Class Action Defense Cases–Peck v. Cingular: Ninth Circuit Reverses Dismissal Of Class Action Holding That Federal Communications Act Did Not Preempt State Law Requiring Disclosure Of Line Item Charges

Class Action Against Wireless Service Provider Challenging Whether Carrier may Pass Business tax through to Customers Without Specifically Disclosing it Service Contract not Preempted by FCA (Federal Communications Act) because State Law did not Seek to Regulate Rates but Rather “Other Terms and Conditions” of Wireless Service Ninth Circuit Holds

Plaintiff filed a class action in Washington state court against his wireless service provider, Cingular, alleging that it improperly passed on to its customers the “business and occupation tax” (B & O Tax) levied by the state; according to the class action complaint, Cingular’s monthly invoices to plaintiff included a $0.31 line item charge identified as “State B & O Surcharge,” which the class action alleged should not have been passed through to customers or, at the very least, should have been disclosed in Cingular’s contract with its customers. Peck v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 535 F.3d 1053, 1054-55 (9th Cir. 2008). The class action sought recover for violation of Washington’s Consumer Protection Act (CPA), breach of contract, and unjust enrichment, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief, id., at 1055. Defense attorneys removed the class action to federal court, id. Defense attorneys then moved to dismiss the class action complaint, alleging that the claims therein were preempted by the Federal Communications Act (FCA), which “prohibits state regulation of telecommunications carriers’ rates.” Id. The district court followed an FCC opinion that the FCA preempted state laws that sought to regulate line item billing for cellular wireless services, and dismissed the class action claims as preempted by the FCA. Id. Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his class action complaint, and the Ninth Circuit reversed. Id., at 1054.

The Ninth Circuit began by observing that “while a state may not regulate a wireless carrier’s rates, it may regulate the ‘other terms and conditions’ of wireless telephone service.” Peck, at 1056. But federal law “leaves its key terms undefined”: “‘It never states what constitutes rate and entry regulation or what comprises other terms and conditions of wireless service.’” Id. (quoting Cellular Telecomms. Indus. Ass’n v. FCC, 168 F.3d 1332, 1336 (D.C. Cir.1999)). The Circuit Court then observed, “When a statute is ambiguous or leaves key terms undefined, a court must defer to the federal agency’s interpretation of the statute, so long as such interpretation is reasonable.” Id. (citation omitted). As noted above, the FCC interpreted the FCA as barring states from regulating “rate structures” and “rate elements,” including line item charges; accordingly, “the FCC [has] concluded state laws that regulate line item charges in wireless bills were pre-empted by the FCA.” Id. The Eleventh Circuit rejected the FCC’s interpretation that rates include line item charges based on its conclusion that federal law “unambiguously preserved the ability of the States to regulate the use of line items in cellular wireless bills,” and vacated the FCC’s order that contained its interpretation of the applicable law. Id. (citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit explained that “as a result of the [Eleventh Circuit’s] vacatur of the Second Report and Order, there is no FCC ruling on the issue of whether ‘rates’ include line item charges.” Id., at 1057.

Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases–Newby v. Enron: Fifth Circuit Partially Partially Affirms District Court Order Denying Law Firm Leave To File New State Law Claims Involving Enron But Reverses As To Claims Governed By Four-Year Limitations Period

Pursuant to District Court Order Enjoining Law Firm from Filing Further Lawsuits Involving Collapse of Enron Absent Leave of Court, District Court Properly Denied Leave to File 24 New Lawsuits in Texas State Court Seeking to Assert 7 New Claims, but only as to those Claims Subject to Two-Year or Three-Year Statutes of Limitation, Requiring Reversal of District Court Order as to Proposed New Claims Subject to Four-Year Limitations Periods Fifth Circuit Hold, but only as to those Claims Subject to Two-Year or Three-Year Statutes of Limitation, Requiring Reversal of District Court Order as to Proposed New Claims Subject to Four-Year Limitations Periods

In 2001, a Houston law firm (Fleming & Associates) filed several individual and class action lawsuits in Texas state courts against Enron, its accounting firm, and various officers; the class action and individual complaints were brought on behalf of shareholders and arose of the collapse of Enron’s stock price. Newby v. Enron Corp., 542 F.3d 463, 2008 WL 4113964, *1 (5th Cir. 2008). Enron filed for bankruptcy protection in December 2001, and “[s]even years later, litigation involving the Enron collapse endures.” Id. The Fleming firm has played a central role in that litigation, and repeatedly has “sought ex parte temporary restraining orders to prevent the defendants from destroying Enron-related documents.” Id. The Circuit Court explained, “Based on the Fleming Firm’s conduct in seeking ex parte orders in state court, on February 15, 2002, the district court issued a memorandum and order enjoining the Fleming Firm from filing any new Enron-related actions without leave of the court (the ‘February 15, 2002, injunction’).” The Fleming Firm challenged this order but the Fifth Circuit affirmed the injunction, holding that district courts have the authority under the All Writs Act to issue “narrowly tailored” injunctions to “enjoin[] repeatedly vexatious litigants from filing future state court actions.” See Newby v. Enron Corp., 302 F.3d 295, 302 (5th Cir. 2002). The Fifth Circuit there explained, “The district court in this case was attempting to rein in a law firm that represents over 750 plaintiffs …. The problem is Fleming’s unjustified and duplicative requests for ex parte temporary restraining orders, without notice to lawyers already across the counsel table from Fleming and engaged in the prosecution and defense of virtually identical claims in federal suits.” 2008 WL 4113964 at *2 (quoting Newby, 302 F.3d at 302). In October 2003, the Fleming Firm sought and obtained leave of court to file two more Enron-related actions in state court. Id., at *2. In July 2003, “the district court issued a scheduling order in the Newby securities class action,” and three years later, in July 2006, the district court granted plaintiffs’ motion to certify the litigation as a class action. Id.

In October 2005, before it obtained class action status in Newby, the Fleming Firm sought leave to file 24 more Enron-related lawsuits in Texas state courts. 2008 WL 4113964 at *2. The lawsuits sought to represent 1200 shareholders and to seek recovery against “several financial institutions and Enron outside officers and directors” under seven theories – “common law fraud and fraud-on-the-market, negligence, statutory fraud, aiding and abetting liability under the Texas Securities Act, civil conspiracy, aiding and abetting common law fraud, and negligent misrepresentation.” Id. The district court denied the motion on the ground that each of the proposed claims were time-barred and that the applicable statutes of limitation had not been tolled. Id. The Fleming Firm appealed, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part.

We do not discuss the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in detail. At bottom, the Circuit Court held that the district court properly denied leave to file suit as to claims subject to two- or there-year statutes of limitation, unless the time period for filing such claims had been tolled, but the district improperly denied leave to file suit as to claims subject to a four-year statute of limitations. 2008 WL 4113964 at *3-*5. The Fleming Firm filed its motion on October 14, 2005: “Given that the Fleming Firm’s clients had notice of their claims on October 17, 2001, the longest statute of limitations at issue here (four years) would have expired on October 17, 2005, unless a tolling doctrine applies.” Id. at *3. The district court had held that even claims subject to a four-year limitations period were time-barred because, under the district court’s local rules, the Fleming Firm could not have filed suit “until twenty days after the Fleming Firm filed the motion, or until November 3, 2005.” Id. The Fifth Circuit disagreed, and held that “it is up to the state court to determine how to proceed” as to those claims. Id., at *5. In sum, the district court improperly denied the motion for leave to file the claims “involving common law fraud and fraud-on-the-market (Count I), statutory fraud (Count III), and aiding and abetting common law fraud (Count VI), because these claims all have a four-year statute of limitations, and the Fleming Firm submitted its motion for leave to file suit before that limitations period expired.” Id.

Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized

ERISA Class Action Defense Cases–White v. Coca-Cola: Eleventh Circuit Affirms Summary Judgment In Favor Of Employer In ERISA Class Action Holding Plan Administrator’s Decision To Reduce Benefits Based On Social Security Benefits Was Reasonable

District Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment in Class Action Alleging Coca-Cola Violated ERISA by Interpreting Plan so as to Permit an Offset Based on Receipt of Social Security Benefits and to Recoup Overpayment of Benefits Eleventh Circuit Holds

Plaintiffs, participants in long term disability plan, filed a class action against their employer, Coca-Cola, in its capacity as sponsor and administrator of a benefits plan alleging violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA); specifically, the class action complaint challenged the plan administrators “reduction of benefits under a long-term-disability plan based on a participant’s receipt of Social Security disability benefits.” White v. Coca-Cola Co., ___ F.3d ___, 2008 WL 4149706, *1 (11th Cir. September 10, 2008). The class action “contest[ed] the plan administrator’s interpretation of both a provision that permits an offset for the receipt of other disability benefits and a provision that allows the plan to recoup overpayments of benefits.” _Id._ The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment; the district court granted the defense motion and entered judgment in favor of Coca-Cola on the class action claims. _Id._ Based on this ruling, the district court denied as moot plaintiffs motion to certify the litigation as a class action. _Id._, at *4. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

We do not here summarize the terms of the plan, other than to note that it “grants the committee exclusive responsibility and discretionary authority ‘to construe the Plan and decide all questions arising under the Plan,’ including the authority ‘to determine the eligibility of Participants to receive benefits and the amount of benefits to which any Participant may be entitled under the Plan.’” White, at *1. We note also that the plan “works with” Social Security benefits received, and provides “for the recoupment of any overpayment of benefits.” Id., at *2. Procedurally, before filing the class action, one of the plaintiffs asked Coca-Cola to reconsider his benefits payments arguing, in part, “that, even if the plan permits the offset of his future benefits to account for his Social Security benefits, the plan and ERISA prohibit the recovery of an overpayment of his past benefits.” Id., at *3. The committee retained outside counsel, who concluded that the plan’s offset provision was ambiguous but that the committee could legally interpret the plan to permit an offset in the manner that it had: accordingly, the committee did not alter its interpretation of the plan. Id.

Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized

Arbitration Class Action Defense Cases–McKee v. AT&T: Washington State Court Holds Class Action Waiver Arbitration Clause Enforceable Affirming Trial Court Order Denying AT&T’s Motion To Compel Arbitration Of Class Action

Class Action Complaint Properly Kept in State Court Rather than Referred to Arbitration because Class Action Waiver Provision in Arbitration Clause Rendered Dispute Resolution Provision of Consumer Service Agreement Unenforceable as Unconscionable Washington State Court Holds

Plaintiff filed a class action against AT&T alleging that it wrongly charged him “city utility surcharges and usurious late fees”; specifically, the class action complaint alleged that plaintiff signed up with AT&T for long distance telephone service, and that his monthly bills “included a Wenatchee city utility tax surcharge, even though he lives outside the Wenatchee city limits.” McKee v. AT&T Corp., ___ P.3d ___ (Wash. August 28, 2008) [Slip Opn., at 1-2]. According to the class action, AT&T assessed taxes based on zip codes, and plaintiff’s zip code included not only people who lived in Wenatchee, but also people who lived outside the city limits. Plaintiff’s class action alleged that AT&T collects taxes from its customers “whether the customers owe the tax or not,” and imposes a late fee of 1.5% if the bill is not paid timely. _Id._, at 2. Defense attorneys removed the class action to federal court on the ground that it raised claims under federal law; plaintiff amended the class action complaint to omit any reference to federal law, and the district court remanded the class action back to state court. _Id._ Defense attorneys then moved to compel arbitration of the dispute pursuant to the dispute resolution provisions of their long distance service contract. _Id._, at 1. The dispute resolution provision required arbitration of all disputes and prohibited class actions; it also provides that claims must be brought within two years, and “limits a consumer’s right to collect punitive damages and attorney fees.” _Id._, at 4. The trial court denied the motion, finding the dispute resolution provision in AT&T’s Consumer Services Agreement to be unconscionable. _Id._, at 1. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed.

