Class Action Defense Cases-In re Banc of America: Judicial Panel On Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) Rejects Defense Opposition To Centralization Of Class Action Litigation And Selects Central District Of California As Transferee Court

Over Defense Objection Judicial Panel Grants Request for Pretrial Coordination Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 and Transfers Class Action Lawsuits to Central District of California Despite Settlement of Action Pending in that District Three class action lawsuits were filed naming Banc of America Investment Services, Quick & Reilly, Fleet National Bank and/or Fleet Investment Services for alleged violations of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and/or state labor laws alleging the failure to pay overtime to individuals who worked as securities brokers or broker trainees.

Class Action Court Decisions Multidistrict Litigation Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases-In re LLRice: Judicial Panel On Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) Grants Unopposed Motion To Centralize Class Action Litigation And Agrees With Defense That Eastern District Of Missouri Is Appropriate Transferee Court

Judicial Panel Grants Unopposed Request for Pretrial Coordination Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 and Agrees with Defense that Eastern District of Missouri is Appropriate Transferee Court Several class actions were filed against Bayer CropScience and others on behalf of rice farmers asserting various causes or action arising out of “the contamination of commercial rice stocks with LLRice 601, a variety of genetically modified rice.” In re LLRice 601Contamination Litig., 466 F.

Class Action Court Decisions Multidistrict Litigation Uncategorized

First American Title Class Action Defense Case-California Court Bars Plaintiff’s Attorney From Conducting “Fishing Expedition” Discovery To Find Prospective Client

California Court Holds that if Class Representative Plaintiff is not and Never was Member of Class then Trial Court Abuses it Discretion if it Permits Precertification Discovery for the Purpose of Identifying Class Member Willing to Serve as Plaintiff

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against his title insurer (First American Title Insurance) and his lender (Wilmington Finance) alleging that “title insurers in the State of California are paying money for referral business from lenders,” that “[the] payments to lenders are rewards for channeling business to them,” and that “[t]hese kickbacks may be disguised as payments for bogus reinsurance which is purchased from captive insurers operated by the firms sending business to the title insurers.” First American Title Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 146 Cal.App.4th 1564 (Cal.App. 2007) [Slip Opn., at 4]. Plaintiff brought the class action on behalf of those persons who “paid in whole or in part for a title insurance policy [from First American] which provided coverage for property located in the State of California . . . [f]or whom part of the premium paid for the title insurance policy was received by Wilmington Finance,” id., at 5. As it turned out, plaintiff was not a member of the class he proposed to represent, and no such scheme existed involving Wilmington Finance; accordingly, he propounded discovery on First American for the purpose of identifying someone willing to serve as class representative so the class action could proceed. Id., at 8. Defense attorneys objected on the ground that “[plaintiff] was never a member of the class alleged in his complaint, and therefore lacked standing to obtain discovery to locate a proper class representative.” Id., at 11. The trial court ultimately rejected the arguments of defense attorneys and granted plaintiff’s motion. The Court of Appeal granted First American’s petition for writ of mandate and directed the trial court to disallow the precertification discovery requested. Id., at 13.

Plaintiff purchased a home in February 2004. He claims the seller’s agent and the escrow company insisted that First American issue title insurance on the property, and he suspected that the escrow company or First American paid a kickback to the seller’s agent. Slip Opn., at 2. In November 2004, Colorado’s Division of Insurance “uncovered a reinsurance kickback scheme” under which “certain homebuilders, lenders and realtors formed their own reinsurance companies, known as ‘captive insurers'” and then referred business to title companies that agreed to “reinsure” the policies through the captive insurer. Id., at 3. In essence, “the reinsurance agreement was simply a way for the title insurer to transfer funds to the captive insurer as a payment for the referral of customers.” Id. California’s Department of Insurance initiated its own investigation in January 2005, one month before Colorado reached a settlement with First American. Id. A few days after the announcement that Colorado and First American had reached a settlement, plaintiff filed suit. Id.

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized

Rent-A-Center Class Action Defense Case-Karraker v. Rent-A-Center: Illinois Federal Court Denies Plaintiff Lawyer’s Request For Attorney Fees Finding Relief Obtained In ADA Class Action To Be De Minimis

Injunctive Relief Obtained Against Defense in ADA Class Action Inadequate to Support Attorney Fee Award Illinois Court Holds

Plaintiffs filed a class action against their employer, Rent-A-Center, alleging violations of the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) arising out of the employer’s requirement that applicants take a psychological test in order to obtain management positions. Karraker v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 431 F.Supp.2d 883, 885 (C.D. Ill. 2006). Specifically, the class action complaint alleged, “[Rent-A-Center] required all employees or outside applicants seeking management positions to submit to a battery of nine separate written tests. This battery of tests was commonly referred to as the Management Test. One of the individual exams included in the Management Test was the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI). The MMPI is a psychological test used by psychologists to diagnose and treat individuals with abnormal psychological symptoms and personality traits.” Id. The district court ultimately certified a class defined as “All past and present employees of Defendant RAC in Illinois who took the APT Management Test.” Id. Defense attorneys prevailed on a motion for summary judgment as to all but a single wrongful termination claim. Id., at 886. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit generally affirmed the judgment in favor of the defense, but remanded the matter “so summary judgment could be entered in favor of Plaintiffs on their claim that the MMPI is a medical examination under the ADA.” Karraker, at 886. The district court entered that order and, pursuant to plaintiffs’ request, the defense agreed to destroy all test results obtained through the APT Management Test. Id. Defense attorneys then moved for summary judgment on the wrongful termination claim. The district court granted the defense motion, thereby resolving the balance of the class action lawsuit. Id.

Plaintiffs’ lawyer then filed a petition seeking an award of $267,000 in attorney fees. Karraker, at 886. The district court recognized that the ADA permits a court to award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party, see 42 U.S.C. § 12205, but held that plaintiffs did not qualify as the prevailing party under the following definition set forth at page 886:

\

Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized

Costco Class Action Defense Case-Ellis v. Costco: California Federal Court Rejects Defense Arguments And Certifies Class Action Alleging Sex Discrimination

California Federal Court Holds that Plaintiffs Satisfied Rule 23 Requirements for Certification of Class Action Alleging Gender Discrimination in Promotion and Management Practices by Costco

Plaintiff filed a class action against their employer for violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act alleging “that Costco’s promotion system has a disparate impact on female employees, that Costco’s management discriminates against women in promotions, and that defendant has retaliated against persons seeking redress for discrimination.” Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., ___ F.Supp.2d ___, 2007 WL 127800-, *1 (N.D. Cal. January 11, 2007). Plaintiffs’ lawyer moved the federal court to certify a nationwide class action on behalf of at least 700 women; defense attorneys opposed the motion and moved to strike the declarations of plaintiffs’ experts in support of the motion. _Id._, at *4, *7. The defense also argued against class action treatment on the grounds that plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies, _id._, at *5, and lacked standing, _id._, at *6. The district court rejected defense arguments and certified a nationwide class action as requested by plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs sought certification of a nationwide class action on behalf of “current and former female employees who have been denied promotion to GM [General Manager] or AGM [Assistant General Manager] or denied Senior Staff jobs important to AGM promotion since January 3, 2002.” Ellis, at *5. The district court first addressed the procedural objections raised by defense attorneys . The administrative remedies defense was premised on the argument that plaintiffs’ EEOC claim was limited to discriminatory practices in promotion to general manager positions. Id.. Plaintiffs disagreed, and argued that even if it had been limited to GM claims that their other claims were “reasonably related to the allegations in the EEOC charge.” Id. The district court agreed, noting that Ninth Circuit case law instructs courts “to construe the EEOC charge ‘with utmost liberality.'” Id. (citation omitted). Plaintiffs’ EEOC claim provided adequate notice to Costco of the claims asserted in the class action complaint. Id. With respect to Costco’s standing arguments, the district court held (1) that former employees may seek injunctive relief on behalf of current employees, because “[t]o hold that employees must continue to work in jobs where they face discrimination in order to challenge discrimination would pervert Article III’s injury-in-fact requirement,” Ellis, at *6, and (2) that a current AGM may seek injunctive relief on behalf of women denied promotion to AGM and that it would not “delve into the merits” of the discrimination claims at the class certification stage, id.

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized

Pioneer Electronics Class Action Case-California Supreme Court Holds Consumers Who Have Complained Of Product Defects Need Not Affirmatively Consent To Release Of Contact Information To Plaintiff’s Attorney Prosecuting Class Action Based On Those Defects

California Supreme Court Rejects Privacy Rights Arguments of Pioneer Electronics’ Defense Attorneys that Consumers Who Contacted Company and Complained about Product Defects Must Thereafter Affirmatively Consent to Release of Contact Information to Attorney Prosecuting Putative Class Action Involving the Same Product Defects In Consumers’ Complaints

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against Pioneer Electronics alleging defects in DVD player, seeking to represent “persons who purchased the same model of allegedly defective DVD player.” Pioneer Electronics v. Superior Court, 40 Cal.4th 360 (Cal. 2007) [Slip Opn., at 2]. During discovery, Pioneer revealed that it had received 700 – 800 consumer complaints concerning the same DVD player. Id. Plaintiff demanded the addresses and telephone numbers of the consumers who had complained; Pioneer objected asserting the right to privacy protected by the California Constitution. Id. (citing Cal. Const., Art. I, § 1). Ultimately the trial court ordered that a letter be sent to the complaining consumers advising them that their contact information would be disclosed to plaintiff’s attorney unless they affirmatively objected to such disclosure. Id., at 4. The California Court of Appeal reversed, granting Pioneer’s petition for writ of mandate to compel the trial court to vacate its order and require that consumers affirmatively consent to the release of their contact information. Id., at 4-5. The California Supreme Court reversed the decision of the appellate court, reinstating the trial court’s order.

The Supreme Court framed the issue as follows: “Does a complaining purchaser possess a right to privacy protecting him or her from unsolicited contact by a class action plaintiff seeking relief from the vendor to whom the purchaser’s complaint was sent?” Slip Opn., at 4. The Court noted that the decision of the Court of Appeal “would place the burden on the discovery proponent to obtain written authorization from each person whose privacy was to be invaded.” Id., at 9. In contrast, plaintiff’s attorney argued that “consumers who initially contacted Pioneer to express dissatisfaction with its product have a reduced expectation of privacy or confidentiality in the contact information they freely offered to Pioneer for the purpose, presumably, of allowing further communication regarding their complaints.” Id., at 6. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that “[r]evealing names, addresses and contact information on persons who have already complained about their Pioneer DVD players would not be particularly sensitive or intrusive.” Id., at 13.

Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases-In re Wachovia: Judicial Panel On Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) Grants Motion To Centralize Class Action Litigation And Selects Central District of California As Transferee Court

Judicial Panel Rejects Defense Request for Pretrial Coordination Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 in the Southern District of New York and Agrees with Plaintiffs that Central District of California is Appropriate Court Several class action lawsuits were filed in New York, Florida, Illinois, Minnesota and Pennsylvania against Wachovia Corp., Wachovia Securities, First Union Securities and/or Prudential Equity Group alleging violations of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and/or state labor laws for failure to pay overtime to securities brokers.

Class Action Court Decisions Multidistrict Litigation Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases-In re Long-Distance Telephone: Over Defense Objection Judicial Panel On Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) Grants Motion To Centralize Class Action Litigation In The District of the District of Columbia

Judicial Panel Rejects Defense Opposition to Request for Pretrial Coordination Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 and Grants Motion for Centralization of Three Class Action Lawsuits Class action lawsuits were filed in California, Wisconsin and the District of Columbia, in addition to an action filed in the Court of Federal Claims, against the federal government and others seeking “reimbursement of the communications excise tax on long-distance telephone service, where the charge for such service was not based on the distance of the telephone call.

Class Action Court Decisions Multidistrict Litigation Uncategorized

Cavin v. Home Loan Class Action Defense Case: Illinois Federal Court Grants Defense Motion For Summary Judgment In Class Action Alleging Violations Of Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)

Mortgage-Offer Mailer Constituted a “Firm Offer of Credit” Under the FCRA (Fair Credit Reporting Act) Warranting Summary Judgment in Favor of Defense Illinois Federal Court Holds

Plaintiffs filed a class action against Home Loan Center for alleged violations of the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) alleging that impermissibly accessed credit reports for purposes of mailing out “pre-approval” mortgage flyers, three of which were mailed to plaintiffs. Cavin v. Home Loan Center Inc., 469 F.Supp.2d 561, 2007 WL 92509, *1 (N.D. Ill. 2007). Plaintiffs did not respond to the loan offers. Id., at *2. Defense and plaintiffs attorneys filed cross-motions for summary judgment; defense attorneys argued that the mailers constituted “firm offers of credit” under the FCRA thus entitling Home Loan Center to obtain the credit reports; plaintiffs argued that mailers did not constitute firm offers because they are too vague. Id., at *3. The district court granted the defense motion, denied the plaintiffs’ motion, and entered judgment in favor of Home Loan Center on the class action complaint.

We do not summarize here all of the language contained in the mailers or the details of the loan program at issue. Class action defense attorneys facing FCRA claims should review the opinion in its entirety in order to understand its full scope. Briefly, the mailers advertised a “SmartLoan” program and stated “This ‘prescreened’ offer of credit is based on information in your credit report indicating that you meet certain criteria.” Cavin, at *1. The mailers set forth “sample loan payments for loans ranging from $100,000 to $600,000.” Id. The reverse side of the mailers stated, “This offer may not be extended if, after responding to this offer, you do not meet the criteria used in the selection process. Further, HomeLoanCenter.com will verify income and employment, review credit, and analyze debt and your equity position in the subject property prior to final loan approval.” Id. Additionally, the mailers stated, “This advertisement does not constitute an offer to enter into an interest rate and/or discount prior agreement.” Id. The mailers were not firm commitments to make a loan, expressly stating “Not all applicants will be approved.”

Id., at *2.

In ruling on the cross-motions for summary judgment, the federal court observed that the parties did not dispute whether Home Loan Center had “express permission to access [plaintiffs’] credit reports,” Cavin, at *2. The class action turned “on whether the SmartLoan mailers constituted a ‘firm offer of credit'” under the FCRA. Id. Plaintiffs urged that the mailers were “vague and totally lacking in terms,” failed to “inform the consumer what is being offered,” and failed to disclose that the mortgage is a negative amortization loan. Id., at *2-*3. The defense countered that the mailers “offered a valuable and popular home mortgage loan worth hundreds of thousands of dollars” and that any missing terms were because mortgage loans “have features and terms that cannot be fixed in advance based solely upon data obtained from prescreening programs.” Id., at *3. Defense attorneys also argued that plaintiffs could not prove actual damages because they never sought or obtained a loan based on the mailers.Id.

Class Action Court Decisions FCRA Class Actions Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases-Taylor v. Quall: California Federal Court Grants Defense Motion To Dismiss Class Action Holding That Debt Collection Practices During Lawsuit Are Insulated By Litigation Privilege

California’s Litigation Privilege Bars Claims of Unfair Debt Collection Practices California Federal Court Holds

Plaintiff filed a putative class action in California state court alleging violations of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and California’s equivalent statute, the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (RFDCPA), and for violations of California’s unfair competition law (UCL), California Business & Professions Code section 17200 et seq. The lawsuit was premised on acts committed by defendants’ efforts to collect a debt Defense attorneys removed the class action to federal court, and filed a motion to dismiss two claims for relief. Taylor v. Quall, 458 F.Supp.2d 1065, 1065-66 (C.D. Cal. 2006). Defendants argued that their conduct was absolutely privileged because it was part of the lawsuit aimed at collecting the debt. Id., at 1066. The district court agreed with the defense and granted the motion.

Plaintiff’s class action complaint alleged the following. After plaintiff lost his job, he received several calls from people attempting to collect monies owed on his Citibank credit card account. Plaintiff advised these people that he was unemployed and would not pay the debt. Eventually, these collection efforts ended. However, defendants thereafter acquired the Citibank debt and filed a lawsuit against plaintiff seeking to collect the amounts owed. Plaintiff claims the lawsuit was time-barred and that defendants lacked standing. Plaintiffs further alleges that “Defendants improperly sought attorney’s fees and costs, and made multiple misrepresentations to Plaintiff until he ultimately settled the action.” Taylor, at 1066. As noted above, defense attorneys argued that any statements made during the course of the lawsuit fell within the scope of the litigation privilege, thus warranting dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). The district court agreed.

Class Action Court Decisions FDCPA Class Actions Uncategorized