action As Moot Did Not Make Plaintiff Prevailing Party

Class Action Plaintiff not Entitled to Attorney Fee Award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 Following District Court Dismissal of Class Action as Moot because Plaintiff was not “Prevailing Party” within the Meaning of Supreme Court Authority Seventh Circuit Holds

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against Calumet City, Illinois, alleging that she suffered damage because the enforcement of a local ordinance interfered with her ability to sell real property that she owned in the City; the class action complaint alleged that “the ordinance violated her right to procedural due process and unreasonably restrained the alienability of her property.” Walker v. Calumet City, Illinois, 565 F.3d 1031, 1032 (7th Cir. 2009). Specifically, the class action complaint challenged the City’s Point of Sale (POS) ordinance, which provides that real property within the city limits “cannot be sold until it is inspected and deemed in compliance with city codes, a fee is paid, and transfer stamps are issued.” Id. In the normal course of events, while the class action complaint was pending, plaintiff’s property was inspected under the City’s Rental Dwelling Inspection (RDI) ordinance, which requires annual inspections of rental properties to ensure compliance with city health, zoning and building codes. Id., at 1033. The inspection of plaintiff’s property revealed “multiple areas…where repair was necessary”; plaintiff completed the required repairs, and the City “pronounced her property compliant with the City’s building and zoning codes.” Id. Defense attorneys then moved to dismiss the class action as moot because, since plaintiff’s property passed the RDI, “an inspection under the POS ordinance to check for the same violations would be redundant.” Id. Over plaintiff’s objection, the district court dismissed the class action as moot based on the City’s representations that it would not enforce the POS ordinance against plaintiff, id., at 1032, 1033. Plaintiff then moved for an award of attorney fees, arguing that she was the “prevailing party” 42 U.S.C. § 1988; defense attorneys countered that the class action had been dismissed as moot “prior to any judicial determination on the merits.” Id., at 1033. The district court agreed with plaintiff and awarded her $189,000 in attorney fees, id. The Seventh Circuit reversed.

The Circuit Court did not find this to be a difficult case because, while the “catalyst rule” for evaluating attorney fee awards had been used in the Seventh Circuit prior to 2001, the Supreme Court rejected that rule in Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001), holding at page 606 that a party was not a prevailing party unless there was a “material alteration in the legal relationship of the parties.” Walker, at 1033-34 (citations omitted). This “alteration” in the relationship of the parties “must arise from a court order.” Id., at 1034 (citation omitted). The Seventh Circuit explained at page 1034, “In Buckhannon, the Supreme Court gave two examples of when a party should be considered prevailing: first, when ‘the plaintiff has received a judgment on the merits’; second, when the plaintiff has ‘obtained a court-ordered consent decree.’ [Citation.] In general, we have stated that ‘[i]t could not be clearer that a voluntary settlement by the defendant … does not entitle a plaintiff to attorneys’ fees.’ [Citation.]”

Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized

Labor Law Class Action Defense Cases–D’Este v. Bayer: Ninth Circuit On Class Action Appeal Certifies Two Questions To California Supreme Court As Central Issues In Numerous Federal Court Class Action Appeals

Summary Judgment in Labor Law Class Action Turned on Issues of First Impression Recurrent in Federal Court Class Action Appeals, Warranting Referral of Questions Underlying Class Action to California Supreme Court for Resolution Ninth Circuit Holds

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against her employer, Bayer Pharmaceuticals, in California state court alleging labor law violations; specifically, the class action complaint asserted that Bayer misclassified pharmaceutical sales representatives (PSRs) as exempt employees, and accordingly failed to pay them overtime or provide them with meal breaks to which they would be entitled as non-exempt employees. D’Este v. Bayer Corp., 565 F.3d 1119, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2009). Defense attorneys removed the class action to federal court, and the district court granted Bayer’s motion for summary judgment “finding that [plaintiff] was exempt under California’s outside sales exemption”’ and based on that finding, the district court did not address whether Bayer also was correct in relying on the “administrative exemption” in its classification of PSRs. Id., at 1122. Plaintiff appealed, id., at 1122. The Ninth Circuit observed that “The question whether PSRs are exempt under California’s outside salesperson and administrative exemptions is the central issue in multiple class action lawsuits in the Ninth Circuit as well as in other circuits.” Id. Accordingly, the Circuit Court – pursuant to Rule 8.548 of the California Rules of Court – certified two questions to the California Supreme Court, id., at 1120.