The Supreme Court explained that plaintiff “did not sign any agreement with AT&T” when he accepted AT&T as his long distance provider, and that he did not know whether he received a contract in the mail from AT&T. McKee, at 2-3. Defense attorneys submitted declarations that stated plaintiff received a “specific agreement” as part of his “fulfillment package,” and attached the agreement to their declarations, id., at 3. Plaintiff argued that the agreement was unconscionable: “He claimed he had no meaningful choice and the agreement was overly one-sided and harsh because it prohibited class actions, shortened the statute of limitations, prohibited punitive damages and attorney fees, required arbitration be kept secret, and required application of New York law.” Id., at 5. The trial court agreed with plaintiff: he ruled that the dispute resolution provision of the agreement was substantively unconscionable “because of the provisions prohibiting class actions, shortening the statute of limitations, limiting damages, requiring confidentiality, and” Id., at 5. A few months later, defense attorneys moved for reconsideration based on a new declaration that stated prior information provided under oath was in error because “AT&T had amended its agreement ‘in significant ways, including, for example, the removal of the two-year statute of limitations, the ability of the customer to determine whether the proceedings should be confidential, and specifically allowing consumers to obtain statutory relief—including damages and attorney’s fees—through the arbitration process.’” Id., at 6. The trial court denied the motion, and AT&T appealed. Id., at 7.

Arbitration Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases—In re Aqua Dots: Judicial Panel On Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) Grants Defense Motion To Centralize Class Action Litigation In Northern District of Illinois

Judicial Panel Grants Defense Request for Pretrial Coordination of Class Action Lawsuits Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, Unopposed by Class Action Plaintiffs, and Transfers Actions to Northern District of Illinois Seven class actions were filed against defendants Spin Master Ltd. and Spin Master, Inc. in six federal district courts – one in New Jersey and one in Pennsylvania – arising out of the “design and manufacture of Aqua Dots” and/or challenging “the adequacy of the November 2007 voluntary recall of this product.

Class Action Court Decisions Multidistrict Litigation Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases—In re Puerto Rican Cabotage: Judicial Panel On Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) Grants Plaintiff Motion To Centralize Class Action Litigation But Transfers Class Actions To District Of Puerto Rico

Judicial Panel Grants Plaintiff Request for Pretrial Coordination of Class Action Lawsuits Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, Unopposed by Other Class Action Plaintiffs or Defendants, but Rejects Southern District of Florida in Favor of District of Puerto Rico as Appropriate Transferee Court Five class actions – three in the Southern District of Florida, one in the Middle District of Florida and one in the District of Puerto Rico – were filed against Horizon Lines and others alleging “that defendants conspired to fix prices of cabotage services to and from Puerto Rico in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.

Class Action Court Decisions Multidistrict Litigation Uncategorized

Medicare Class Action Defense Cases–Uhm v. Humana: Ninth Circuit Affirms Dismissal Of Class Action Complaint Holding State Law Claims Concerning Medicare Prescription Drug Benefits Fell Within Express Preemption Of Federal Law

Class Action Claims Concerning Medicare Prescription Drug Benefits Fell Within Express Preemption Provision of Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003 so District Court did not Err in Grant Defense Motion to Dismiss Class Action Complaint Ninth Circuit Holds Plaintiffs filed a putative class action complaint against Humana Health Plan, Inc. and Humana, Inc. (collectively “Humana”) concerning medication benefits under Medicare. Uhm v. Humana Inc., ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir.

Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized

CAFA Class Action Defense Cases – Louisiana v. Allstate: Fifth Circuit Holds State’s Parens Patriae Lawsuit Removable To Federal Court Under Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) Based On “Real Parties In Interest” And “Real Nature” Of Action

Antitrust Lawsuit Brought by State on Behalf of Insurance Policyholders as a Parens Patriae Action, not a Class Action, Removable to Federal Court under Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) because “Real Parties in Interest” were Policyholders and “Real Nature” of Lawsuit was “Mass Action” Fifth Circuit Holds

The State of Louisiana filed a parens patriae action (not a class action) against numerous insurance companies, including Allstate, State Farm, Farmers and USAA, alleging violations of the state’s antitrust laws; specifically, the complaint alleged that defendants “worked together to form a ‘combination’ that illegally suppressed competition in the insurance and related industries” and that “[i]n a scheme to thwart policyholder indemnity and in direct violation of their fiduciary duties, insurer defendants and others continuously manipulated Louisiana commerce by rigging the value of policyholder claims and raising the premiums held in trust by their companies for the benefit of policy holders to cover their losses as taught by McKinsey Company. Louisiana ex rel. Caldwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 536 F.3d 418, 421-22 (5th Cir. 2008). Pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), defense attorneys removed the lawsuit to federal court, id., at 422. The defense urged that the law was “in substance” a “class action” or a “mass action” within the meaning of the Class Action Fairness Act because it seeks treble damages on behalf of all Louisiana insurance policyholders. Id., at 423. Louisiana moved the district court to remand the action to state court, arguing that CAFA did not apply because the lawsuit was not a class action. Id., at 422-23. Focusing on who the “real parties in interest” are, the district court denied the motion. As permitted by the Class Action Fairness Act, the Fifth Circuit granted Louisiana permission to appeal the remand order. The central issue on appeal was “whether the ‘person who [was] injured in his business or property’ – in this case the policyholders – are the real parties in interest.” Id., at 430. The Fifth Circuit concluded, “We have no reason to believe that they are not,” id., and affirmed.

We do not here discuss the factual allegations in the State’s complaint. See Allstate, at 422-23. The Fifth Circuit summarized defendants’ arguments as follows: Even though the complaint is styled as a parens patriae action, it is “in substance and in fact” a class action within the meaning of the Class Action Fairness Act. Id., at 423. Defense attorneys argued that the fact Louisiana was not proceeding under Rule 23 was not dispositive; rather, they urged the district court to “look beyond the labels used in the complaint and determine the real nature of Louisiana’s claims,” and they “highlighted that several other similar purported class actions are and/or were pending before the same federal district court, where the same group of lawyers filed, or attempted to file, nearly identical claims as those alleged in this case by the state of Louisiana, as further evidence that this lawsuit is in fact a class action.” Id., at 423 (citations omitted). The Circuit Court explained at page 423 that “the district court was primarily concerned about who the real parties in interest are in this case.” The district court believed that he was obligated to examine the true nature of the lawsuit, explaining that “it’s the Court’s responsibility to not just merely rely on who a plaintiff chose to sue, or, in this case, how the plaintiff chose to plead, but I have to look at the specific substance” of the action. Id. The district court concluded that the State was but a nominal party, and the real parties were the insurance policyholders; accordingly, it concluded that the lawsuit was properly removable under CAFA and denied the motion to remand. Id.

Class Action Court Decisions Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) Removal & Remand Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases–Yabsley v. Cingular: California State Court Affirms Dismissal Of UCL Class Action Holding Administrative Regulation Created Safe Harbor For Class Action’s False Advertising Claims Against Cingular

Class Action Challenging Wireless Phone Company’s Advertisements of Discounted Cell Phone Prices as False for Failing to Disclose that Sales Tax would be Calculated based on the Non-Discounted Price Falls within Safe Harbor Provision of State Administrative Regulation thereby Warranting Dismissal of Class Action Complaint California State Court Holds

Plaintiff filed a class action in California state court against Cingular Wireless alleging violations of the state’s unfair competition law (UCL): According to the class action complaint, Cingular advertises that it will give purchasers a 50% discount off the retail price of a wireless phone they enroll in a calling plan package. California’s Code of Regulations requires that Cingular compute the sales tax on the “non-sale price” of the phone, but does not require that this charge be passed on to the purchaser. Cingular does pass the sales tax on to its customers, but prior to sale does not advise them that the sales tax will be computed based on the full price of the phone. The class action alleged that Cingular engaged in false advertising “by failing to inform the consumer that the tax would be imposed on the full price of the cell phone.” Yabsley v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, ___ Cal.App.4th ___, 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 903 (Cal.App. August 18, 2008) [Slip Opn, at 1]. Defense attorneys demurred to the first amended class action complaint on the ground that the regulations provide a “safe harbor” for the payment of taxes such as the one underlying the class action’s UCL claim; the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. _Id._, at 1-2. The Court of Appeal affirmed.

The class action complaint alleges that Cingular “advertised a cell phone for $149.99, a 50 percent reduction in the phone’s retail price, if the purchaser enrolled in a Cingular wireless calling plan.” Yabsley, at 2. Plaintiff saw the advertisement and purchased the phone and enrolled in the plan: His sales receipt, however, disclosed that he had been taxed on the phone’s regular price of $299.99, rather than its discounted price, resulting in $11.62 more in sales tax. Id. Plaintiff filed his class action complaint against Cingular and the State Board of Equalization “asserting that Regulation 1585, governing taxation of sales of wireless communication devices, was invalid because it conflicted with Revenue and Taxation Code section 6051 imposing a sales tax on gross receipts.” Id. Plaintiff’s first amended class action complaint also named the Board and Cingular as defendants, but plaintiff dismissed the Board that same day. Id. The class action alleged that Cingular’s advertisements were deceptive because they “fail[ed] to apprise prospective customers that sales tax would be charged on the undiscounted price of the cell phone.” Id. Defense attorneys demurred, arguing that the safe harbor provided by Regulation 1585 (see Note) immunized Cingular against such claims: “This regulation requires that sales tax on a ‘bundled’ cell phone sale, i.e., a cell phone purchased with a call plan, be calculated based on the phone’s higher, unbundled price.” Id., at 3. The trial court agreed and dismissed the class action. Id.

Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases–Owner-Operator v. Landstar: Eleventh Circuit Reverses Judgment In Favor Of Defense But Affirms Decertification Of Class Action Status

District Court Certified Class Action but Subsequently Decertified Class Action as to Damages because of “Unique and Individualized Proof” Required by Class Action Allegations Eleventh Circuit Holds

The Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association, which “represents truck owners and truck drivers who enter into lease agreements to provide equipment and services to haul freight in interstate commerce for Landstar System,” a U.S. Department of Transportation-approved motor carrier, filed a class action complaint against Landstar and others alleging defendants violated the federal Truth in Leasing regulations; specifically, the class action alleged that defendants “fail[ed] to disclose in their lease agreements that banking fee charges would be deducted from compensation paid to the truck owners and drivers” and “fail[ed] to provide documentation regarding the computation of charge-back items including pricing information submitted by Qualcomm.” Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Assn., Inc. v. Landstar System, Inc.., ___ F.3d ___, 2008 WL 4058042, *1 (11th Cir. 2008). The class action “sought damages and equitable relief, including restitution, disgorgement of Landstar’s profits, and injunctive relief.” _Id._, at *2. Defense attorneys moved to the complaint on the ground that the two-year statute of limitations had run the class action claims; the district court denied the motion, ruling that a four-year limitations period applied. _Id._, at *3. Eventually, the district court granted plaintiff’s motion to certify the litigation as a class action, _id._ The court noted, however, that “not all aspects of this case present common issues” and specifically stated that “if these common questions are resolved in favor of the putative class, the issue of damages will be unique and subject to individualized proof.” _Id._ The parties waved their right to a jury trial, _id._, and the district court ruled that “[the] only claims remaining in this action are those regarding injunctive relief, damages sustained, and attorney’s fees,” _id._, at *4. On the first day of trial, the district court granted defendant’s motion to decertify the class as to damages, explaining that “issues regarding damages sustained by individual members of the Class would require unique and individualized proof.” _Id._, at *4. However, the class action was not decertified with respect to the complaint’s prayer for injunctive relief. _Id._ Ultimately, the district court entered judgment in favor of Landstar on the issue of damages, and entered judgment as a matter of law in favor of Landstar. _Id._, at *5-*6. Plaintiff appealed seven of the district court’s rulings, _id._, at *6; defense attorneys filed a cross-appeal. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part.

We do not discuss the specific factual allegations leveled against Landstar. See Landstar, at *1-*3. For our purposes, the Circuit Court’s discussion of the class action certification issues is paramount. In this regard, based on its ruling that plaintiff had to prove actual damages, the district court decertified the class action. Id., at *16. The district court reasoned that “decertification is appropriate because the determination of the remaining issue of damages in this case on a class-wide basis is unfeasible, unmanageable, and would not be superior to individual actions.” Id. The Eleventh Circuit noted that there are “‘extreme cases in which computation of each individual’s damages will be so complex, fact-specific, and difficult that the burden on the court system would be simply intolerable…but we emphasize that such cases rarely, if ever, come along.’” Id. (citation omitted). The Circuit Court concluded that plaintiff “failed to establish that actual damages can be easily calculated for all class members, [so] the District Court did not abuse its discretion in decertifying the class for actual damages.” Id., at *17.

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized