San Francisco’s Paid Sick Leave Ordinance To Take Effect On February 5, 2007

On February 5, 2007, San Francisco’s sweeping Paid Sick Leave Ordinance (“PSL”) will take effect. The PSL Ordinance (Chapter 12W) was approved by 60% of San Francisco voters in the November election. San Francisco employers who do not comply with the PSL Ordinance will face stiff penalties and possible civil lawsuits with attorneys’ fees recoverable.

All employers in San Francisco will be required to provide paid sick leave to all full-time, part-time and even temporary employees who work in San Francisco. Under the PSL Ordinance, employees accrue one hour of paid sick leave for every 30 hours worked (about 9 days per year for a full-time, non-exempt employee). Those employed as of February 5, 2007 will begin accruing paid sick leave as of that date. Those employed after February 5, 2007 will begin accruing paid sick leave 90 days into their employment. Employers may cap maximum accruals at 40 hours if they employ fewer than 10 employees and at 72 hours if they employ 10 or more employees. Unlike vacation benefits, paid sick leave does not need to be paid out when employees leave their employers.

Beginning February 5, 2007, employers must post the City’s official notice of the PSL Ordinance in a conspicuous location in English, Spanish, Chinese and any other languages spoken by at least 5% of an employer’s workforce in San Francisco. Under the PSL Ordinance, paid sick leave may be used to care for family members (“kin care”), which is more broadly defined than California’s Labor Code and includes relatives such as siblings and grandparents. In addition, employees who do not have a spouse or registered domestic partner may once a year designate a person for whom the employee may use paid sick leave. Further, unlike current California law, an employee may use the entire amount of their sick leave for kin care.

Class Actions In The News Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized

Costco Class Action Defense Case-Ellis v. Costco: California Federal Court Rejects Defense Arguments And Certifies Class Action Alleging Sex Discrimination

California Federal Court Holds that Plaintiffs Satisfied Rule 23 Requirements for Certification of Class Action Alleging Gender Discrimination in Promotion and Management Practices by Costco

Plaintiff filed a class action against their employer for violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act alleging “that Costco’s promotion system has a disparate impact on female employees, that Costco’s management discriminates against women in promotions, and that defendant has retaliated against persons seeking redress for discrimination.” Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., ___ F.Supp.2d ___, 2007 WL 127800-, *1 (N.D. Cal. January 11, 2007). Plaintiffs’ lawyer moved the federal court to certify a nationwide class action on behalf of at least 700 women; defense attorneys opposed the motion and moved to strike the declarations of plaintiffs’ experts in support of the motion. _Id._, at *4, *7. The defense also argued against class action treatment on the grounds that plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies, _id._, at *5, and lacked standing, _id._, at *6. The district court rejected defense arguments and certified a nationwide class action as requested by plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs sought certification of a nationwide class action on behalf of “current and former female employees who have been denied promotion to GM [General Manager] or AGM [Assistant General Manager] or denied Senior Staff jobs important to AGM promotion since January 3, 2002.” Ellis, at *5. The district court first addressed the procedural objections raised by defense attorneys . The administrative remedies defense was premised on the argument that plaintiffs’ EEOC claim was limited to discriminatory practices in promotion to general manager positions. Id.. Plaintiffs disagreed, and argued that even if it had been limited to GM claims that their other claims were “reasonably related to the allegations in the EEOC charge.” Id. The district court agreed, noting that Ninth Circuit case law instructs courts “to construe the EEOC charge ‘with utmost liberality.'” Id. (citation omitted). Plaintiffs’ EEOC claim provided adequate notice to Costco of the claims asserted in the class action complaint. Id. With respect to Costco’s standing arguments, the district court held (1) that former employees may seek injunctive relief on behalf of current employees, because “[t]o hold that employees must continue to work in jobs where they face discrimination in order to challenge discrimination would pervert Article III’s injury-in-fact requirement,” Ellis, at *6, and (2) that a current AGM may seek injunctive relief on behalf of women denied promotion to AGM and that it would not “delve into the merits” of the discrimination claims at the class certification stage, id.

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized

Jimenez v. Domino’s Pizza-Class Action Defense Cases: California Federal Court Agrees With Defense That Putative Labor Law Class Action Fails To Satisfy Requirements Of Rule 23 And Denies Plaintiffs’ Motion For Class Certification

California Federal Court Holds that Evidence Presented in Connection with Plaintiffs’ Motion for Certification of Class Action Established that Individual Questions as to Whether Employees were Misclassified Predominate over Common Questions of Fact, Thus Rendering Litigation Unsuitable for Class Action Treatment

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action in California state court against their former employer, Domino’s Pizza, for violations of California’s labor laws and unfair competition laws alleging failure to pay overtime and to provide rest and meal periods to its general managers by misclassifying them as exempt employees. Plaintiffs assert they were not exempt because most of their work consisted of making pizzas and cleaning stores, and that only about 20% of their workday was spent “performing their actual general manager duties.” Jimenez v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 238 F.R.D. 241, 245-46 (C.D. Cal. 2006). The defense removed the action to federal court, id., at 246, and plaintiffs moved the court to certify the lawsuit as a class action. The district court first addressed the requirements of Rule 23(a). Id., at 247. The court found that each of Rule 23(a)’s prerequisites – numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation – had been satisfied. Id., at 247-49. However, the district court agreed with defense attorneys that plaintiffs had not established the elements required by Rule 23(b), and so denied the motion.

Plaintiffs asserted that the putative class action satisfied each prong of Rule 23(b), so the court addressed each in turn., Jimenez, at 249. With respect to Rule 23(b)(1), the district court agreed with defense attorneys that plaintiffs misperceived the statute’s purpose. Rule 23(b)(1) authorizing class action treatment when separate lawsuits “create a risk of imposing incompatible standards of conduct on the defendant,” id. In this case, while it is possible that different courts may reach different conclusions in separate lawsuits as to whether a particular general manager is exempt or non-exempt, the fact remained that Domino’s “would not be incapable of fulfilling various judgments,” so certification under Rule 23(b)(1). Id., at 250.

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized

Ward v. Bank of New York Class Action Defense Case: Offer Of Judgment Rendered Moot Plaintiff’s Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) Collective Action Claim New York Federal Court Holds

New York Federal Court Agrees with Defense that FRCP Rule 68 Offer of Judgment Required Dismissal of Plaintiff’s FLSA (Fair Labor Standards Act) Claim and Court Refuses to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction Over State Labor Law Class Action Claims

A former hourly employee, Ward, filed a putative class action against her former employer, Bank of New York, alleging violations of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) (as a collective action) and New York labor laws (as a class action) for failure to pay overtime. Ward v. Bank of New York, 455 F.Supp.2d 262, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). An amended complaint named a former assistant manager, Smalls, who alleged additionally that the Bank improperly classified her and others as exempt employees. Id., at 265. The defense made an offer of judgment to Ward for $1000 under FRCP Rule 68, which she rejected. Id. Defense attorneys then moved to dismiss Ward’s claims because the Rule 68 offer rendered her action moot and because no other ” plaintiffs had opted in to the FLSA collective action. Id. The federal court granted the defense motion Ward’s FLSA claim and dismissed her state law class action claims because it refused to exercise jurisdiction over them.

Defense attorneys argued that “Ward’s FLSA claims should be dismissed on the ground that [the Bank’s] Rule 68 offer of judgment moots those claims, and therefore the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.” Ward, at 265. The district court agreed. The court held that “[w]hen a defendant offers the maximum recovery available to a plaintiff, the Second Circuit has held that the case is moot and ‘there is no justification for taking the time of the court and the defendant in the pursuit of miniscule individual claims which defendant has more than satisfied.'” Id., at 267 (citations omitted). The same rule applies in FLSA collective actions: unless other plaintiffs opt in to the collective action, the plaintiff “advances only her own individual claims,” which the Rule 68 offer rendered moot Id. The federal court held at page 267 that this was true “even where plaintiff rejects the offer of judgment” (citations omitted). Moreover, “Rule 68 also applies in class actions, where prior to class certification defendant offers plaintiff the maximum amount that plaintiff could recover at trial.” Id., at 268 (citations omitted).

Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized

Edwards v. City of Long Beach Class Action Defense Case: California Federal Court Denies Defense Motion To Certify Class Action But Grants Collective Action Status Under § 216(b) of the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)

California Court Rejects Defense Arguments Against Collective Action for Alleged Violations of FLSA (Fair Labor Standards Act) but Agrees with Defense that Class Action is not Superior Device for Litigating State Employment Law Claims and Denies Class Action Status to Claims Based on California Labor Code, Over Which it had Supplemental Jurisdiction, as Inconsistent with “Opt-In” Requirements for FLSA Collective Action

Plaintiff, former Long Beach police officer, filed a putative class action against the City of Long Beach for alleged violations of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and of California’s Labor Code sections 226.7, 512 and 2802 based on the allegations that he was denied meal and rest breaks and was not properly reimbursed for business expenses while a police officer. Edwards v. City of Long Beach, ___ F.R.D. ___ (C.D. Cal. December 15, 2006) [Slip Opn., at 2-3.] The thrust of the class action complaint asserted that while police officers kept track of, and received pay for, overtime hours worked, no policy or procedure existed for officers to record or report missed meal and rest periods. _Id._, at 2-3. Further, while officers were required to have clean and functional uniforms and equipment, the City did not reimburse class members for the costs incurred in maintaining those items. _Id._, at 3. Plaintiff filed two motions in the district court: one requested certification of the lawsuit as a class action under Rule 23, _id._, at 7, which defense attorneys opposed on the grounds that the numerosity, commonality and typicality requirements are not met, a class action will not benefit the class, and other alternatives exist rather than class action litigation, _id._, at 8; the second sought certification of a collective action under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), _id._, at 1, which defense attorneys opposed by focusing on the differences in job duties between the plaintiff and other class members, _id._, at 6. The district court refused to certify a class action under Rule 23, but granted the motion to certify a collective “opt-in” action under § 216(b), _id._, at 1.

In granting the motion to certify a collective action (in essence an “opt-in” class action) under § 216(b) of the FLSA, the federal court explained that “employees wishing to join the suit must ‘opt-in’ by filing a written consent with the court” or else they are not bound by any judgment or settlement. Edwards, at 4. In a majority of jurisdictions, certifying such a collective action requires a two-step process: “the first step is for the court to decide, ‘based primarily on the pleadings and any affidavits submitted by the parties, whether the potential class should be given notice of the action,'” id., at 5 (citations omitted); the court found that the “lenient standard” required to overcome this hurdle had been met. Id., at 5-7. The second step in the process is a motion by defense attorneys to decertify the class action, id., at 7; but the district court explained that it does not address that issue until after the opt-in time period has passed, id. The court rejected defense arguments that a collective action was inappropriate because of the differences in job duties between the plaintiff and other class members, id., at 6, explaining that – even though the defense had presented a “detailed analysis” of those differences, together with a “detailed discussion” of the differences in claims that potential class members may assert – the defense arguments were “better suited for motion to decertify the § 216(b) collective action,” id., at 7.

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized

Morales-Arcadio v. Shannon Produce Class Action Defense Case: Defense Rule 68 Offer Of Judgment Served Prior To Opt-In Deadline For Class Action Under Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) Is Invalid Georgia Federal Court Holds

Georgia Federal District Court Holds that Offers of Judgment in FLSA (Fair Labor Standards Act) Class Action Cannot be made Prior to Expiration of Opt-In Period Because Rule 68 Requires that Offer be made on Adverse Parties and Class Members are not “Fully Identifiable” Until Opt-In Period Ends

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action on behalf of migrant farm workers against Shannon Produce Farms in July 2005 alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and in November 2005 they filed a motion for certification of a FLSA collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), which the district court granted. Morales-Arcadio v. Shannon Produce Farms, 237 F.R.D 700, 701 (S.D. Ga. 2006). Prior to the “opt-in” deadline for class members to join the class action, defense attorneys served an offer of judgment pursuant to Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. Plaintiffs’ lawyer moved to invalidate the offer of judgment. The district court summarized the competing arguments at page 701 as follows:

Plaintiffs contend that defendants’ offer of judgment is improper since defendants served it during the time period provided by the Court for other similarly-situated plaintiffs to join the instant FLSA collective action. . . . Plaintiffs argue, inter alia, that the offer short-circuits the collective action process, has no legal effect since it purports to extend to workers who are not parties to the action, and moots the certified collective action and court-authorized notice. . . . Defendants have filed an opposition to the motion contending that plaintiffs’ motion is premature since a motion to strike an offer of judgment is only proper at the conclusion of a case. . . . Defendants also contend that their offer of judgment is proper since it specifically contemplates and provides a recovery for additional opt-in plaintiffs who join the action by the opt-in deadline. . . . (Footnote omitted)

Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized

UPS Class Action Defense Case-Bates v. UPS: Ninth Circuit Upholds Refusal To Decertify Class Action And Affirms Class Action Judgment Against UPS Based On ADA Claim, But Agrees With Defense That Unruh Act Violation Must Be Reversed

District Court did not Clearly Err in Finding UPS Violated Federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) by Refusing to Hire Deaf Drivers, But Defense was Correct that Class Action Judgment Based on Violation of California’s Unruh Act Must be Reversed Ninth Circuit Holds

Plaintiff filed a putative class action in California federal court against United Parcel Service alleging violations of the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and Unruh Civil Rights Act (Unruh Act) because it “categorically exclude[s] individuals from employment positions as ‘package-car drivers’ because they cannot pass a United States Department of Transportation (DOT) hearing standard that does not apply to the vehicles in question.” Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 465 F.3d 1069, 1073 (9th Cir. 2006). The district court certified the lawsuit as a class action. After a bifurcated trial, the district court ruled against the defense and found that UPS violated the ADA, the FEHA and the Unruh Act. On appeal, defense attorneys argued that “(1) Bates did not establish that any class members are ‘qualified’; (2) UPS satisfied its burden under the business necessity defense of the ADA; (3) the plaintiff class should be decertified; (4) the court’s injunction was an abuse of discretion; and (5) UPS did not violate the FEHA or the Unruh Act.” Id. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment as to the ADA claim, reversed the judgment as to the Unruh Act, and refused to reach the FEHA claim finding it unnecessary in light of the fact that affirmance of the ADA claim “is sufficient grounds for affirming the injunction.” Id., at 1093 n.25.

Applicants for positions as UPS package drivers must, inter alia, pass the same physical exam that the United States Department of Transportation requires of prospective drivers of commercial vehicles, which includes a “forced whisper” test of the applicants’ hearing. Bates, at 1074. However, the DOT only requires a physical exam of those who will be driving vehicles with a gross weight in excess of 10,000 pounds. UPS, on the other hand, required the exam of all applicants, including the thousands of drivers operating vehicles weighing from 7100 to 9300 pounds. Id., at 1075. The class conceded that UPS may require the physical exam of who drive DOT-regulated vehicles, but argued that its blanket exclusion of deaf applicants violated state and federal laws. Id. The district court ruled in favor of the class, holding in part that UPS had failed to establish a business necessity defense to its actions. Id.

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized

FLSA Class Action Defense Cases-Choimbol v. Fairfield Resorts: Virginia Federal Court Conditionally Certifies Class Action Under Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) Holding Only “Minimal Evidence” Required To Support Class Action Treatment

FLSA Class Action Certification within Court’s Discretion Even if Supported by only “Minimal Evidence” Virginia Federal Court Holds and Conditionally Certifies Class Action Subject to Defense Motion for Decertification Following Discovery

Plaintiffs filed a class action against their employers (see Note) alleging failure to pay overtime in violation of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Choimbol v. Fairfield Resorts, Inc., 475 F.Supp.2d 557, 558 (E.D. Va. 2006). Plaintiffs moved the court to certify the lawsuit as a class action; defense attorneys objected on the grounds that plaintiffs were not “similarly situated” to the class and had introduced no evidence that defendant Fairfield Resorts was a “joint employer” of plaintiffs or members of the putative class. The district court rejected defense arguments and conditionally certified a class action, holding that it had authority to grant the motion for class action treatment based on “minimal evidence” subject to a subsequent motion by defense attorneys for decertification of the class action.

