12 U.S.C. § 2609– Limitation On Requirement Of Advance Deposits In Escrow Accounts Under The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA)

As a resource for the class action defense lawyer who defends against RESPA (Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act) class actions, we provide the text of RESPA. Congress detailed limitations on lender requirements for advance deposits in escrow accounts under RESPA in 12 U.S.C. § 2609, which provides:

§ 2609. Limitation on requirement of advance deposits in escrow accounts

(a) In general

A lender, in connection with a federally related mortgage loan, may not require the borrower or prospective borrower–

(1) to deposit in any escrow account which may be established in connection with such loan for the purpose of assuring payment of taxes, insurance premiums, or other charges with respect to the property, in connection with the settlement, an aggregate sum (for such purpose) in excess of a sum that will be sufficient to pay such taxes, insurance premiums and other charges attributable to the period beginning on the last date on which each such charge would have been paid under the normal lending practice of the lender and local custom, provided that the selection of each such date constitutes prudent lending practice, and ending on the due date of its first full installment payment under the mortgage, plus one-sixth of the estimated total amount of such taxes, insurance premiums and other charges to be paid on dates, as provided above, during the ensuing twelve-month period; or

(2) to deposit in any such escrow account in any month beginning with the first full installment payment under the mortgage a sum (for the purpose of assuring payment of taxes, insurance premiums and other charges with respect to the property) in excess of the sum of (A) one-twelfth of the total amount of the estimated taxes, insurance premiums and other charges which are reasonably anticipated to be paid on dates during the ensuing twelve months which dates are in accordance with the normal lending practice of the lender and local custom, provided that the selection of each such date constitutes prudent lending practice, plus (B) such amount as is necessary to maintain an additional balance in such escrow account not to exceed one-sixth of the estimated total amount of such taxes, insurance premiums and other charges to be paid on dates, as provided above, during the ensuing twelve-month period: Provided, however, That in the event the lender determines there will be or is a deficiency he shall not be prohibited from requiring additional monthly deposits in such escrow account to avoid or eliminate such deficiency.

Statutes & Rules Uncategorized

12 U.S.C. § 2608—Title Insurance And Liability Of Sellers Under The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) For Requiring Use Particular Title Companies

As a resource for the class action defense lawyer who defends against RESPA (Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act) class actions, we provide the text of RESPA. Congress prohibited sellers from requiring that buyers use a “particular title company” and provided for liability for any such conduct in 12 U.S.C. § 2608, which states: § 2608. Title companies; liability of seller (a) No seller of property that will be purchased with the assistance of a federally related mortgage loan shall require directly or indirectly, as a condition to selling the property, that title insurance covering the property be purchased by the buyer from any particular title company.

Statutes & Rules Uncategorized

Merck’s Vioxx Defense Team Suffers Setback As New Jersey Appellate Court Holds Trial Court “Prematurely Terminated” Class Action Complaint

Peter Loftus of The Wall Street Journal reports today that a New Jersey state appellate court has reversed a lower court ruling dismissing a putative class action against Merck on behalf of people who used Vioxx for at least six (6) weeks but who have not evidenced any medical problems. While the opinion is a setback for the Vioxx defense team, it does not appear to be a “tremendous decision” as viewed by plaintiffs’ counsel.

Class Actions In The News Uncategorized

Labor Law Class Action Cases Again Claim Top Spot In New Class Action Cases Facing Defense Attorneys In California

To aid California class action defense attorneys in anticipating claims against which they may have to defend, we provide weekly an unofficial summary of legal categories for class actions filed in California state and federal courts in the Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Jose, Sacramento, San Diego, San Mateo, Oakland/Alameda and Orange County areas. This report covers the time period of from January 11 – January 18, 2007. We include only those categories that contain 10% or more of the class action filings during the relevant timeframe.

Class Actions In The News Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases-In re PolyMedica: Massachusetts Federal Court Refuses To Certify Securities Fraud Class Action For Contested Period Because Plaintiff Failed To Establish “Cause And Effect” And “Market Efficiency”

Defense Defeats Class Action Certification for Contested Time Period Because Plaintiff’s Evidence Failed to Demonstrate “Cause and Effect” and Only “Weakly” Showed Market Efficiency Massachusetts Court Holds

Plaintiff investors filed a putative class action against PolyMedica and others alleging securities fraud, relying on the “fraud on the market” doctrine to establish the reliance element of their securities fraud claim. In re PolyMedica Corp. Securities Litig., 453 F.Supp.2d 260, 264-65 (D. Mass. 2006). A Massachusetts federal court certified a class action for the time period of October 26, 1998 to August 21, 2001; the First Circuit reversed with respect to the time period of January 1, 2001 to August 21, 2001, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Id., at 264. The new district court explained at page 264, “The sole issue for further adjudication here is whether Rule 23(b)(3) can be satisfied in the circumstances of this case.” (Broadly, Rule 23(b)(3) requires that common questions of law or fact predominate over individual issues and that the class action device be the superior method for resolving the dispute.) The court agreed with defense attorneys that it could not, and refused to certify a class for the 2001 time period.

The federal court began by noting the special problem created by securities fraud class actions, explaining at page 264: “In the context of securities fraud allegations, the nature of Rule 23(b)(3) analysis is quite particularized. Securities frauds, like all frauds, entail proof of reliance. . . . While reliance is typically demonstrated on an individual basis, the Supreme Court has noted that such a rule would effectively foreclose securities fraud class actions because individual questions of reliance would inevitably overwhelm the common ones under Rule 23(b)(3). . . . To avoid this result, the Supreme Court has recognized the fraud-on-the-market theory, which relieves the plaintiff of the burden of proving individualized reliance on a defendant’s misstatement, by permitting a rebuttable presumption that the plaintiff relied on the ‘integrity of the market price’ which reflected that misstatement.” (Citations omitted.) The fraud on the market doctrine requires that the market be “efficient” – that is, “‘one in which the market price of the stock fully reflects all publicly available information,'” id., at 265 (quoting In re PolyMedica Corp. Securities Litig., 432 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2005)).

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions PSLRA/SLUSA Class Actions Uncategorized

Sinclair v. Merck-Class Action Defense Case: New Jersey Appellate Court Holds Class Action Ruling In Favor Of Defense In Vioxx Case Was Premature

New Jersey Court Holds that Whether Trial Court should Order Medical Monitoring of Vioxx Patients who Show no Signs of Illness, and Whether such Patients have a “Presently Cognizable Injury,” Requires Additional Evidence

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against Merck in New Jersey state court for negligence, products liability, fraud and breach of warranty because they had used Vioxx for at least six consecutive weeks before the drug was removed from the market. The plaintiffs had not yet suffered any medical problems but alleged that “as a result of their direct and prolonged exposure to Vioxx, they have an enhanced risk of sustaining serious, undiagnosed and unrecognized myocardial infarctions,” and prayed for “the establishment of a court-administered medical screening program, funded by Merck.” Sinclair v. Merck & Co., Inc., — A.2d —-, 2007 WL 91446, *1 (N.J.Super.A.D. January 16, 2007). Defense attorneys moved to dismiss the class action complaint on the ground that New Jersey law did not afford the remedy of medical screening in products liability cases; the trial court agreed and granted the motion to dismiss. Id. The appellate division reversed, holding that the trial court “prematurely terminated plaintiffs’ opportunity to establish the existence of a legally cognizable claim.” Id., at *2.

In reinstating the class action complaint, the appellate division noted the “difficulty” created by “the relative paucity of New Jersey precedent.” Sinclair, at *2. The opinion discusses at length the three controlling decisions on the issue of medical monitoring, id., at *2-*6, and concluded that those cases required an analysis of “scientific and other evidence relevant to plaintiffs’ claims” in order for the trial court to properly determine “that a medical monitoring remedy should not be recognized in connection with Vioxx exposure,” id., at *6. The appellate division explicitly noted that it was “express[ing] no opinion as to the ultimate viability of plaintiffs’ action,” id., at *2, and recognized that “evidence may prove the judge to be correct” in dismissing the class action, id., at *6.

Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized

Dale v. Comcast Class Action Defense Case: Georgia Federal Court Grants Defense Motion To Compel Arbitration Under Agreement Barring Class Action Lawsuits Holding Arbitration Clause Unconscionable And Dismisses Class Action Complaint

Arbitration Clause Barring Class Action Lawsuits in Contract Governed by Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) Valid and Enforceable Georgia Federal Court Holds, Agreeing with Defense that Arbitration Agreement was not Unconscionable

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action in Georgia state court against their cable television company alleging that it overcharged them for cable television services in violation of the federal Cable Communications Policy Act, 47 U.S.C. § 522 et seq. Dale v. Comcast Corp., 453 F.Supp.2d 1367, 1370 (N.D. Ga. 2006). Defense attorneys removed the action to federal court and moved to compel arbitration under a clause governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) that arbitration clause required customers to bring claims only in an individual capacity, thereby precluding participation in class action lawsuits, id., at 1374. Specifically, the arbitration clause provided, ” ALL PARTIES TO THE ARBITRATION MUST BE INDIVIDUALLY NAMED, THERE SHALL BE NO RIGHT OR AUTHORITY FOR ANY CLAIMS TO BE ARBITRATED OR LITIGATED ON A CLASS ACTION OR CONSOLIDATED BASIS OR ON BASIS INVOLVING CLAIMS BROUGHT IN PURPORTED REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY ON BEHALF OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC (SUCH AS A PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL), OTHER SUBSCRIBERS, OR OTHER PERSONS SIMILARLY SITUATED.” Id. The district court granted the defense motion.

Comcast provides its customers with a “subscriber agreement” at the time it installs service, and “on an annual basis, [it] disseminates notices of its policies and practices to its subscribers by including them in the subscribers’ monthly bills.” Dale, at 1371. Notice of the arbitration clause was provided to customers in December 2004 via “a billing stuffer entitled ‘Important Notices to Our Customers: Your Local Cable Company’s Policies & Practices,'” id., and noted that this complied with federal law, id., at 1372 n.2. For new customers, Comcast provided notice of the arbitration agreement at the time service was installed, and new Comcast customers signed forms agreeing to be bound to the terms of the subscriber agreement. Id., at 1371. The district court found that “plaintiffs were given copies of the Subscriber Agreement containing the arbitration provisions at the time of installation of their service” and that “when defendant amended the Subscriber Agreement, it notified plaintiffs that the changes would not take effect for thirty days and that plaintiffs could cancel their service if they objected to the changes.” Id., at 1377 n.4. Defense attorneys moved to compel arbitration and to dismiss the class action allegations.

In analyzing the defense motion, the federal court held that while it was obligated to determine the validity of the arbitration clause under state contract laws, Dale, at 1371-72, “as the FAA is ‘preemptive of state laws hostile to arbitration,’ the court should take into consideration the federal policy favoring arbitration,” id., at 1372 (citing Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1367-68 (11th Cir.2005)). The district court first rejected plaintiffs’ claim that they never entered into an arbitration agreement with Comcast. Id. Comcast established that it sent the notices in the regular course of business, and that plaintiffs’ paid their December 2004 bills evidencing that they received the billing statements. Based on the evidence presented, the federal court concluded “that plaintiffs’ denials and/or conclusory declarations that they do not recall receiving copies of the arbitration provisions are insufficient to defeat defendant’s motion to compel.” Id.

Arbitration Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized

Davis v. Chase Bank Class Action Defense Case: California Court Holds Defense Properly Removed Class Action To Federal Court Under Class Action Fairness Act Of 2005 (CAFA) Because Securities Exception Did Not Apply

Class Action Alleging Improper Credit Card Charges does not Implicate “Securities Exception” to Federal Court Jurisdiction under CAFA (Class Action Fairness Act) so Defense Removal of Class Action was Proper California Court Holds

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against Chase Bank alleging improper finance charges in connection with retail purchases made with a “rewards” credit card arising out of a no-interest promotional offer Chase extended to cardholders. Davis v. Chase Bank U.S.A., N.A, 453 F.Supp.2d 1205, 1207 (C.D. Cal. 2006). Defense attorneys removed the action to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), and the district court sua sponte issued an order to show cause why the case should not be remanded to state court. Id., at 1206. Following briefing, the district court concluded that the defense properly removed the class action.

Plaintiff made a $2000 purchase at Circuit City using his Chase “Rewards Card,” taking advantage of a no-interest promotional offer whereby no finance charges would be assessed if the balance was paid in full prior to January 2008. Davis, at 1207. At the time of the purchase, plaintiff had an outstanding balance on his credit card account, and the billing statement he received following his Circuit City purchase included a finance charge which, he alleges, included interest on the $2,000 “no-interest” amount as well as his otherwise outstanding balance. Id. Plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit in California state court, and the defense removed the action asserting that it involved more than $5,000,000 and thus fell within the scope of CAFA. Id. In response to the federal court’s OSC on the issue of whether the class action indeed involved more than $5 million, plaintiff’s lawyer argued that even if it did the class action complaint fell within the securities exception to CAFA and therefore remand was appropriate. Id. The district court disagreed.

Class Action Court Decisions Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) Removal & Remand Uncategorized

Merck’s Vioxx Defense Team Suffers Setback As New Jersey Appellate Court Holds Trial Court “Prematurely Terminated” Class Action Complaint

A state appellate court has ruled that a lower court prematurely dismissed a putative class action against Merck on behalf of people who used Vioxx for at least six (6) weeks but who have not evidenced any medical problems. While the opinion is a setback for the Vioxx defense team, the New Jersey appellate court held only that plaintiffs were entitled to additional discovery in an effort to prove whether they have a valid claim.

Class Actions In The News Uncategorized

Robinson v. Fountainhead Title-Class Action Defense Cases: Federal Court Holds Class Action Complaint Did Not Toll RESPA (Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act) Statute Of Limitations Against New Defendants

Maryland Court Holds that Federal Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) Claims were not Tolled by Filing of Class Action Complaint Where Defendants were not Named and had No Notice of RESPA Claims Until After Limitations Period Expired

In October 2003 plaintiff filed a putative class action in Maryland federal court against four entitles for violations of RESPA (Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act) and various state laws, arising out of her May 2003 purchase of a home, alleging sham business arrangements and the charging of fees in violation of RESPA. Robinson v. Fountainhead Title Group Corp., 447 F.Supp.2d 478, 481 (D. Md. 2006). In January 2006, plaintiff filed a Third Amended Complaint naming three new defendants which were served on January 20. 2006; prior to being served, none of these defendants had notice of any of the prior class action complaints. Id., at 482. Defense attorneys moved to dismiss the action; the federal court agreed with defense arguments that RESPA’s one year statute of limitations period had run and granted the motion.

Plaintiff purchased a home in May 2003 and financed the purchase. Robinson, at 482. The district court explained that “RESPA claims brought under [12 U.S.C.] § 2607 must be brought within ‘1 year . . . from the date of the occurrence of the violation.'” Id., at 483 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 2614). The defense argued that the limitations period began to run on the date that escrow closed on the home purchase, and that the new defendants had not been added as party-defendants until after the one-year period expired. Id. Plaintiff’s lawyer, relying on American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974), countered that the filing of the original complaint tolled the statute of limitations period on the RESPA claims. Id. The district court disagreed, concluding that American Pipe did not support plaintiff’s theory.

Class Action Court Decisions RESPA/TILA Class Actions Uncategorized