Class Action Defense Issues-Ledbetter v. Goodyear: Divided Supreme Court Holds Statute Of Limitations For Title VII Pay Discrimination Claims Begins To Run When Discriminatory Act Occurs

Discriminatory Employment Practice Acts that occur Prior to EEOC Charging Period are Time-Barred even if the Discriminatory Acts had “Continuing Effects” During the EEOC Charging Period Supreme Court Holds

In a case that will have substantial impact of Title VII class action lawsuits, a divided Supreme Court held that the limitations period on a Title VII pay discrimination claim begins to run when the discriminatory act occurs. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., __ U.S. __, 2007 WL 1528298, *2 (May 29, 2007). Plaintiff had worked for Goodyear for almost 20 years, from 1979 to 1998, and received or was denied raises based on performance evaluations by her supervisors, id., at *3. Plaintiff filed a questionnaire with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in March 1998 alleging sex discrimination, and in July filed a formal charge with the EEOC. Id. In November 1998, after taking early retirement, plaintiff filed suit against Goodyear asserting several claims, including a Title VII pay discrimination allegation. Id. The Supreme Court summarized the district court proceedings at page *3 as follows:

The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Goodyear on several of Ledbetter’s claims, including her Equal Pay Act claim, but allowed others, including her Title VII pay discrimination claim, to proceed to trial. In support of this latter claim, Ledbetter introduced evidence that during the course of her employment several supervisors had given her poor evaluations because of her sex, that as a result of these evaluations her pay was not increased as much as it would have been if she had been evaluated fairly, and that these past pay decisions continued to affect the amount of her pay throughout her employment. Toward the end of her time with Goodyear, she was being paid significantly less than any of her male colleagues. Goodyear maintained that the evaluations had been nondiscriminatory, but the jury found for Ledbetter and awarded her backpay and damages.

Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases-Neary v. Metropolitan Property: Connecticut Federal Court Grants Defense Motion In FLSA Class Action To Dismiss Class Action Claims Based On State Wage And Hour Laws

Federal Court Refuses to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction over State Law Wage and Hour Class Action Claims Because of Substantial Variance in State Laws and Conflict with FLSA (Fair Labor Standards Act) Opt-In Provision

Employees filed a putative class action in Connecticut federal court against Metropolitan Property alleging that the employer failed to pay overtime in violation of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Connecticut state labor laws. Neary v. Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 472 F.Supp.2d 247, 248 (D. Conn. 2007). The class action complaint included causes of action for a class action claim under FRCP Rule 23(b)(3) “for violation of state wage and hour laws ‘in each state in which each [p]laintiff worked’ (Count 4),” as well as “a class action claim under [FRCP Rule 23(b)(1)] for violation of state wage and hour laws ‘of the various states in which [p]laintiffs worked’ (Count 5).” Id. Defense attorneys moved to dismiss these class action claims on the grounds that the state law opt-out claims presented an irreconcilable conflict with the FLSA’s opt-in requirement. Id., at 249. The district court agreed.

Plaintiff’s class action complaint alleged that defendant insures vehicles nationwide and engaged in the practice of classifying field adjusters, field appraisers and outside adjusters as exempt from overtime in violation of the FLSA “and the wage and hour laws of the various states in which [p]laintiffs performed work for [d]efendant.” Neary, at 249. Plaintiff purported to bring the class action on behalf of a nationwide class alleging that certification was appropriate under Rule 23(b)(3). Id., at 249-50. The defense moved to dismiss Counts 4 and 5 of the class action complaint “pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b), on the basis that the class action procedures in Rule 23 irreconcilably conflict with Section 216(b) of the FLSA which expressly limits the scope of representative lawsuits seeking overtime pay to individuals who affirmative opt-in to the action.” Id., at 250. The district court granted the defense motion, but not for the reasons advanced.

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases-Mooney v. Allianz Life: Minnesota Court Certifies Class Action Holding Class Action Premised On State Consumer Fraud Laws And Common Law Unjust Enrichment Could Be Applied To Non-Resident Class Members

Federal Court Rejects Defense Constitutional Objection to Certification of Class Action and Holds Rule 23(b)(3) Predominance Test Satisfied in Class Action Premised on Minnesota Consumer Fraud Laws and Common Law for Unjust Enrichment because Minnesota’s Contacts with Non-Resident Class Members were Significant Enough to Permit Application of Minnesota Law to all Class Action Claims

Plaintiffs filed a class action against Allianz Life Insurance alleging consumer fraud claims arising out of the marketing of certain annuity products to senior citizens. Mooney v. Allianz Life Ins. Co., __ F.Supp.2d __ (D. Minn. May 10, 2007) [Slip Opn., at 2]. Plaintiffs moved for certification of a class action; defense attorneys objected in part on the grounds that predominance did not exist under Rule 23(b)(3) because of choice-of-law and conflicts-of-law issues. Id. The district court denied class action treatment, concluding that “because Plaintiffs had not performed the conflicts-of-law and choice-of-law analyses required by the Eighth Circuit’s opinion in In re St. Jude Medical, Inc., 425 F.3d 1116, 1120-21 (8th Cir. 2005), the Court was unable to determine whether class-wide questions of law predominate, or whether class-wide treatment is superior to other means of resolving this controversy.” Id. The court otherwise found that all of the class action requirements of Rule 23(a) had been met, id. Plaintiffs and defense filed supplemental briefing on the predominance issue, and the federal court certified a class action as requested.

Rule 23(b)(3) requires that “questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.” Plaintiffs argued that this test was met because Minnesota’s consumer fraud statutes and common law regarding unjust enrichment constitutionally may be applied to the claims of each class member; defense attorneys countered that “the law of each class member’s home state must be applied and therefore individualized questions of law predominate.” Mooney, at 3. According to the defense, applying Minnesota law to the claims of out-of-state residents is unconstitutional; alternatively, the defense argued that Minnesota’s choice of law rules required that the claims of each class member be examined under the laws of the states in which the class members lived. Id. The district court rejected the defense arguments and granted class certification.

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized

Federal Court Order Certifying Securities Class Action Against Vivendi Revised And Officially Published

In a prior article, we reported that the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York had granted plaintiffs’ motion to certify a securities class action against French company Vivendi and two of its individual officers – that article may be found here. The court’s Revised Memorandum Opinion and Order may be found at In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 242 F.R.D. 76 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). A copy of the district court’s revised opinion and order granting class action treatment is provided.

Class Actions In The News Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases-Interinsurance v. Superior Court: Defense Entitled To Judgment In Class Action Because Interest Charged On Installment Payments For Auto Policy Was Not A “Premium” Under California Law

As Matter of First Impression, California Appellate Court Holds that Department of Insurance Interpretation of Statute was not Entitled to Deference and that Trial Court Erred in Holding that Interest Charged by Insurer for Installment Payments Was a “Premium” Required to be Disclosed Under California law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against her insurer, Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club (IEAC) alleging violations of California law in that the insurer failed to advise her of the fees associated with paying her insurance premium in installments rather than in one lump sum. Interinsurance Exch. of the Auto. Club v. Superior Court, ___ Cal.App.4th ___, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 421, 423 (Cal.App. March 26, 2007). Defense and plaintiff attorneys moved for summary judgment; the trial court granted plaintiff’s motion and denied the defense motion, _id._ Defense attorneys filed a petition for writ of mandate with the Court of Appeal and the appellate court reversed, holding that a “premium” within the meaning of the applicable California law “does not include charges imposed for making payments of the annual premium in installments” and, accordingly, IEAC did not violate California law and was entitled to summary judgment against plaintiff’s class action complaint. _Id._ Defense attorneys filed a petition for writ relief with the Court of Appeal; the appellate court accepted the case in part because it presented an issue of first impression, and ultimately reversed the trial court.

In 2002, plaintiff obtained car insurance from IEAC with an annual premium of $1049, and in 2002 and 2003 she paid the premium in one lump sum. IEAC, at 423. Her renewal statement for 2004 reflected an annual premium of $986 (after a $63 discount), and provided plaintiff the option of paying the premium in one lump sum or in 9 installments “subject to additional charges for interest at a rate of 17.99 percent per year and requiring payment of only the first installment of $53.60,” id. Plaintiff understood the notice and “understood an election to pay the annual premium in installments would subject her to interest charges”; nonetheless, she “elected to pay the annual premium in installments rather than in one lump sum.” Id. The following year plaintiff received another renewal notice, this one reflecting an annual premium of $846, and again providing her with “the option of paying the $846 annual net premium in either one lump sum or nine monthly installments, subject to additional charges for interest at a rate of 18 percent per year and requiring payment initially of only the first installment of $34.48.” Id., at 424. Plaintiff again selected the installment option, id.

Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases-In re Intel: Delaware Federal Court Holds Sherman Act Class Action Claims Premised On Foreign Conduct Barred By Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA)

Defense Motion to Dismiss Class Action Allegations Based on Foreign Conduct Granted because no Evidence of “Direct, Substantial and Foreseeable Effect on U.S. Commerce” as Required by Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (FTAIA) Delaware District Court Holds

After Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) filed suit Intel alleging Sherman Act antitrust claims and violations of California’s unfair competition laws, several class action lawsuits were filed and ultimately consolidated with the AMD lawsuit. In re Intel Corp. Microprocessor Antitrust Litig., 476 F.Supp.2d 452, 453 (D. Del. 2007). The first amended class action complaint alleged that Intel “engaged in anticompetitive conduct in the United States which has resulted in Intel obtaining an unlawful world-wide monopoly over the x86 microprocessor market” thereby increasing the cost of the x86 to consumers. Id., at 453-54. In addition to Sherman Act claims, the class action complaint included claims under the laws of 20 states for antitrust/restraint of trade, and 23 states for unfair competition/consumer protection, and prayed for injunctive relief, monetary damages (including punitive and treble damages), disgorgement of profits, and establishment of a constructive trust. Id., at 454. Defense attorneys moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ “foreign conduct claims” under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, id.; the district court granted the defense motion.

By way of background, AMD’s complaint against Intel included foreign conduct allegations that on Intel’s motion the district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. In re Intel, at 455. The class action complaint similarly included allegations of foreign conduct: the class plaintiffs “allege that the weakening of AMD in the market resulted in Intel charging higher prices overseas to third parties for microprocessors who then installed these higher priced Intel chips into computers that were eventually sold in the United States Market, which in turn led to higher retail prices for those computers in the United States.” Id. Intel argued that the foreign conduct theory in the class action complaint is even more attenuated than the claim the Court struck from AMD’s Complaint and, accordingly, the foreign conduct claims should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (FTAIA). Id. Specifically, FTAIA requires evidence of a “direct, substantial and foreseeable effect on U.S. commerce” and Intel argued that the class action complaint failed to include any such evidence. Id.

Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized

15 U.S.C. § 78w—Rules, Regulations, Orders And Annual Reports Under The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA)

To assist class action defense attorneys who defend against securities class action litigation, we provide the text of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA). For purposes of private securities class actions, Congress set forth rules, regulations and orders, and provisions governing annual reports, in 15 U.S.C. § 78w, which provides:

§ 78w. Rules, regulations, and orders; annual reports

(a) Power to make rules and regulations; considerations; public disclosure

(1) The Commission, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the other agencies enumerated in section 78c (a)(34) of this title shall each have power to make such rules and regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to implement the provisions of this chapter for which they are responsible or for the execution of the functions vested in them by this chapter, and may for such purposes classify persons, securities, transactions, statements, applications, reports, and other matters within their respective jurisdictions, and prescribe greater, lesser, or different requirements for different classes thereof. No provision of this chapter imposing any liability shall apply to any act done or omitted in good faith in conformity with a rule, regulation, or order of the Commission, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, other agency enumerated in section 78c (a)(34) of this title, or any self-regulatory organization, notwithstanding that such rule, regulation, or order may thereafter be amended or rescinded or determined by judicial or other authority to be invalid for any reason.

Statutes & Rules Uncategorized

Labor Law Class Action Filings Continue Streak As Top Category Of New Class Action Filings In California State And Federal Courts

As a resource to California defense attorneys, we provide weekly, unofficial summaries of the legal categories for new class action lawsuits filed in California state and federal courts in the Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Jose, Sacramento, San Diego, San Mateo, Oakland/Alameda and Orange County areas. We include only those categories that include 10% or more of the class action filings during the relevant timeframe. This past week, only 36 new class action cases were filed in these courts.

Class Actions In The News Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases-In re Midland National Life: Judicial Panel On Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) Grants Motion To Centralize Class Action Lawsuits But Selects Central District of California As Transferee Court

Judicial Panel Grants Request, Unopposed by Defense, for Pretrial Coordination of Class Action Lawsuits Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 but Rejects Moving Plaintiff’s Request to Transfer Class Actions to Southern District of Iowa Class action lawsuits were filed in Iowa and California federal courts against Midland National Life Insurance Company alleging deceptive marketing and sale of annuities to seniors. In re Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co. Annuity Sales Prac. Litig.

Class Action Court Decisions Multidistrict Litigation Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases-Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: Supreme Circuit Holds Allegations Of Parallel Conduct Unfavorable To Competition Insufficient To Survive Motion To Dismiss Absent Facts Evidencing Agreement Rather Than Identical Independent Action

Sherman Act § 1 Class Action Complaint Must Allege Agreement not Merely Parallel Conduct Supreme Court Holds

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against various “Baby Bells” defendants alleging violations of the § 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, __ U.S. __, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 2007 WL 1461066, *4 (May 21, 2007). Defense attorneys moved to dismiss the class action on the grounds that defendants were acting in their economic self-interest and that evidence of “parallel behavior” among them is insufficient to establish a conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act, id., at *5. The district court agreed and granted the defense motion to dismiss, but the Second Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court “granted certiorari to address the proper standard for pleading an antitrust conspiracy through allegations of parallel conduct.” Id., at *6. The Supreme Court explained at page *4, “The question in this putative class action is whether a § 1 complaint can survive a motion to dismiss when it alleges that major telecommunications providers engaged in certain parallel conduct unfavorable to competition, absent some factual context suggesting agreement, as distinct from identical, independent action. We hold that such a complaint should be dismissed.”

Following the divestiture of AT&T’s local telephone service in 1984, regional telephone monopolies known as “Baby Bells” or “Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers” (ILECs) arose to provide local phone service but they were excluded from providing long-distance service. Twombly, at *4. In 1996, Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act of 1996 that permitted competition for local telephone service and authorized ILECs to enter the long-distance market, id. Plaintiffs’ class action complaint named BellSouth Corp., Qwest Communications, SBC Communications and Verizon, and alleged that these ILECs control at least 90% of the local telephone service market in the 48 contiguous states. Id., at *4 n.1. In essence, plaintiffs allege that defendants must have conspired in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, and that this conspiracy may be “inferred from the ILECs’ common failure ‘meaningfully [to] pursu[e]’ ‘attractive business opportunit[ies]’ in contiguous markets where they possessed ‘substantial competitive advantages.’” Id., at *5. The gravamen of the class action complaint was as follows:

Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized