ERISA Class Action Defense Cases–Nauman v. Abbott Laboratories: Illinois Federal Court Denies Defense Motion For Summary Judgment On ERISA Class Action Complaint Holding Conduct “As A Whole” Warranted Trial

Defense Summary Judgment in ERISA Class Action Complaint Erroneously Attacked Class Action Claims as Separate and Distinct, but when Defendants’ Conduct was Considered as a Whole, Genuine Issues of Material Fact Existed Sufficient to Defeat Summary Judgment Illinois Federal Holds

Plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit against their former employer, Abbott Laboratories, and their new employer, Hospira, a newly-created corporate entity, after Abbott spun off its Hospital Products Division (HPD) to Hospira. The class action complaint alleged that the manner in which defendants spun off HPD violated sections 510 and 404 of ERISA. Nauman v. Abbott Labs., ___ F.Supp.2d ___ (N.D.Ill. July 10, 2008) [Slip Opn., at 1]. The four-count class action alleged that, in order to save money associated with the costs of its pension and retiree medical benefits plans for older workers, (1) Abbott terminated HPD employees with the specific intent of denying them retirement benefits, (2) as part of that scheme, Abbott refused to rehire employees transferred to Hospira within two years of the transfer, (3) as part of that scheme, Hospira refused to hire Abbott employees who retired and collected benefits from Abbott, and (4) Abbott breached fiduciary duties owed under § 404 “by making deliberate misrepresentations about the benefits that post-spin-off employees could expect at Hospira.” _Id._, at 1-2. Defense attorneys moved for summary judgment on the class action claims on the grounds that Abbott argued that it had legitimate business reasons for spinning off HPD. _Id._, at 2, 16. The district court held that while the claims may be subject to attack if viewed individually, when the course of conduct are viewed as whole the class action adequately presented genuine issues of material fact as to whether defendants acted with a specific intent to deny benefits to retirees in violation of ERISA.

After providing a lengthy discussion of the material facts, see Nauman, at 5-12, and the legal standard governing § 510 claims under ERISA, see id., at 12-15, and § 404 claims under ERISA, see id., at 16, the district court turned to the merits of the defense motion. The federal court admitted that by “dissecting” the claims in the class action and “examining each in isolation,” the summary judgment motions were “generally persuasive” and “convincing[],” id., at 16. But the district court explained that the motions were “premised on the assumption that the several counts of plaintiffs’ complaint arise out of independent and unrelated events,” id., at 17. The defense motions thus overlook the thrust of the class action – viz., “that the termination alleged in Count I, coupled with the policies challenged in Counts II and III, constitute a ‘scheme’ that Abbott conceived, and that the defendants jointly adopted, with the specific intent of avoiding the payment of projected benefits.” Id., at 18. The court considered defendants’ conduct “as a whole,” id., at 20, and concluded that genuine issues of material fact existed sufficient to warrant a trial on the § 510 class action claims, id., at 21-22.

Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases—In re Packaged Ice: Judicial Panel On Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) Grants Plaintiffs’ Motions To Centralize Class Action Litigation And Selects Eastern District of Michigan As Transferee Court

Judicial Panel Grants Plaintiffs’ Requests for Pretrial Coordination of Class Action Lawsuits Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, Unopposed by other Class Action Plaintiffs and Unopposed by any Class Action Defendants, but Among Various Options Selects Eastern District of Michigan as Transferee Court Thirty-seven (37) class actions – twelve actions in the Eastern District of Michigan, ten actions in the District of Minnesota, seven actions in the Northern District of Texas, four actions in the Northern District of Ohio, and one action each in the Northern District of California, the Southern District of California, the District of Kansas and the Southern District of Ohio – were filed against various defendants, including Reddy Ice Holdings, Reddy Ice, Arctic Glacier Income Fund, Arctic Glacier, Inc.

Class Action Court Decisions Multidistrict Litigation Uncategorized

Labor Law Class Action Defense Cases–Brinker v. Superior Court: California Appellate Court Reverses Trial Court Order Certifying Labor Law Class Action Holding Employers Need Not “Ensure” Employees Take Meal And Rest Breaks

Trial Court Erred in Granting Class Action Treatment to Complaint Alleging Labor Law Violations because Employer need only “Provide” Meal and Rest Periods to Employees but need not “Ensure” that Meal and Rest Breaks are Taken California State Court Holds

Plaintiffs filed a class action in California state court against Brinker Restaurant, Brinker International and Brinker International Payroll alleging labor law violations; specifically, the class action complaint alleged that Brinker failed to provide its employees with meal and rest breaks. Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court, _\_Cal.App.4th __ (Cal.App. July 22, 2008) [Slip Opn., at 3]. Plaintiffs moved the trial court to certify the litigation as a class action, and the court granted the motion. Id. The central issue in the class action was whether an employer must ensure that employees take meal and rest breaks in order to comply with California law, or whether it is sufficient to make available meal and rest breaks; the Court of Appeal held that an employer is not responsible for ensuring that employees take meal and rest breaks to which they are entitled. Id., at 3-4. Accordingly, the appellate court granted defendants’ petition for writ of mandate and reversed the trial court’s class action certification order.

Defendants have a written policy, on a form signed by each employee, that sets forth the statutory meal and rest periods and acknowledging that the employee may be disciplined or terminated for failing to take those breaks. Brinker, at 5. Employees also are required to clock in and out so that defendants may maintain accurate records for payroll purposes, id., at 5-6. Plaintiffs’ class action complaint alleged that defendants failed to provide meal and rest breaks, id., at 7-8. The class action alleged further that defendants required employees to take “early lunches” and then required that they work upwards of 9 hours without any additional meal period, id., at 8. Finally, the class action alleged that defendants required employees to work “off the clock,” id., at 8-9. Plaintiffs argued that employers “must ‘ensure’ that the employee takes meal periods,” id., at 9. The trial court an employer must give employees a meal break “before [an] employee’s work period exceeds five hours,” and that the purpose of the statute is “to provide employees with break periods and meal periods toward the middle of an employee[‘]s work period in order to break up that employee’s ‘shift.’” Id., at 10.

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized

T-Mobile Class Action Defense Cases–Zaldivar v. T-Mobile: Washington Federal Court Denies Defense Motion to Dismiss Class Action Finding Class Action Complaint Adequately Pleaded Claims For Relief

Class Action Complaint Adequately Pleaded Claims Against T-Mobile because Claims were not Premised on Fraud, so Rule 9(b) did not Apply, and because Claims Sufficiently Pleaded Breach of Contract, Unjust Enrichment and Violation of Consumer Protection Act Washington Federal Court Holds Plaintiff filed a class action complaint T-Mobile USA alleging unfair business practices in connection with cellular telephone text messaging; specifically, the class action alleged that “T-Mobile charges customers for the receipt of unsolicited text messages, and does not adequately disclose the practice in its contract with customers.

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized

TILA Class Action Defense Cases–Megitt v. IndyMac: Massachusetts Federal Court Dismisses Class Action Holding Technical Deficiencies In TILA 3-Day Notice Of Right To Cancel Underlying Class Action Claims Were Not Actionable

Defense Motion to Dismiss Truth in Lending Act (TILA) Class Action Granted because Failure to Specify Date by which Right to Cancel must be Exercised was merely a Technical TILA Violation and, Viewed Objectively, a Reasonably Alert Borrower would have Understood her Rights Massachusetts Federal Holds

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against IndyMac for violations of the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA); the class action complaint alleged that IndyMac failed to provide the requisite notice of a borrower’s three-day right to cancel because the disclosure “[left] blank the specific date by which the notice of cancellation had to be sent.” Megitt v. IndyMac Bank, F.S.B., 547 F.Supp.2d 56, 56 (D.Mass. 2008). More specifically, the class action complaint revealed that IndyMac provided plaintiffs with a Notice of Right to Cancel, which stated in part that the borrower had “a legal right under federal law to cancel this transaction, without cost, within three (3) business days from whichever of the following events occurs last: (1) the date of the transaction, which is: June 16, 2006; or (2) the date you received your Truth in Lending disclosures; or (3) the date you received this notice of your right to cancel.” Id., at 57-58. However, the class action further alleged that IndyMac’s notices provided, “If you cancel by mail or telegram, you must send notice no later than midnight of, ______, (or midnight of the third business day following the latest of the three events listed above).” Id., at 58. Thus, the notices from IndyMac left the date blank, id. Defense attorneys moved to dismiss the class action: The chief magistrate issued and report and recommendation that the motion to dismiss should be granted, relying in part on Palmer v. Champion Mortgage, 465 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2006), and the district court adopted the recommendation. Id., at 57. The federal court explained at page 57, “The import of the First Circuit’s Palmer decision with regard to the purely technical omission in the document embodying the notice makes the ruling here compelling and inevitable.” Accordingly, the court dismissed the class action.

Defense attorneys argued that, under the First Circuit’s decision in Palmer, the “technical” deficiency underlying the class action is not actionable under TILA, Regulation Z or Massachusetts state law. Megitt, at 58. Palmer, from which the district court quoted at length, essentially holds that if a lender’s 3-day notice of a borrower’s right to cancel tracks the model form for such disclosures is “at the very least, prima facie evidence of the adequacy of the disclosure.” Id., at 59 (quoting Palmer, at 29). As the district court noted, “The court went so far as to recognize that there was both statutory and case law support for the proposition that adherence to a model form bars a TILA non-disclosure claim entirely” but “it left ‘for another day the question of whether such adherence invariably brings a creditor within a safe harbor.’” Id. n.2 (citations omitted). Palmer also explained that courts should rely on “the text of the disclosures themselves rather than on plaintiffs’ descriptions of their subjective understandings,” and base their decisions on objectively reasonable factors rather than the plaintiff’s subjective understanding, id., at 59 (citations omitted).

Class Action Court Decisions RESPA/TILA Class Actions Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Issues–Silvercreek v. Bank of America: Fifth Circuit Affirms Order Denying Leave To Extend Time To Opt Out Of Class Action Settlement Against BofA Because Notice Of Class Action Settlement Properly Served On Party

Class Member Failed to Timely Opt Out of Class Action Settlement, and District Court did not Err in Refusing to Extend Opt-Out Deadline because Party Received Notices of Class Action Settlement and Evidence did not Establish Excusable Neglect in Failing to Timely Opt Out Fifth Circuit Holds Two class action lawsuits were filed against Bank of America and Banc of America Securities (collectively BofA) based on the collapse of Enron; each class action was consolidated with In re Enron Corp.

Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized

FACTA Class Action Defense Cases—In re Make-Up Art Cosmetics: Judicial Panel On Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) Grants Defense Motion To Centralize Class Action Litigation In Central District of California

Judicial Panel Grants Defense Request for Pretrial Coordination of Class Action Lawsuits Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, Rejects Transferee Court Proposed by Class Action Plaintiffs, and Transfers Class Actions to Central District of California Three class actions – two in California and one in Illinois – were filed against Make-Up-Art Cosmetics (MAC) alleging violations of the federal Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA); specifically, the class action complaints alleged that MAC printed “certain credit and debit card information on customer receipts” in violation of FACTA.

Class Action Court Decisions FCRA Class Actions Multidistrict Litigation Uncategorized

Dell FLSA Class Action Defense Cases–Norman v. Dell: Oregon Federal Court Certifies FLSA Class Action Against Dell But Denies Without Prejudice Request To Certify Class Action Of State Law Claims

Class Action Complaint Alleging Violations of Federal Fair Standards Labor Act (FLSA) and of Oregon State Labor Laws Conditionally Certified as a Class Action as to FLSA Claims but Denied Without Prejudice as to State Law Claims Oregon Federal Court Holds

Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint against Dell Inc. and other defendants alleging violations of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Oregon’s state labor laws; the class action alleged that plaintiffs are “consumer sales representatives” (CSRs) who sell Dell computers via telephone, and that Dell (1) misclassified CSRs as exempt from overtime pay, failed to properly pay incentive compensation, and required CSRs to work “off the clock.” Norman v. Dell Inc., ___ F.R.D.___ (D.Or. July 14, 2008) [Slip Opn., at 1, 3]. Plaintiffs’ lawyer moved the district court to certify the litigation as a class action, _id._, at 1; specifically, plaintiffs sought an order conditionally certifying the class action complaint’s FLSA claims, and an order certifying under state law a class action of the complaint’s state labor law claims, _id._, at 2. Defense attorneys opposed any class action treatment. _Id._, at 1. The district court granted the motion with respect to the FLSA claims, but denied the motion without prejudice as to the state law claims pending expiration of the opt-in period for the federal claims and briefing as to the impact on the opt-in response on certification of the state class action claims. _Id._, at 2.

The federal court addressed first the request for certification of the FLSA claims. After noting that federal law does not define “similarly situated” under the FLSA, the court utilized the two-tier approach followed by most federal courts. Norman, at 2-3. The first step considers whether, “based on the pleadings and affidavits submitted by the parties,” notice should be given to the putative class, and employs a “fairly lenient standard” that, in the court’s opinion, usually results in class certification. Id., at 2. The second step involves a motion by defense attorneys to decertify the class action following completion of discovery, id., at 3. At the first stage, however, courts look only to whether there are “substantial allegations that the putative class members were subject to a single illegal policy, plan or decision,” but plaintiffs may not rely solely on the allegations in their class action complaint. Id. Under that standard, the district court concluded that plaintiffs adequately established that Dell policies and practices with respect to compensation of the putative class members is essentially uniform, id.

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized

FCRA Class Action Defense Cases–Cavin v. Home Loan Center: Seventh Circuit Affirms Summary Judgment In Favor Of Defense In FCRA Class Action Holding Letters Sent To Class Action Plaintiffs Constituted Firm Offers Of Credit

District Court Properly Granted Defense Motion for Summary Judgment in Class Action Alleging Violations of Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) because Mailer need not Contain Every Material Loan Term and because Offer may be Conditioned on Additional Information such as Verification of Employment and Income Seventh Circuit Holds

Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint against Home Loan Center, doing business as HomeLoanCenter.com, alleging violations of the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA); specifically, the class action alleged that Home Loan Center sent them a mailer for a “SmartLoan mortgage program” but that the mailer was not a “firm offer of credit” and therefore violated the FCRA. Cavin v. Home Loan Center, Inc., ___ F.3d ___ (7th Cir. July 2, 2008) [Slip Opn., at 1]. The letters referenced in the class action were sent “to thousands of Illinois residents” and stated that the recipient had been “pre-approved to receive HomeLoanCenter.com’s exclusive SmartLoan program.” _Id._, at 2. The mailers contained a box with the figures of 1.00%/4.27%, adjacent to two columns that listed various monthly payments for various loan amounts. _Id._ The letters stated that no fees would be charged to get the loan process started, and that defendant could “prequalify [the recipient] right over the phone in minutes and provide [the recipient] with a customized loan program that suits [the recipient’s] needs.” _Id._ The letter also provided, “This offer may not be extended if, after responding to this offer you do not meet the criteria used in the selection process. Further, HomeLoanCenter.com will verify income and employment, review credit, and analyze debt and your equity position in the subject property prior to final loan approval.” _Id._, at 2-3. The mailers stated that not all applicants would be approved and reiterated that terms and conditions applied to the offer, _id._, at 3. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment; the district court agreed with defense attorneys that the mailers did not violate the FCRA and accordingly entered judgment in favor of defendant. _Id._, at 1-2. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