The facts underlying the class action complaint are rather complicated but the salient facts are these, found at pages 559 through 561 of the district court’s opinion: Fairfield Resorts operates timeshares including Kingsgate, Governor’s Green and Patriot Place timeshare locations in Virginia. Fairfield contracted with Sandulyak and Nunnery to hire immigrants to provide laundry, housekeeping and grounds maintenance services at certain properties in Virginia. Sandulyak (doing business as Carolina Janitorial) provides regional immigrant labor, and is “commonly owned, staffed and operated” by national immigrant providers Ambassador Hospitality and Proline Management. Fairfield’s contract with Ambassador provided that the immigrant laborers would be employees and Carolina Janitorial and that Fairfield had no right to supervise, direct or control the laborers. In practice, however, Sandulyak failed to supervise the laborers, Carolina Janitorial did not have a manager at the properties, and Sandulyak only visited the properties once every 1-3 months. Rather, for more than a year responsibility for supervision and day-to-day control over the laborers fell to Nunnery, who had negotiated the agreement with Ambassador “in the name and on behalf of Fairfield.”

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases-Otto v. Pocono Health: Federal Court Grants Defense Motion To Dismiss State Law Overtime Class Action Claims As Incompatible With Federal Overtime Class Action Claims Because Of Conflict Between Opt-In/Opt-Out Requirements

Pennsylvania Federal Court Agrees With Defense that Fair Labor Standard Act (FLSA) Opt-In Requirement for Overtime Class Actions is “Inherently Incompatible” with Rule 23 Opt-Out Requirement for State Law Overtime Class Action Cases Mandating Dismissal of State Claims Former employees filed a putative class action in Pennsylvania federal court against Pocono Health System and Pocono Medical Center alleging violations of the federal Fair Labor Standard Act (FLSA), and of Pennsylvania’s Minimum Wage Act and Wage Payment and Collection Law, because defendants paid overtime on an “8 and 80” plan, requiring overtime if employees work more than 8 hours in a day or more than 80 hours over a two-week period.

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases-In re Farmers Insurance Exchange: Employer Properly Classified Insurance Claims Adjusters As Exempt From Overtime Requirements Of Federal Fair Labor Standard Act (FLSA) Ninth Circuit Holds

Ninth Circuit Directs District Court to Enter Judgment in Favor of Defense in Overtime Class Action Because 29 C.F.R. § 541.203 Exempts Insurance Claims Adjusters from FLSA Overtime Requirements

Insurance claims adjusters filed several overtime class action lawsuits against Farmers Insurance Exchange alleging failure to pay overtime under the federal Fair Labor Standard Act (FLSA). Defense attorneys argued that claims adjusters are exempt from FLSA’s overtime provisions. The district court created a “$3,000 in claims paid per month rule” and, under this new rule, found that some of the adjusters were exempt from overtime while others were not. On appeal, plaintiff and defense attorneys agreed that this rule “is neither workable nor supported by the evidence.” The Ninth Circuit agreed, holding that FLSA expressly exempts claims adjusters and directing that judgment be entered in favor of the defense in the class action. In re Farmers Ins. Exch., 466 F.3d 853, 855-56 (9th Cir. 2006).

In its capacity as an inter-insurance exchange, Farmers “performs all the functions of a typical insurance company,” including adjusting claims. In re Farmers Ins. Exch., at 856. In fact, approximately half of its 10,000 employees are claims adjusters categorized into five different types, which the Ninth Circuit summarized at pages 856 and 857 as:

Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized