Labor Law Class Action Defense Cases-Schachter v. Citigroup: California State Court Affirms Summary Judgment In Favor Of Defense In Labor Law Class Action Challenging Forfeiture Provisions Of Voluntary Employee Incentive Compensation Plan

Defense Motion for Summary Judgment in Labor Law Class Action Properly Granted because Employee Incentive Compensation Plan did not Violate California law by Providing for Forfeiture of Stock for Following Resignation or Termination for Cause During Plan’s Two-Year Vesting Period California State Court Holds

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against their employer, Citigroup, alleging violations of California’s Labor Code; specifically, the class action alleged that the financial brokerage company’s voluntary incentive compensation plan – which “allows participants the option of using a portion of their annual earnings to purchase shares in the company’s stock at a price below the stock’s publicly-traded market price” but provides further that “[i]f the participating employee resigns or is terminated for cause within a two-year vesting period, the employee forfeits the stock as well as the money used to purchase it” – violates California law because the money used to purchase the shares were wages and their forfeiture constituted a conversion of wages. Schachter v. Citigroup, Inc., 159 Cal.App.4th 10, 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 776, 778 (Cal.App. 2008). Defense attorneys moved for summary judgment; the trial court granted the motion and dismissed the class action. The Court of Appeal affirmed.

The appellate court framed the issue as follows: “Do the forfeiture provisions of this voluntary incentive compensation plan violate Labor Code sections 201 and 202, which require an employer to pay its employee all earned but unpaid compensation following the employee’s discharge or his or her voluntary termination of employment?” Schachter, at 778 (footnote omitted). In brief, the Plan permitted employees to purchase company stock “at a 25 percent discount below the stock’s then-current market price,” but the stock “could not be sold, transferred, pledged or assigned during a two-year period, which commenced on the date the stock was initially acquired.” Id., at 779. During this two-year vesting period, the employees received any stock dividends and exercised the right to vote their shares. At the end of the two-year period, the stock fully vested in the employee, but if “the employee voluntarily terminated his or her employment or was terminated for cause during the two-year period, he or she forfeited the shares, as well as the money used to purchase them.” Id. The employee could contribute from 5-25% of their compensation to the program, id. n.4, and employees who retired or were involuntarily terminated without cause were not subject to the forfeiture provisions of the Plan, id. n.7. The appellate court concluded at page 778, “As a matter of economic reality, employees who elect to participate in the plan’s stock-purchase program are paid all the wages they designate to invest in company stock. Thus, the plan’s forfeiture provisions do not violate the Labor Code; and the trial court in this case properly granted summary judgment in favor of the brokerage company.”

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ERISA Class Action Defense Cases-Robinson v. Sheet Metal Workers’: Second Circuit Affirms District Court Judgment In ERISA Class Action In Favor Of Defense Holding Trustees Did Not Violate Anti-Cutback Rule Or Breach Contract

ERISA Class Action Failed to Establish Violation of Anti-Cutback Rule or Breach of Contract or Fiduciary Duties because Industry-Related Disability Pension was a Welfare Benefit Plan and an Ancillary Benefit Second Circuit Holds Plaintiffs, as recipients of an Industry-Related Disability Pension (IRD), filed a putative class action against the Sheet Metal Workers’ National Pension Fund alleging breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).

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Arbitration Class Action Defense Cases-Aguilar v. BLH Construction: California Court Affirms Trial Court Order Denying Petition To Compel Arbitration Of Class Action Thereby Permitting Labor Law Class Action To Proceed In State Court

In an Unpublished Opinion, California Appellate Court Holds that Trial Court did not Abuse Discretion in Denying Petition to Compel Arbitration of Labor Law Class Action on Ground that Defense Attorneys Failed to Prove that Plaintiffs Signed Arbitration Agreement

Plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit against their employer, BLH Construction alleging labor law wage and hour claims. Aguilar v. BLH Construction Co., 2007 WL 4418105, *1 (Cal.App. December 19, 2007). Defense attorneys moved to compel arbitration, but the court opinion is silent on the arbitration clause purported to bar class actions or whether the defense sought to enforce a class action arbitration waiver. Id. The trial court denied the motion, finding that plaintiffs had not signed the arbitration agreement, id. The defense appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion “by not continuing the hearing to permit oral testimony and cross-examination of witnesses on the issue.” Id. The Court of Appeal affirmed.

BLH hired plaintiffs as construction workers in February 2005 and, on the day they were hired, provided each plaintiff with an employee handbook, a form entitled “Receipt of Handbook and Acknowledgement of At-Will Employment,” and a form entitled “Mutually Binding Arbitration Agreement.” Aguilar, at *1. “Each form had lines for the employee’s signature and the date of signing.” Id. As part of the petition to compel arbitration, defense attorneys submitted signed copies of the “Mutually Binding Arbitration Agreement.” Id. Plaintiffs, however, insisted that they had not signed this document and by declaration claimed that their signatures had been forged, id. In response, defense attorneys submitted (1) the declaration of a supervisor stating that he had given plaintiffs the employee documents referenced above and that plaintiffs “signed and dated the two signature pages contained within the Employee Handbook,” (2) the declaration of BLH’s chief operations officer stating that plaintiffs had signed the mutually binding arbitration agreement, and (3) the declaration of BLH’s counsel stating that the signed documents had been obtained from the BLH custodian of records, “and that it was BLH’s custom and practice to have each employee sign the arbitration agreement.” Id.

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ADEA Class Action Defense Cases-Schuler v. PricewaterhouseCoopers: District of Columbia Circuit Reverses District Court Order Dismissing ADEA Class Action Finding Plaintiff Satisfied ADEA Prerequisites For Filing Class Action

District Court Erred in Dismissing ADEA (Age Discrimination in Employment Act) Class Action because Plaintiff Satisfied ADEA Prerequisites for Filing Class Action Complaint and because Plaintiff was not Required to File Separate Charges for each Allegedly Discriminatory Failure to Promote Plaintiff District of Columbia Circuit Court Holds

Plaintiff, who worked in Washington, D.C., filed an EEOC (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) charge in New York alleging PricewaterhouseCoopers discriminated against him on the basis of age in violation of the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) “by maintaining a discriminatory partnership policy under which the company refuses to promote older qualified employees.” Schuler v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, ___ F.3d ___, 2008 WL 398968, *1 (D.C. Cir. February 12, 2008). The EEOC dismissed the charge and informed plaintiff of his right to sue. Plaintiff responded by filing a class action complaint in the district court for the District of Columbia; the class action alleged violations of the ADEA and of D.C.’s Human Rights Act. _Id._ Defense attorneys moved to dismiss the class action complaint: The district court dismissed the class action on the ground that plaintiff “failed to satisfy the ADEA’s procedural requirements because he failed to file (1) his EEOC charge with the D.C. Office of Human Rights and (2) a new EEOC charge following the company’s allegedly unlawful July 2005 promotion denial.” _Id._ Plaintiff appealed and the Circuit Court reversed, reinstating his class action.

The class action alleged that PricewaterhouseCoopers requires mandatory retirement at age 60, and that as a result it “rarely promotes employees over the age of forty-five to partner.” Schuler, at *2. This damages qualified employees because “Partners enjoy higher salaries, more generous retirement benefits, and greater responsibilities than other professional employees.” Id. The class action complaint further alleges that PricewaterhouseCoopers “refuses to promote him ‘and other qualified older professional employees’ to partner on the basis of age in violation of the ADEA” and that “he is the longest serving managing director in the firm, having been promoted to that position in 1994, and that his education, training, and experience qualify him for partnership.” Id. (Plaintiff previously sued PwC in 2002 over the same allegedly discriminatory partnership policy. Id., at *2.) The Circuit Court also noted that plaintiff’s EEOC charge had included the instruction: “I want this Class Action Charge filed with both the EEOC and the State and local Agency, if any.” Id., at *3.

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ERISA Class Action Defense Cases-In re Syncor: Ninth Circuit Reverses Defense Judgment In Class Action Holding District Court Erred In Failing To First Consider Proposed Class Action Settlement Under Rule 23(e)

District Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment in ERISA Class Action Because it should have Considering Proposed Class Action Settlement Prior to Ruling on Summary Judgment and Because Third Circuit’s Moench Presumption not Applicable in Ninth Circuit Triable Issues of Fact Existed Precluding Summary Judgment Ninth Circuit Holds

Plaintiffs, participants in employee stock ownership plan (ESOP), filed a class action against their employer, Syncor International, and two board of directors alleging breach of fiduciary duties under ERISA (Employee Retirement Income Security Act); the class action alleged that Syncor administered an Employee’s Saving and Stock Ownership retirement plan governed by ERISA (“the Plan”), and permitted employees to invest in Syncor stock even though they knew that Syncor’s Taiwanese subsidiary and other foreign offices systematically used bribes to increase sales and to grow Syncor’s business in violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). In re Syncor ERISA Litig., 516 F.3d 1095, 2008 WL 427763, *1-*2 (9th Cir. 2008). Once news of the illegal payments became public Syncor’s stock price lost half of its value, decreasing the value of the Plan by at least $24 million and precipitating the filing of the class action lawsuit on behalf of Plan participants. Id., at *2. Plaintiffs’ lawyers sought and obtained certification of the litigation as a class action, id. Syncor Taiwan pleaded guilty to violating the FCPA, and a member of the board of directors surrendered $2.5 million worth of personal Syncor stock to reimburse the company for fines levied by governmental agencies. Id. Following the filing of a consolidated class action complaint, defense attorneys filed a motion for summary judgment; simultaneously, the parties participated in settlement discussions. Id. In December 2005, the district court took the summary judgment motions under submission, and in January 2006, without knowing that the district court had decided the summary judgment motion, the parties signed a proposed settlement of the class action. Id. The parties notified the court of the tentative settlement on January 10, 2006, but failed to provide the court with the term sheet evidencing the settlement; that same day, the district court entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of the defense. Id. The following day, the parties requested that the court not rule on the summary judgment motions because of the proposed settlement, but again failed to provide a term sheet, id., at *3. Nonetheless, on January 12, 2006, the district court entered judgment in favor of defendants on the class action complaint, and denied as moot the proposed class action settlement, id. The Ninth Circuit reversed.

The Ninth Circuit summarized its holding as follows: “We hold that, when parties (1) enter into a binding class action settlement agreement, which requires court approval pursuant to Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and (2) provide the required notice of the settlement to the district court prior to the district court’s entry of the final judgments, the district court should hold a hearing and review the settlement agreement to determine if it is fair, reasonable, and adequate…. Failure to do so-even when the district court has already drafted a summary judgment order-is an abuse of discretion.” In re Syncor, at *1. The Circuit Court further held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment “genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether the Defendants breached their fiduciary duty under ERISA,” id.

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Class Action Defense Cases-Anderson v. CNH: Eighth Circuit Dismisses As Moot Appeal From District Court Order Denying Class Action Certification

Class Action Settlement Reached after District Court Denied Motion for Class Action Treatment Precluded Settling Plaintiffs from Appealing Denial of Class Action Motion Eighth Circuit Holds Plaintiffs, retirees of Case Corporation, filed a putative class action against administrators of the company’s pension and retirement plans for “violat[ing] the terms of the retirees’ pension plan by failing to make certain payments the month after each retiree turned 62 years old. Anderson v.

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Attorney Fees Class Action Defense Cases-Harrington v. Payroll Entertainment: California State Court Holds Plaintiff Lawyers Who Filed Labor Law Class Action Deserved Only $500 In Fees Because Class Action Complaint Was Not Viable

Lawyers who Filed Putative Class Action Alleging State Labor Law Claims but Failed to Secure Class Action Certification were Entitled to Reasonable Attorney Fees as a Matter of Right under Settlement of Individual Claim Declaring Plaintiff “Prevailing Party” but Reasonable Fee Award for Filing a Frivolous Class Action Based on a $44 Overtime Claim Warranted only $500 in Attorney Fes California State Court Holds

Plaintiff, an off-duty police officer, filed a class action against Payroll Entertainment Services alleging violations of California’s labor laws; specifically, the class action alleged that Payroll would hire retired and off-duty police officers to provide “traffic and crowd control services,” and that Payroll underpaid him after he worked a single 14-hour day. Harrington v. Payroll Entertainment Servs., Inc., ___ Cal.App.4th ___, 72 Cal.Rptr.3d 922 (Cal.App. 2008) [Slip Opn., at 2]. Plaintiff alleged to have filed the class action complaint on behalf of all retired and off-duty police officers who had worked for Payroll Entertainment, _id._ In response to plaintiff’s motion to certify the litigation as a class action, defense attorneys acknowledged the error in calculating plaintiff’s pay, but explained that Payroll Entertainment “had based its wage calculations on a memorandum issued by the Los Angeles Police Protective League without realizing that the formula set out in the memo violated California’s overtime wage laws,” _id._ The defense argued further that class action treatment was unnecessary because it had hired only 16 officers for the event in question and that the amount at stake was only $714. _Id._ The trial court denied the class action certification motion; specifically, the trial court found that plaintiff had failed to establish numerosity, typicality or superiority to support class action treatment. _Id._, at 4. The litigation proceeded as to plaintiff’s individual claim, settling shortly before trial for $10,500. _Id._, at 2-3. Plaintiff’s lawyers sought attorney fees but the trial court denied the motion, _id._, at 3. Plaintiff appealed. The appellate court reversed but awarded plaintiff’s lawyers only $500.

As part of the settlement, in addition to its monetary payment, Payroll Entertainment agreed that plaintiff was a “prevailing party” for purposes of recovering attorney fees and that the trial court would determine the amount of fees that were reasonably incurred by plaintiff. Harrington, at 3. Plaintiff’s lawyers filed a motion requesting $46,000 in attorney fees; in opposition, defense attorneys argued that plaintiff should not be awarded any attorney fees. Id. The trial court’s rationale is set forth in detail at pages 3 through 6 of the appellate court’s slip opinion. In pertinent part, the trial court found that plaintiff had retained counsel and filed suit to recover $44, id., at 5. The Court of Appeal quoted the following language from the trial court’s order at page 5:

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Labor Law Class Action Defense Cases-McClain v. Lufkin: Fifth Circuit Issues Mixed Opinion On Class Action Appeal Following Judgment In Favor Of Plaintiff On Title VII/§ 1981 Discrimination Class Action Complaint

District Court Judgment on Discrimination Class Action Complaint Required Reversal and Remand as to Certain Issues Necessitating Remand of Class Action to District Court for Further Proceedings Fifth Circuit Holds

Plaintiffs filed a class action against their employer, Lufkin Industries, alleging violations of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 based on the allegation that Lufkin’s “practice of delegating subjective decision-making authority to its managers with respect to initial assignments and promotions disparately affected them.” McClain v. Lufkin Industries, Inc., ___ F.3d ___ (5th Cir. February 29, 2008) [Slip Opn., at 2]. Among the many named plaintiffs in the class action complaint, only two had filed charges with the EEOC and received right-to-sue letters, _id._ The class action involved all four of Lufkin’s production divisions, and the company has approximately 1,500 hourly and salaried workers. _Id._ The district court granted plaintiffs’ request to certify the litigation as a class action with respect to the disparate-impact claims, but the court refused to give class action treatment to plaintiffs’ disparate-treatment claims. _Id._, at 3. Following a bench trial, at which “the court strictly limited each party to twenty hours for the presentation of its case,” the court found in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded $3.4 million in back pay, together with injunctive relief and attorney fees. _Id._ Both sides appealed: plaintiffs argued the court should have granted class action treatment to the disparate-treatment claims, and defense attorneys argued (1) plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies, (2) lacked standing to represent the class, and (3) the district court committed various errors in finding for plaintiffs and calculating damages. _Id._, at 4. The Fifth Circuit issued an opinion “unfortunately inconclusive of the litigation,” _id._, at 1.

The Fifth Circuit addressed first the defense claim that plaintiffs failed to exhaust their EEOC remedies, which the Circuit Court characterized as the “mainstay of proper enforcement of Title VII remedies.” McClain, at 4. The defense argued that the class action’s disparate-impact claims concerning its hiring and promotional practices, id., at 4-5. Relying on Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S.Ct. 299 (2006), the Circuit Court concluded that the January 1995 letter from plaintiff McClain to the EEOC (relied on by the district court in finding that plaintiffs had exhausted their administrative remedies) complained only about demotion and was thus insufficient to support the hiring and promotion class action claims. See McClain, at 5-8. The Court concluded, however, that plaintiff Thomas’s EEOC charge satisfied the exhaustion requirement, id., at 8-9. However, the Fifth Circuit agreed with defense attorneys that neither McClain nor Thomas adequately complained about Lufkin’s “Foundry” division, and therefore vacated the judgment insofar as it affected the Foundry division, id., at 9. Indeed, the Court noted that “considerable doubt” existed as to whether either of these individuals even had standing to represent a class consisting of Foundry division workers. Id., at 9 n.2.

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Class Action Defense Cases-Thorpe v. Abbott Labs: California Federal Court Denies Defense Motion To Dismiss Class Action Finding California State Law Class Action Claims Were Not Incompatible With Illinois FLSA Class Action

Defense Motion to Dismiss California Class Action Alleging Misclassification of Employees and Seeking Damages under California State Law Fails because Class Action was not Incompatible with Illinois Class Action by Same Plaintiff Lawyer Alleging Misclassification of Same Group of Employees and Seeking Damages under Federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) California Federal Court Holds

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against Abbott Laboratories in California state court on September 25, 2007, and defense attorneys removed the class action complaint to federal court on November 7, 2007, arguing that removal jurisdiction existed under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA). Thorpe v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., ___ F.Supp.2d ___ (N.D. Cal. February 12, 2008) [Slip Opn., at 1]. The class action complaint stated that plaintiff formerly had been employed by Abbott as a Pharmaceutical Representative, and alleged that improperly classified him and other Pharmaceutical Representatives as “exempt” employees and that he was required to work more than 8 hours per day or 40 hours per week without overtime, and was denied meal and rest periods. _Id._, at 2. The class action further alleged that Abbott failed to provide accurate wage statements as required by California law. _Id._ Defense attorneys moved to dismiss the class action or, in the alternative, to strike the class action allegations, _id._, at 1-2. The federal court denied the motion.

The defense argued that the class action complaint must be dismissed, or the class action allegations stricken, “because plaintiff’s claims for unpaid overtime for Pharmaceutical Representatives at Abbott are based on the same facts and circumstances as those alleged in a parallel federal action, Jirak v. Abbott Laboratories, et al., 07-03636 (‘Jirak action’), filed by plaintiff’s counsel and currently pending in the District Court in the Northern District of Illinois.” Thorpe, at 2. Defense attorneys argued that even though Thorpe was not a plaintiff in the Jirak action, “the present complaint is an attempt by plaintiff’s counsel to circumvent the requirements for maintaining a class action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (‘FLSA’)… by filing two class actions based on the same circumstances, namely that Abbott mis-classified Pharmaceutical Representatives as exempt employees.” Id., at 2-3. In essence, the defense argued “the opt-out class action that plaintiff seeks to maintain for his claims under California law is incompatible with the FLSA opt-in class action proceeding concurrently in the Northern District of Illinois.” Id., at 3.

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FLSA Class Action Defense Cases-Spoerle v. Kraft Foods: Wisconsin Federal Court Denies Defense Summary Judgment Motion In FLSA Class Action Seeking Compensation For Donning And Doffing Protective Equipment

Defense Motion for Summary Judgment Arguing that Class Action Claims Seeking Compensation under Federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) for Time Spent Donning and Doffing Safety Gear Required by Employer Denied for Failure to Establish as a Matter of Law that Class Action Claims Fell Within Exception to FLSA Compensation Requirement Wisconsin Federal Court Holds

Plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit against their employer, Kraft Foods, alleging violations of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and state law for time spent in donning and doffing safety and sanitation equipment as part of their jobs at a meat processing plant. Spoerle v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 527 F.Supp.2d 860, 2007 WL 4564094, *1 (W.D. Wis. 2007). Defense attorneys moved for summary judgment arguing that the class action claims fell within the Portal-to-Portal Act exception, that the allegations in the class action complaint did not constitute “changing clothes” within the meaning of the FLSA, and that in any event the class action claims fell within the FLSA’s “de minimis” exception. Id. (While such dispositive motions are generally inappropriate prior to the court’s ruling on a class action certification motion, plaintiffs stipulated that they would not seek class action treatment until the court ruled on the summary judgment motion, id.) Except as explained in the Note, below, the district court denied the defense motion because it could not find as a matter of law “that the donning and doffing of the equipment at issue in this case is excluded from the protections of the FLSA,” id.

The district court stated at page 1, “This case presents a straightforward question: does the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219, require defendant Kraft Foods Global, Inc., to pay its employees for time they spend putting on and taking off items of safety and sanitation equipment that defendant’s policies and federal law require the employees to wear?” Kraft operates a meat processing plant in Wisconsin and requires employees to use time clocks “typically [located] right outside the ‘production area’” to track their time. Spoerle, at *1. Federal law, as well as company policy, requires employees wear safety and sanitation equipment in the production area, which “includes a hard hat or bump cap, steel-toed shoes or sanitation boots, ear plugs, hairnet and beard net, safety glasses, a freezer coat (if necessary), gloves, plastic gloves, paper frock or plastic apron, sleeves, slickers (for employees that work in wet areas) or a cotton frock (employees may choose to wear cotton pants and a shirt instead, which the parties refer to as ‘career clothes’).” Id. Failure to wear the required equipment may lead to discipline, id. The gravamen of the class action is that some of these items – all of which are owned by the employer and stored at the plant – must be put on before clocking in, id., at *2. The court noted that “The current collective bargaining agreement between plaintiffs and defendant does not guarantee compensation for the time spent donning and doffing personal protective equipment,” id., and noted further that Kraft did not dispute that such conduct was “work,” id., at *3; rather, the defense argued that the conduct falls within an exception.

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