The FCRA permits a finance company to obtain an individual’s credit report, but “the company needs to obtain it with the intent of extending a firm offer of credit to the potential customer.” Cavin, at 4 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(c)(1)(B)(I)). Under the FCRA, a “firm offer of credit” is “any offer of credit or insurance to a consumer that will be honored if the consumer is determined, based on information in a consumer report on the consumer, to meet the specific criteria used to select the consumer for the offer except that the offer may be further conditioned…” 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(l). In this case, class action plaintiffs argued that defendant accessed their credit information “without a permissible purpose” because the mailers sent to them and other members of the putative class did not constitute a firm offer of credit within the meaning of the FCRA. Id., at 3-4. Specifically, plaintiffs argued that material terms of the loan program were not disclosed and/or were not adequately explained, id., at 5. The Seventh Circuit disagreed, explaining at page 5, “The mailer identified the basis for calculating interest, the length of the loan, the possibility of a rate change after thirty days, the minimum payment option with accompanying deferred interest, and the information needed to obtain the loan.” That is all that was required because the FCRA does not require the initial communication “‘contain all of the important terms that must be agreed on before credit is extended.’” Id., at 5 (citation omitted). On the contrary, requiring a financial institution to disclose all material terms would result in the mailer being more difficult for the consumer to understand. Id., at 5-6 (citation omitted). The Circuit Court explained that “the proper inquiry in ascertaining whether a letter is a firm offer is whether the offer will be honored, not whether all of the material terms are listed.” Id., at 6.

Class Action Court Decisions FCRA Class Actions Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases–Otsuka v. Polo Ralph Lauren: California Federal Court Certifies Class Action Against Polo Ralph Lauren Holding Rule 23 Requirements For Labor Law Class Action Had Been Satisfied

Complaint Alleging Labor Law Violations Granted Class Action Status because Overriding Issues Involved Company Policies and Practices and Class Action Treatment was Superior to Other Means of Resolving Disputes California Federal Court Holds

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action complaint in California state court against their former employer, Polo Ralph Lauren, alleging labor law violations; specifically, the class action complaint alleged that in the 28 stores operated by defendants in California, defendants failed to provide rest breaks or pay for off-the-clock time, failed to pay overtime by misclassifying employees as commissions salespeople exempt from such pay, and improperly reduced earnings on future commissions if salespeople failed to meet certain sales requirements. Otsuka v. Polo Ralph Lauren Corp., 251F.R.D. 439 (N.D.Cal. 2008) [Slip Opn., at 1-2]. The complaint identified not only a main class, but two subclasses – one for misclassification and one for arrearages. The class action alleged further that defendants’ California stores used a single employee handbook, and that “defendants’ policies and practices are standardized throughout California in both retail and outlet stores.” Id., at 2. Defense attorneys removed the class action to federal court, id., at 1-2. Plaintiffs moved the district court to certify the litigation as a class action, id., at 1. Defense attorneys “vigorously” objected to class action treatment, id., at 5. The federal court granted the motion, concluding that “defendants’ arguments primarily dispute the merits of plaintiffs’ claims and raise questions of act that will not be resolved at this juncture,” id.

With respect to numerosity, the main class identified in the class action complaint encompassed more than 5,000 employees; the subclasses, however, consisted of 49 members and 69 members, respectively. Otsuka, at 5. Defendants argued these subclasses failed to satisfy the numerosity requirement, id. The federal court disagreed, noting that under Ninth Circuit authority class actions with “as few as 39 members may be sufficiently numerous under the right circumstances.” Id., at 5-6 (citation omitted). Similarly, the district court found that commonality clearly existed as to the main class identified in the class action complaint, id., at 6, and it rejected defense challenge to the subclasses because it attacked the merits but failed to demonstrate that common questions existed within the subclasses, id., at 6-7. With respect to typicality, defense attorneys argued that the claims on the named plaintiffs were not typical with respect to the misclassification subclass because after the lawsuit had been filed defendants performed a reconciliation and compensated them for overtime not previously paid. Id., at 7-8. The court found that this did not render them unqualified to serve as typical class representatives because (1) they may establish that they are entitled to additional overtime pay, and (2) their claims that defendants acted unlawfully by failing to perform annual reconciliations. Id., at 8. With respect to adequacy of representation, the district court rejected the technical objection made by defendants to one of the named representatives, id., at 8-9. Thus, the federal court found that the Rule 23(a) requirements for class action treatment had been met.

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized