FLSA Class Action Defense Cases-Parker v. Rowland: Minnesota District Court Adopts Eleventh Circuit Holding That Conditional Class Action Certification Of FLSA Class Action Requires Proof That Other Class Members Want To Opt In

As Matter of First Impression in Eighth Circuit, Plaintiff in FLSA Class Action must Establish that Other “Similarly Situated” Putative Class Members Desire to “Opt In” to the Lawsuit as a Prerequisite to Conditional Class Certification Minnesota District Court Holds

Two former truck drivers filed suit against regional package delivery company Rowland Express for violations of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) and Minnesota and Iowa state law, alleging that Rowland improperly classified its drivers as independent contractors instead of employees, thereby denying them overtime pay. Parker v. Rowland Express, Inc., 492 F.Supp.2d 1159, 1162-63 and n.1 (D.Minn. 2007). Plaintiffs filed a motion requesting that the court conditionally certify a class action under FLSA (technically a “collective action”) so that other Rowland employees may be provided an opportunity to “opt in” to the putative class action. Id., at 1162. Defense attorneys opposed class action treatment, arguing Eleventh Circuit precedent that conditional class certification requires a showing that other class members desire to “opt in” to the lawsuit. The district court denied the motion, holding as a matter of first impression in the Eighth Circuit that conditional class action certification and notice to putative class members is not warranted absent evidence that other similarly situated class members wish to join the action.

The class action complaint alleged that Rowland previously classified its drivers as “employees” and paid them overtime, but that after it became affiliated with DHL it changed the classification of its drivers to “independent contractors” and ceased paying overtime. Parker, at 1162-63. After conducting limited discovery, plaintiffs moved for an order conditionally certifying a FLSA class action on the grounds that plaintiffs “are ‘informed and believe’ that other drivers worked in excess of 40 hours per week and did not receive overtime compensation.” Id., at 1163. Defense attorneys opposed class action treatment, arguing in part that plaintiffs “failed to show that other ‘similarly situated’ individuals desire to opt in to this litigation,” id.

After discussing FLSA class actions and the FLSA’s requirement that the other employees be “similarly situated” to the plaintiffs but failure to define that term, see Parker, at 1163-64, the district court described the two-stage process generally followed in determining whether the plaintiffs are “similarly situated” to other putative class members: the first stage, known as the “notice stage,” involves a preliminarily determination “usually based only on the pleadings and any affidavits which have been submitted” as to whether notice of the class action should be provided in order to give putative class members an opportunity to “opt in”; the second stage involves a more in-depth analysis by the court into whether the plaintiffs are in fact similarly situated to the putative class, id., at 1164. At the first stage, the plaintiffs’ burden “is not onerous” but neither is it “invisible,” id.

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized

Circuit City Class Action Defense Case-Gentry v. Superior Court: California Supreme Court Invalidates Class Action Waiver In Arbitration Clause As Against Public Policy And Concludes Arbitration Clause Procedurally Unconscionable Despite Right To Opt Out

Class Action Lawsuits are More Effective in Redressing Employee Labor Law Claims thus Rendering Class Action Waiver in Arbitration Clause Unenforceable, and Arbitration Clause was Procedurally Unconscionable Despite 30-Day Window to Opt Out of Entirely Voluntary Dispute Resolution Program California Supreme Court Holds

Plaintiff filed a putative class action in California state court against Circuit City alleging violations of the state’s unfair and deceptive business practices statutes and labor code arising out of its misclassifying employees as exempt in order to deny them overtime pay. Gentry v. Superior Court, ___ Cal.4th ___, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 773, Slip Opn., at 2-3 (Cal. August 30, 2007). Defense attorneys moved to dismiss the class action and compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause with a class action waiver. The trial court found the arbitration clause and the class action waiver to be fully enforceable, and granted the defense motion. The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court’s reasoning, but the California Supreme Court reversed.

At the time Circuit City hired plaintiff, he was provided with written materials that included the company’s “Dispute Resolution Rules and Procedures”; the program gave employees “various options, including arbitration, for resolving employment-related disputes” and provided that if the employee elected arbitration – a choice that was subject to a class action arbitration waiver – then the company could compel the employee to dismiss any civil action in favor of arbitration. Gentry, at 3. As the Supreme Court explained, “The packet included a form that gave the employee 30 days to opt out of the arbitration agreement. [Plaintiff] Gentry did not do so.” Id. Both the trial court and the appellate court were influenced by the fact that plaintiff failed to opt out of the arbitration program within the 30-day window, despite the fact that there would have been no adverse employment ramifications had he done so. Id., at 3-4. The Supreme Court, however, disagreed.

In a strangely vague and sharply split opinion, the Supreme Court held that class action arbitration waiver provisions in overtime cases “may be contrary to public policy,” Gentry, at 5 (italics added). But despite all of its hedging, the Court seems to be clear that anything short of an attorney-supervised waiver would not withstand scrutiny, explaining at page 12:

Arbitration Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized

FLSA Class Action Defense Cases-In re Tyson Foods: Judicial Panel On Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) Grants Defense Motion To Centralize Class Action Litigation But Selects Middle District Of Georgia As Transferee Court

Judicial Panel Grants Defense Request, Opposed by Virtually All Plaintiffs, for Pretrial Coordination of Class Action Lawsuits Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 but Rejects Defense Request to Transfer Class Actions to Alabama Eighteen (18) putative class action lawsuits were filed in ten federal courts against Tyson Foods, Tyson Chicken and Tyson Farms (collectively “Tyson”) alleging, inter alia, violations of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act Litigation (FLSA). In re Tyson Foods, Inc.

Class Action Court Decisions Multidistrict Litigation Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases-In re Household Goods: Judicial Panel On Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) Grants Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion To Centralize Class Action Litigation In District of South Carolina

Judicial Panel Grants Request, Unopposed by Defense, for Pretrial Coordination of Class Action Lawsuits Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 and Concurs with Request to Transfer Class Actions to District of South Carolina Antitrust class action lawsuits were filed in Illinois and South Carolina against various moving companies for violation of the Sherman Act arising from the allegation that defendants entered into an agreement concerning the method for calculating fuel surcharges.

Class Action Court Decisions Multidistrict Litigation Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases-CE Design v. Mortgage Exchange: Illinois Court Grants Defense Motion To Dismiss Appeal From Refusal To Certify Class Action For Lack Of Jurisdiction

Motion for Reconsideration of Denial of Class Action did not Toll Statutory Time Period for Appealing Court Order Appellate Court Holds Plaintiffs filed a putative class action in Illinois state court against The Mortgage Exchange alleging violations of the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA), which makes it unlawful to send unsolicited advertisements via facsimile, and the state’s Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, which prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.

Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized

PSLRA Class Action Defense Cases-Central Laborers’ v. Integrated Electrical: Fifth Circuit Holds Class Action Complaint Failed To Adequately Plead Scienter Under PSLRA And Leave To Amend Class Action Complaint Properly Denied

District Court Properly Concluded that Securities Fraud Allegations in Class Action Complaint did not Satisfy Heightened Pleading Requirements of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) and that Amendment of Class Action Complaint would have been Futile Fifth Circuit Holds

Plaintiff, a pension fund, filed a putative class action against Integrated Electrical and certain officers alleging violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) & 78t(a), and Rule 10b-5 based on “a number of false or misleading statements by IES regarding the company’s financial condition caused an artificial inflation in the market price of IES’s securities during the class period.” Central Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Integrated Electrical Services Inc., 497 F.3d 546, 2007 WL 2367776, *1 (5th Cir. 2007). Defense attorneys moved to dismiss the class action on the ground that it failed to plead scienter with the requisite specificity under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), id. The district court agreed that the complaint failed to meet the PSLRA’s heightened pleading standards and dismissed the class action; in so ruling, the court implicitly denied plaintiff’s request for leave to file an amended class action complaint. Id. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the PSLRA compelled dismissal of the class action complaint and that the district did not abuse its discretion in concluding that further amendment of the class action complaint would have been futile.

Integrated Electrical is a publicly-traded company that provides electrical contracting services throughout the country. Central Laborers’, at *1. Beginning in April 2003, the company “expressed confidence” in its financial status, but in August 2004 it “publicly disclosed that it could not release its quarterly earnings numbers on time due to an ongoing evaluation of certain projects.” Id. Ultimately, the company restated its financial statements for fiscal years 2002 through the first half of 2004, id. In the Fifth Circuit, “‘[t]o state a claim under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must allege, in connection with the purchase or sale of securities[:] (1) a misstatement or an omission (2) of material fact (3) made with scienter (4) on which plaintiff relied (5) that proximately [injured him].’” Id., at *2 (quoting Fin. Acquisition Partners LP v. Blackwell, 440 F.3d 278, 286 (5th Cir. 2006)). The PSLRA requires that securities fraud must be pleaded with particularity, and alleged violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 require proof that the defendant acted either with intent or with “severe recklessness.” Id., at *2. And appellate review of a district court order refusing leave to amend is governed by an abuse of discretion standard, id., at *3.

Class Action Court Decisions PSLRA/SLUSA Class Actions Uncategorized

FACTA Class Action Defense Cases-Arcilla v. Adidas: California Federal Court Rejects Defense Challenge To Constitutionality Of FACTA And Permits Class Action To Proceed Past Pleading Stage

Whether FACTA Class Action Violates Due Process Because Statutory Damages are Grossly Disproportionate to Actual Harm Suffered must be Challenged by Defense at Motion to Certify Class Action Rather than by Defense Motion to Dismiss California Federal Court Holds

Plaintiff filed a class action in California federal court against Adidas alleging violations of the federal Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) for failing to remove credit card expiration dates from receipts given customers following credit card purchases. Arcilla v. Adidas Promotional Retail Operations, Inc., 488 F.Supp.2d 965, 967-68 (C.D. Cal. 2007). Defense attorneys moved to dismiss the class action complaint or to strike the prayer for punitive damages, id., at 968. The district court rejected the defense challenges to the class action complaint.

FACTA is part of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), and provides in part, “[N]o person that accepts credit cards or debit cards for the transaction of business shall print more than the last 5 digits of the card number or the expiration date upon any receipt provided to the cardholder at the point of the sale or transaction.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g). The statute became effective December 4, 2006, and since that time literally hundreds of putative class action complaints have been filed alleging violations of FACTA; indeed, the district court noted that the putative class action before it was “one of as many as 70” FACTA class action lawsuits filed in the Ninth Circuit alone. Arcilla, at 967. The class action allegations in the instant class action complaint “resemble those in the others”: the putative class action alleges that plaintiff purchased merchandise from defendant and received a credit card receipt that disclosed the expiration date of his credit card, id. The class action alleged that defendant provided similar receipts to other customers, and alleged further that some of those receipt included “more than the last five digits of the card numbers,” id., at 968. The class action complaint prayed for statutory damages, punitive damages, and attorney fees, and alleges that defendant’s conduct resulted in an “increased risk of identify theft.” Id.

The district court summarized the defense arguments at page 968 as follows: “(1) it could not have willfully violated the FACTA because the statute is vague and ambiguous; (2) the Complaint seeks statutory damages that would be constitutionally excessive and thus violate due process because no actual harm has been suffered; (3) the statutory damages would violate ‘principles of tort law’ because Plaintiff and the potential class members have suffered no actual harm; (4) the request for punitive damages is improper because any such damages would be excessive absent an allegation of actual harm.” The district court disagreed, concluding that the allegations of the class action complaint were sufficient to survive the defense motions, and that certain challenges to the class action had to be brought in response to a motion to certify the litigation as a class action.

Class Action Court Decisions FCRA Class Actions Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases-Arias v. Superior Court: California Court Holds State Unfair Competition Law (UCL) Representative Claims Must Be Brought As Class Action Because UCL Suits Must Comply With Class Action Statute

Because California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) Requires Compliance With State’s Class Action Statutes, UCL Representative Claims Must be Brought as Class Action Lawsuits California Court Holds, but PAGA (Private Attorney General Act) Representative Actions under Labor Code need not Satisfy Class Action Pleading Requirements Plaintiff filed suit in California state court against his employer, Angelo Dairy, and others alleging, inter alia, that he was not paid overtime and did not receive meal and rest breaks required by law; the action purported to be a representative action under California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) and under the Private Attorney General Act (PAGA) contained in the state’s labor code.