The Ninth Circuit summarized the relevant facts as follows. Bayer gave plaintiff a list of doctors and hospitals, as well as a list of products, for which she was responsible: “[Plaintiff’s] job was to communicate information about her Bayer products to her roster of doctors and seek their non-binding commitment to write prescriptions for those products. She was also responsible for communicating with hospitals in her territory to influence them to add the Bayer products for which she was responsible to their formularies.” D’Este, at 1121. Plaintiff was “trained on a message” and was required to “adhere closely to the information provided by Bayer about its products”; beyond this, however, “she had the freedom to develop her own strategy for communicating with and influencing doctors.” Id. Additionally, she “had flexibility regarding how she spent her day,” id., at 1122. Specifically, “[Plaintiff] developed her own schedule for meeting with the doctors on her list. She received little or no daily supervision, and saw her manager once every six to eight weeks.” Id. According to the class action complaint, plaintiff regularly worked more than 8 hours per day and more than 40 hours per week, id. For this, she received between $81,000 and $103,000 per year in compensation, id., at 1121. And plaintiff was “not required to keep or maintain set hours.” Id., at 1122.

Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized

CAFA Class Action Defense Cases–Thomas v. Bank of America: Eleventh Circuit Affirms Remand Of Class Action To State Court Holding Evidence Insufficient Of Amount In Controversy Under Class Action Fairness Act

Class Action Improperly Removed to Federal Court under Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) because Defendant Failed to Adequately Establish that the $5 Million Amount in Controversy Requirement Eleventh Circuit Holds Plaintiff filed a class action in Georgia state court against Bank of America and its wholly-owned subsidiary FIA Card Services (collectively “BofA”) alleging insurance fraud, unfair and deceptive acts, bad faith, and violations of the state’s Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); the class action complaint was premised on the allegation that BofA “[sold] a bundled insurance product, known as Credit Protection Plus, to ineligible individuals.

Class Action Court Decisions Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) Removal & Remand Uncategorized

Merck Class Action Defense Cases–In re Vioxx: California Trial Court Denies Class Action Certification Of Putative Class Action Complaint Against Merck Arising From Sale Of Vioxx

Class Action Complaint Alleging Deceptive Marketing Practices in Sale of Vioxx not Entitled to Class Action Treatment because Individual Issues will Predominate over Common Questions of Law or Fact California State Trial Court Holds

Various class action lawsuits against Merck were consolidated in the Los Angeles Superior Court under the title In re Vioxx Consolidated Cases; the class action lawsuits alleged that Merck knew of the cardiovascular dangers associated with Vioxx long before it voluntarily pulled it from the market. In re Vioxx Conxolidated Cases, Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. JCCP4247 (April 30, 2009) [Slip Opn., at 1-2]. The consolidated class action complaint alleged that “Merck’s deceptive marketing practices violate the unfair competition law [(UCL)]…and false advertising law…, constitute deceptive trade practices under the Consumers Legal Remedies Act [(CLRA)]…, and resulted in unjust enrichment.” Id., at 2. Interestingly, the class action “[did] not allege that Vioxx itself harmed anyone or was ineffective, only that consumers lost money in purchasing it because it was more expensive than, but not better than less expensive [alternatives].” Id. Plaintiffs’ lawyers moved the trial court to certify the litigation as a class action; defense attorneys opposed class action treatment, arguing that “individual issues of causation and reliance predominate over any common issues because Merck knew different things about Vioxx at different times and class members, physicians and TPPs [third party payors] were exposed to different representations at different times and were influenced by representations to varying extents.” Id., at 3. Additionally, defense attorneys argued that individual issues will predominate as to economic injury, and that the named representatives’ claims are not typical of the claims of the class. Id. The trial court denied the motion for class action certification.

After summarizing the standards governing class action certification of UCL and CLRA claims, see In re Vioxx, at 3-4, and after readily determining that the numerosity and ascertainability requirements for class action treatment had been met, id., at 5, the trial court turned its attention to the question of typicality – that is, “whether a sufficient relationship exists between the injury to the named plaintiff and the conduct affecting the class.” Id., at 5 (citation omitted). The trial court found that the claims of the individual plaintiffs were not typical of the TPPs based on Merck’s evidence that “the decisionmaking that goes into purchasing Vioxx on an individual basis is entirely distinct from the process of putting it into a group formulary.” Id. The trial court found further that plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of providing “substantial evidence” that common questions of law or fact will predominate over individual issues affecting the various class members. Id., at 6. The court did agree with plaintiffs that Merck engaged in a “uniform marketing scheme that was likely to deceive patients and physicians,” id., at 6-7, and that the information available to physicians was susceptible to common proof, id., at 8, but plaintiffs must additionally prove “damage suffered ‘as a result of’ a deceptive practice,” and this element was not subject to common proof, id., at 8-11. As the trial court explained at page 9, “Under all of plaintiffs’ causes of action, a central issue will be whether defendant’s alleged misrepresentations or nondisclosures were material to those who purchased Vioxx.” This means that plaintiffs will have to prove reliance, id., at 10, and the evidence presented in opposition to the motion for class certification demonstrates that class-wide proof of reliance will not exist. Id., at 10-11. And under the circumstances of this case, the necessary proof of reliance cannot be inferred. Id., at 11-12. Nor are the claims of the TPPs subject to common proof, id., at 11.

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized