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Class Action Defense Cases–Arias v. Superior Court: California Supreme Court Holds Representative Actions Under UCL Must Comply With Class Action Requirements But Labor Law PAGA Representative Claims Need Not Meet Class Action Requirements

Jul 6, 2009 | By: Michael J. Hassen

Employee Representative Action Under California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) Must Satisfy Class Action Requirements, but Employee Representative Actions Seeking Penalties Under California Labor Code’s Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) Need Not Satisfy Class Action Requirements California Supreme Court Holds

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against his former employer, Angelo Dairy, alleging labor law violations; the class action complaint alleged causes of action for violations of the Labor Code, labor regulations, and an Industrial Welfare Commission wage order, for .breach of contract and “breach of the warranty of habitability on the ground that defendants provided residential units in a defective and dangerous condition,” for violations of California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) “based on defendants’ failures to credit plaintiff for all hours worked, to pay overtime wages, to pay wages when due, to pay wages due upon termination, to provide rest and meal periods, and to obtain written authorization for deducting or offsetting wages.” Arias v. Superior Court, ___ Cal.4th ___, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 588, 2009 WL 1838973, *1 (Cal. June 29, 2009). In addition, the class action complaint sought enforcement under the UCL of penalties provided for in the Labor Code, and alleged under California’s Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), Labor Code § 2698 _et seq._, that “defendants had violated the Labor Code, labor regulations, and an Industrial Welfare Commission wage order by failing to pay all wages due, to provide itemized wage statements, to maintain adequate payroll records, to pay all wages due upon termination, to provide rest and meal periods, to offset proper amounts for employer-provided housing, and to provide necessary tools and equipment.” _Id._ Defense attorneys moved to strike five causes of action in the class action complaint “on the ground that plaintiff failed to comply with the pleading requirements for class actions”; the trial court granted the motion. _Id._ Plaintiff sought a writ of mandate from the Court of Appeal, which held that UCL claims brought in a representative capacity had to satisfy class action requirements, but that representative labor law claims under PAGA need not, _id._ The Supreme Court granted review and held “that an employee who, on behalf of himself and other employees, sues an employer under the [UCL]…for Labor Code violations must satisfy class action requirements, but that those requirements need not be met when an employee’s representative action against an employer is seeking civil penalties under [PAGA].” _Id._

The Supreme Court began in analysis by rejecting plaintiff’s claim that representative actions under the UCL (brought individually and on behalf of others) need not comply with the requirements for class actions. Arias, at *2. After summarizing California’s UCL, including the 2004 amendments thereto, and after noting that California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 does not mention the words “class action,” the Court addressed the issue of whether the UCL, as amended by the voters so as to require that private plaintiffs bringing representative actions comply with Section 382, “imposes a requirement that the action be brought as a class action.” Id. Based on the Supreme Court’s analysis of the statutory language, and recognizing that a “literal construction of an enactment…will not control when such a construction would frustrate the manifest purpose of the enactment as a whole,” id., at *3, the Supreme Court concluded that California voters clearly intended “to impose class action requirements on private plaintiffs’ representative actions” under the UCL, id. The Court therefore held that representative actions under the UCL must comply with class action requirements, id., at *4.

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized

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Labor Law Class Action Defense Cases–D’Este v. Bayer: Ninth Circuit On Class Action Appeal Certifies Two Questions To California Supreme Court As Central Issues In Numerous Federal Court Class Action Appeals

Jun 24, 2009 | By: Michael J. Hassen

Summary Judgment in Labor Law Class Action Turned on Issues of First Impression Recurrent in Federal Court Class Action Appeals, Warranting Referral of Questions Underlying Class Action to California Supreme Court for Resolution Ninth Circuit Holds

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against her employer, Bayer Pharmaceuticals, in California state court alleging labor law violations; specifically, the class action complaint asserted that Bayer misclassified pharmaceutical sales representatives (PSRs) as exempt employees, and accordingly failed to pay them overtime or provide them with meal breaks to which they would be entitled as non-exempt employees. D’Este v. Bayer Corp., 565 F.3d 1119, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2009). Defense attorneys removed the class action to federal court, and the district court granted Bayer’s motion for summary judgment “finding that [plaintiff] was exempt under California’s outside sales exemption”’ and based on that finding, the district court did not address whether Bayer also was correct in relying on the “administrative exemption” in its classification of PSRs. Id., at 1122. Plaintiff appealed, id., at 1122. The Ninth Circuit observed that “The question whether PSRs are exempt under California’s outside salesperson and administrative exemptions is the central issue in multiple class action lawsuits in the Ninth Circuit as well as in other circuits.” Id. Accordingly, the Circuit Court – pursuant to Rule 8.548 of the California Rules of Court – certified two questions to the California Supreme Court, id., at 1120.

The Ninth Circuit summarized the relevant facts as follows. Bayer gave plaintiff a list of doctors and hospitals, as well as a list of products, for which she was responsible: “[Plaintiff’s] job was to communicate information about her Bayer products to her roster of doctors and seek their non-binding commitment to write prescriptions for those products. She was also responsible for communicating with hospitals in her territory to influence them to add the Bayer products for which she was responsible to their formularies.” D’Este, at 1121. Plaintiff was “trained on a message” and was required to “adhere closely to the information provided by Bayer about its products”; beyond this, however, “she had the freedom to develop her own strategy for communicating with and influencing doctors.” Id. Additionally, she “had flexibility regarding how she spent her day,” id., at 1122. Specifically, “[Plaintiff] developed her own schedule for meeting with the doctors on her list. She received little or no daily supervision, and saw her manager once every six to eight weeks.” Id. According to the class action complaint, plaintiff regularly worked more than 8 hours per day and more than 40 hours per week, id. For this, she received between $81,000 and $103,000 per year in compensation, id., at 1121. And plaintiff was “not required to keep or maintain set hours.” Id., at 1122.

Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized

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Class Action Defense Cases—In re Staples: Judicial Panel On Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) Grants Defense Motion To Centralize Class Action Litigation In District Of New Jersey

Jun 19, 2009 | By: Michael J. Hassen

Judicial Panel Grants Defense Request for Pretrial Coordination of Class Action Lawsuits Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, Unopposed by Class Action Plaintiffs, and Transfers Actions to District of New Jersey Six class actions – two in Massachusetts and one each in Connecticut, New Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania – were filed against Staples alleging violations of state and federal labor laws; specifically, the class action complaints allege that Staples failed to pay its assistant, operations and/or sales managers overtime pay under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and/or various state wage and hour statutes.

Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Multidistrict Litigation Uncategorized

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T-Mobile Class Action Defense Cases–Vega v. T-Mobile: Eleventh Circuit Reverses Class Action Certification Order And Orders Lawsuit To Proceed On Individual Rather Than Class Action Basis

Jun 18, 2009 | By: Michael J. Hassen

Class Action Certification Order of Labor Law Class Action must be Reversed because District Court Failed to Conduct “Rigorous Analysis” of Rule 23’s Requirements for Class Action Treatment Eleventh Circuit Holds

Plaintiff filed a putative nationwide class action against his former employer, T-Mobile, after it fired him for poor attendance; the class action complaint alleged labor law violations. Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., ___ F.3d ___, 1260-61 (11th Cir. 2009). Specifically, the class action alleged that “by charging back commissions advanced on sales of ‘deactivated’ prepaid service plans, T-Mobile violated the terms of the compensation program, failed to pay commissions earned by the sales representatives, and was unjustly enriched by retaining the benefit of its employees’ services without fully compensating them for such services.” _Id._, at 1262. T-Mobile’s compensation package for retail sales representatives consisted of an hourly wage plus commissions. _Id._, at 1261. The commissions were incentive-based, paid on the employee’s “net activations” – if a customer canceled service within 180 days of activation then T-Mobile would “charge-back” the commission previously paid “in order to reclaim that amount from the sales representative.” _Id._ Under T-Mobile’s plan, commissions paid within the 180-day window are “paid as an advance against commissions anticipated to be earned in the future” and “[c]ommissions are not earned until the expiration of the 180-day commission charge back window.” _Id._ Additionally, T-Mobile, in its sole discretion, determined whether sales qualified for commission payments, _id._ The class action complaint was filed in Florida state court, _id._, at 1262, but defense attorneys removed the class action to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), _id._, at 1263. Plaintiff moved the district court to certify the litigation as a class action; defense attorneys opposed class action treatment and moved for summary judgment. _Id._ The district court denied T-Mobile’s summary judgment motion, and granted class action certification on behalf of a Florida class only. _Id._, at 1263-64. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), the Eleventh Circuit granted interlocutory review of the class action certification order and reversed. _Id._, at 1264.

The class action complaint did not impress the Circuit Court, which it characterized as “incomplete and ambiguous.” Vega, at 1263. The vague complaint “simply alleges: (1) that, because prepaid customers paid up-front for their service, T-Mobile ‘bore no risk of non-payment’; (2) that when T-Mobile charged its employees back for commissions on prepaid plans, ‘even though T-MOBILE received the full benefit of its agreement with the prepaid plan customers, T-MOBILE’s commission based employees lost the benefits of those sales and the resulting commissions’; and (3) that ‘T-MOBILE has unfair [sic] and unjustly profited from its internal systems error by unduly charging back its employees on the prepaid plans and retaining its employee’s [sic] wages for its own use and benefit.’” Id., at 1262. The class action asserted two claims – one for “unpaid wages” and one for “unjust enrichment” – arising out of the central allegation that “T-Mobile improperly withheld or charged back from its employees.” Id. The class action did not allege that employees nationwide were subject to the same compensation structure, id. The Eleventh Circuit noted that the district court certified the litigation as a class action despite two concerns: first, that a nationwide class “lacked commonality due to variations in the contract and employment laws of the fifty states,” and second, that the class action complaint’s allegations “focused on charge backs of commissions already paid, but indicated nothing about any failure to pay commissions in the first instance, the inclusion in the class of T-Mobile ‘employees … who … were entitled to receive[ ] commissions … who did not receive their commissions’ would implicate claims falling outside the scope of the complaint, as pled, and, thus, failed the typicality requirement.” Id., at 1263-64.

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized

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Class Action Defense Cases–Olvera v. El Pollo Loco: California Court Affirms Denial Of Motion To Compel Individual Arbitration Of Labor Law Class Action Holding Class Action Arbitration Waiver Unenforceable

Jun 16, 2009 | By: Michael J. Hassen

Class Action Waiver in Arbitration Clause Unconscionable thereby Warranting Denial of Motion to Compel Plaintiff to Arbitrate Individual Claims rather than Pursue Labor Law Class Action Complaint California State Court Holds

Plaintiff, the general manager of an El Pollo Loco restaurant, filed a putative class action against El Pollo Loco alleging violations of California’s labor code; the class action complaint alleged inter alia that defendant misclassified its general managers as exempt when they “spent the majority of their time performing nonmanagerial tasks” and that it wrongfully denied its general managers overtime compensation and meal breaks. Olvera v. El Pollo Loco, Inc., 173 Cal.App.4th 447, 451 (Cal.App. 2009). As part of his employment, plaintiff received written materials that, in part, required that all work-related disputes be resolved through binding arbitration, governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Id., 449-50. Class action litigation was prohibited, but the parties were permitted “to conduct discovery and bring motions in an arbitration as provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” id., at 450. Defense attorneys moved to compel arbitration of the class action complaint as to plaintiff’s individual claims only, id., at 451. Plaintiff opposed the motion to compel arbitration, arguing that the arbitration clause was unconscionable; defense attorneys argued that the clause was not unconscionable because employees were not required to sign the acknowledgement form by which they were bound to the arbitration clause. Id., at 452. The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration, concluding that the clause was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Id., at 453. Under California law, an order denying a motion t compel arbitration is an appealable order. Cal. Code Civ. Proc., § 1294. Defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed.

After summarizing the relevant law regarding arbitration agreements, see Olvera, at 453-54, the appellate court turned first to the issue of procedural unconscionability. The Court of Appeal explained at page 454, “Procedural unconscionability focuses on oppression or unfair surprise, while substantive unconscionability focuses on overly harsh or one-sided terms.” (Citations omitted.) California courts view these two factors on a sliding scale: “The more procedural unconscionability is present, the less substantive unconscionability is required to justify a determination that a contract or clause is unenforceable. Conversely, the less procedural unconscionability is present, the more substantive unconscionability is required to justify such a determination.” Id., at 454 (citations omitted). The appellate court found that the arbitration clause was procedurally unconscionable because of (1) the unequal bargaining power between the employees and the employer, which “makes it likely that the employees felt at least some pressure to sign the acknowledgment and agree to the new dispute resolution policy” even if the company insists that they were not required to do so, and (2) agreement to the dispute resolution procedure was “not an informed decision” because the description of the dispute resolution policy “was totally inaccurate.” Id., at 455-56.

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Starbucks Class Action Defense Cases–Chau v. Starbucks: California Appellate Court Reverses $86 Million Class Action Judgment Against Starbucks Holding Labor Law Class Action Claims Failed

Jun 15, 2009 | By: Michael J. Hassen

Trial Court Judgment in Class Action Alleging Starbucks Violated Labor Code by Sharing Tips with Shift Supervisors Required Reversal because California Law does not Prohibit Starbucks’ Shift Supervisors from Sharing in Tips California State Court Holds

Plaintiff filed a class action against Starbucks alleging violations of California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) and Labor Code; the class action complaint alleged that Starbucks alleged shift supervisors to participate in tip pools in violation of California law, specifically Labor Code section 351. Chau v. Starbucks Corp., 174 Cal.App.4th 688 (Cal.App. 2009) [Slip Opn., at 1-2]. The trial court certified the litigation as a class action, id., at 2. Starbucks moved to decertify the class, but the motion was denied. Id., at 6. Prior to trial, the court granted plaintiff’s in limine motion to exclude evidence that shift supervisors serve customers, finding that such evidence was “irrelevant” (though it did allow some evidence on the matter). Id., at 7. Ultimately, the trial court awarded the class $86 million as restitution based on its finding at the conclusion of a bench trial that plaintiff had proved the UCL claim. Id., at 2. Starbucks appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that Starbucks’ tip sharing policy did not violate California law: “The applicable statutes do not prohibit Starbucks from permitting shift supervisors to share in the proceeds placed in collective tip boxes.” Id. The Court explained that the tip-pooling practice challenged by the class action “concern[ed] an employer’s authority to require equitable allocation of tips placed in a collective tip box for those employees providing service to the customer.” Id., at 2-3. The appellate court held at page 3, “There is no decisional or statutory authority prohibiting an employer from allowing a service employee to keep a portion of the collective tip, in proportion to the amount of hours worked, merely because the employee also has limited supervisory duties.” Accordingly, it reversed the trial court judgment.

Starbucks’ thousands of stores are staffed by baristas, shift supervisors, assistant store managers, and store managers. Chau, at 3. The Court of Appeal explained the differences between the store employees as follows: “Baristas are entry-level, part-time hourly employees responsible for customer service related tasks, such as working the cash register and making coffee drinks. Shift supervisors are also part-time hourly employees who perform all the duties of a barista, but are also responsible for some additional tasks, including supervising and coordinating employees within the store, opening and closing the store, and depositing money into the safe. A barista is eligible for promotion to shift supervisor after six months on the job. A store manager is a full-time salaried employee, and has the authority to recruit, hire, promote, transfer, schedule, discipline, and terminate baristas and shift supervisors. In some stores, a store manager is assisted by an assistant store manager, who is also a fulltime salaried employee.” Id., at 3-4. At trial, Starbucks introduced evidence that shift supervisors spend 90-95% of their time “performing the same jobs as baristas,” and that they had “no authority to hire, discipline, or terminate baristas.” Id., at 8. Moreover, shift supervisors are not considered “management” by the company, id. The trial court ruled against Starbucks because it found that shift supervisors “‘supervise’ and ‘direct’ the acts of other employees,” and that they were barred by California law to share in tip pools. Id., at 8-9.

Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized

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Class Action Defense Cases–Baum v. AstraZeneca: Pennsylvania Federal Court Grants Defense Summary Judgment Motion In Labor Law Class Action Holding Plaintiff Properly Classified As Exempt From Overtime Pay

May 25, 2009 | By: Michael J. Hassen

Labor Law Class Action Challenging Defendant’s Classification of Pharmaceutical Sales Representatives as Exempt from Overtime Laws Dismissed on Defense Motion for Summary Judgment because Plaintiff Fell within Outside Sales Exemption Pennsylvania Federal Court Holds Plaintiff, a pharmaceutical sales representative, filed a class action in Pennsylvania state court against her employer, AstraZeneca, alleging labor law violations; the class action complaint asserted that defendant improperly classified her as “exempt” and failed to pay her overtime required by Pennsylvania law.

Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized

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AT&T Class Action Defense Cases–AT&T v. Hulteen: Supreme Court Holds Employer Does Not Violate Pregnancy Discrimination Act By Paying Pension Benefits Calculated Under Pre-PDA Accrual Rule Giving Less Retirement Credit For Pregnancy Than Medical Leave

May 20, 2009 | By: Michael J. Hassen

Class Action Failed to Allege Discrimination Against Employer that Calculated Pension Benefits under Pre-Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) Rules, Lawful at the Time, that Gave Less Retirement Credit to Pregnancy Leave than for Medical Leave Supreme Court Holds Plaintiffs filed a class action against AT&T alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; the class action complaint asserted that defendant discriminated against employees on the basis of sex and pregnancy by providing pension and other benefits on a seniority system that treated pregnancy differently from other medical conditions.

Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized

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3M Class Action Defense Cases–Whitaker v. 3M: Minnesota State Court Grants Class Action Treatment To Labor Law Class Action Against 3M Alleging Age Discrimination

May 15, 2009 | By: Michael J. Hassen

Labor Law Class Action Against 3M Alleging Age Discrimination Warranted Class Action Certification Minnesota State Court Holds Plaintiff filed a class action against his employer, 3M, alleging labor law violations; the class action complaint asserted that 3M discriminated against employees on the basis of age with respect to leadership development opportunities, promotion decisions, compensation decisions, and job eliminations. Whitaker v. 3M Co., Ramsey County District Court, Second Judicial District, Case No.

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized

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MDL Class Action Defense Cases—In re Staples: Judicial Panel On Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) Grants Defense Motion To Centralize Class Action Litigation In District Of New Jersey

May 1, 2009 | By: Michael J. Hassen

Judicial Panel Grants Defense Request for Pretrial Coordination of Class Action Lawsuits Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, Unopposed by Class Action Plaintiffs, and Transfers Class Actions to District of New Jersey Six class actions – two in Massachusetts, and one each in Connecticut, New Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania – were filed against Staples alleging labor law violations; specifically, the class action complaints allege “that Staples assistant, operations and/or sales managers are entitled to overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act and/or various state wage and hour statutes.

Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Multidistrict Litigation Uncategorized

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