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases—In re Depo-Provera: Judicial Panel On Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) Agrees with Defense And Denies Motion To Centralize Personal Injury Cases With Class Action Litigation

Judicial Panel Denies Request, Opposed by Defense, for Pretrial Coordination of Class Action Lawsuits Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 Because Centralization will not Further Efficient Conduct of Class Action Litigation Three lawsuits, including one class action, were filed against Pfizer and others alleging products liability claims. In re Depo-Provera Products Liab. Litig., ___ F.Supp.2d ___, 2007 WL 2301928, *1 (Jud.Pan.Mult.Lit. August 6, 2007). Plaintiff’s lawyers in the two California actions filed a motion with the Judicial Panel for Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) requesting centralization of the class actions pursuant to 28 U.

Class Action Court Decisions Multidistrict Litigation Uncategorized

FDCPA Class Action Defense Cases–Gonzales v. Arrow Financial: California Federal Court Holds Debt Collection Letter Violated FDCPA And California Rosenthal Act And Denies Defense Motion To Decertify Class Action

Federal Court Holds Least Sophisticated Debtor would be Misled by Language in Debt Collection Letter thus Entitling Plaintiff in FDCPA Class Action to Summary Judgment and Finds Fact Plaintiff was not Misled Irrelevant to its Decision or to Defense Motion to Decertify Class Action

Plaintiff filed a class action in California federal court against Arrow Financial Services alleging violations of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and its state-law equivalent, California’s Rosenthal Act, in that debt collection letters sent by defendant failed to comply with the applicable laws. Gonzales v. Arrow Fin. Servs. LLC, 489 F.Supp.2d 1140, 1143 (S.D. Cal. 2007). The class action complaint was premised on the following language in defendant’s “form collection letters”: “Upon receipt of the settlement amount and clearance of funds, and if we are reporting the account, the appropriate credit bureaus will be notified that this account has been settled.” Id. Plaintiff alleged this violated the FDCPA and the Rosenthal Act because the debt underlying defendant’s collection effort had been charged off more than 7 years ago and “a credit bureau cannot report a debt charged off more than 7 years previously,” id. An unsophisticated consumer thus may be misled by the form letter into believing that “payment or nonpayment of the claimed debt may impact the consumer’s credit reporting, when that is not true.” Id., at 1143-44. After the district court certified the lawsuit as a class action, defense and plaintiff attorneys filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and defense attorneys moved to decertify the class, id., at 1144. The district court denied both defense motions, and granted partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiff.

After summarizing the FDCPA and the “least sophisticated debtor” standard applied in the Ninth Circuit, Arrow, at 1146, a determination made by the court, not a jury, measured by an “objective standard,” id., and after setting forth the relevant section of the Rosenthal Act, id. (quoting Cal. Civil Code, § 1788.13(f)), the district court turned to the defense motion for summary judgment. Defense attorneys argued that the debt collection letters did not violate the FDCPA or the Rosenthal Act because the letters are not false or misleading – the letters did not “illegally threaten[] any action” or mislead or deceive anyone, and “Arrow does not have a policy to report debts such as plaintiff’s debts to the credit bureaus and in no way seeks to use credit reporting as a means to illegally collect debts.” Id., at 1147. The defense also relied on plaintiff’s deposition testimony that (1) he knew he did not have to pay the debt and that Arrow would not report such a failure to credit bureaus, and (2) he was not confused by the letter he received from Arrow, id. The federal court noted that it had already found the letters to be misleading or deceptive because “without any explanation detailing what debts are likely to be reported or even if the subject debt is one that is reportable, ‘the least sophisticated debtor could likely believe his [or her] debt is reportable just because the letters indicate the credit bureaus will be notified’” and that even though the letters did not expressly threaten to contact credit bureaus they implied that “the status of the debt may have already been or may, at some later date, be submitted to the credit bureaus” and that such conduct “is actionable under the Act.” Id., at 1148 n.1.

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions FDCPA Class Actions Uncategorized