Burlington Northern v. White — Class Action Defense Issues

Supreme Court Expands Breadth of Potential Employee Claims for Alleged Retaliation

In a prior article on class actions and class action defense, we discussed the rise of employment law class actions. One area that had not yet been widely subject to class actions consists of alleged retaliation claims. Every employment law practioner knows that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination based on “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). To protect employees who seek to establish such employment discrimination, Congress included an “anti-retaliation” provision in Title VII that prohibits discrimination against one who has “made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated” in a Title VII matter, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). By their nature, such claims are “class action resistant” because they are based on the case-by-case treatment of the employee and the specific conduct against which the employer alleges seeks to retaliate. That may change.

On June 22, 2006, the United States Supreme Court fundamentally altered the landscape of employment law retaliation claims. See Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. _\_, __ S.Ct. ___ (2006). Title VII retaliation claims require proof of an “adverse employment action” but courts have disagreed on what satisfies this requirement. The Supreme Court summarized the issues presented and its answers as follows:

The Courts of Appeals have come to different conclusions about the scope of the Act’s anti-retaliation provision, particularly the reach of its phrase “discriminate against.” Does that provision confine actionable retaliation to activity that affects the terms and conditions of employment? And how harmful must the adverse actions be to fall within its scope?

We conclude that the anti-retaliation provision does not confine the actions and harms it forbids to those that are related to employment or occur at the workplace. We also conclude that the provision covers those (and only those)employer actions that would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee or job applicant. In the present context that means that the employer’s actions must be harmful to the point that they could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. Slip Opn., at 1-2.

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Class Action Defense Cases–Lindsay v. GEICO: District Court Erred In Refusing To Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction Over State Law Claimants Who Did Not Opt In to FLSA Class Action

Certification of Class Actions and Supplemental Jurisdiction – District Court Improperly Denied Class Certification of State Law Claimants Who Did Not Opt In to Federal Class Action Under FLSA (Fair Labor Standards Act) D.C. Circuit Holds

The FLSA (Fair Labor Standards Act) requires that potential class members affirmatively opt in to class actions based on the overtime pay provision. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 207, 216(b). Certain class actions under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23, however, require that potential class members opt out of class action cases. See Fed.R.Civ.Proc., Rule 23(b)(3), (c)(2)(B). On May 26, 2006, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held as a matter of first impression that the district court erred in refusing to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claim of, and in denying class action certification to, those state law class action claimants who did not also opt in to a FLSA overtime class action. Lindsay v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 448 F.3d 416 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action alleging that GEICO willfully misclassified certain employees as “administrative” in order to avoid paying them overtime in violation of FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a), and sought certification to pursue an opt in class action under FLSA. Lindsay, at 418. Plaintiffs also alleged that GEICO’s conduct violated New York’s Minimum Wage Act, N.Y. Labor Law, §§ 650 et seq., and sought certification to pursue an opt out class action pursuant to Rule 23. Id. As the D.C. Circuit summarized at page 418:

The district court denied certification of the state law class, concluding that the FLSA class certification procedure requiring all class members to affirmatively opt in precluded it from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over those state law claimants who did not affirmatively join the FLSA claim. We disagree and therefore reverse the order denying certification and remand to the district court.

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Motions to Remand – Supplemental Jurisdiction When Federal Claims Are Resolved: Class Action Defense Issues

28 U.S.C. § 1447 – Supplemental Jurisdiction When Federal Claims Are Resolved

Defendants in class actions often remove their case to federal court whenever possible. Plaintiffs invariably seek to remand class actions to state court. Thus, once a class action has been removed to federal court, it can be expected that plaintiff’s counsel will file a motion to remand the matter to state court. When removal is based on federal questions jurisdiction, then plaintiffs may seek to secure remand by dismissing their federal question claims.

What happens, then, if an action is removed to federal court based on federal question jurisdiction and the district court exercises supplemental jurisdiction (see 28 U.S.C. §1367) over the remaining state claims, but the federal question claims are later resolved (whether by voluntary dismissal, motion to dismiss or summary judgment) leaving only state law claims before the court?

Remand of cases to state court is governed by 28 U.S.C. §1447(c). “A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal,” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). However, “If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” Id.

If an action is removed to federal court based on federal question jurisdiction but the federal question claims are later revolved, leaving only state law claims, then two separate questions are presented. First, how does the 30-day time period for filing a motion to remand apply? A recent district court opinion holds that the absence of a federal question goes to subject matter jurisdiction and therefore is not subject to the 30-day rule:

Clearly, the defect urged by Plaintiffs is one of subject-matter jurisdiction, and not some other defect in the removal procedure. Thus, Plaintiffs’ alternative request for discretionary remand to state court is not subject to the thirty-day time limitation in §1447(c), and is, therefore, timely. See e.g., Pierpoint v. Barnes, 94 F.3d 813, 818 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that the thirty day time period was specifically written “in terms of a defect in ‘removal procedure’ in order to avoid any implication that remand is unavailable after disposition of all federal questions . . . .”).

Hardy v. GMRI, Inc., 2006 WL 752506, *2 (S.D. Iowa 2006).

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Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo — Class Action Defense Cases

Class Action Securities Fraud Cases Must Plead Economic Loss and Causal Connection Between Alleged Fraud and Loss

Class actions alleging securities fraud are commonplace. Whenever a publicly traded stock declines in value, an investor is ready to file a class action claiming that the stock price had been inflated or that he would not have invested in the company but for misleading representations made by the company. Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) hoping, in part, to stem the “abusive” practice of “the routine filing of lawsuits . . . with only a faint hope that the discovery process might lead eventually to some plausible cause of action.” H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369, p. 31 (1995), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1995, pp. 679, 730.

Class action defendants had high hopes for the PSLRA: it imposes limits on damages and attorney fees, imposes limits on the way lead plaintiffs are selected and the amounts they can be awarded, imposes sanctions for frivolous litigation, provides companies with a “safe harbor” for certain statements, and allows courts to issue stays of discovery pending motions by a defendant to have the case dismiss. See, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4. Also, Section 21D(b)(2) of the PSLRA requires that a plaintiff alleging securities fraud “state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.” SLUSA, discussed in a separate article, represents Congress’s attempt to fill in the loopholes in the PSLRA. Other holes, however, have been left to the judicial branch. The U.S. Supreme Court filled one such hole in Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 125 S.Ct. 1627 (2005).

A class action alleging securities fraud was filed against Dura Pharmaceuticals in a California federal court. The complaint alleged that Dura falsely represented that a new product would secure FDA approval and that its drug sales would be profitable. The Supreme Court opinion sets forth the basic allegations of the complaint, which we do not repeat here. The Court stated at pages 339-40:

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Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortgage — Defense of Class Action Cases

Class Action Settlement Approval of Nationwide Class Action Reversed and Remanded for District Court Failure to Analyze Value of Class Claims Under the State Laws of Each Applicable Jurisdiction Seventh Circuit Holds

On June 19, 2006, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals considered for the second time a proposed class action settlement of a nationwide class action against Fleet Mortgage brought under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) and various state laws. Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 1667802 (7th Cir. 2006) (“_Fleet II_”). As explained below, the class action involved two classes: a “telemarketing class,” and an “information-sharing class.” The Seventh Circuit previously reversed district court approval of a proposed settlement of the class action claims because “the district court failed to consider adequately the value of the claims of the so-called ‘information-sharing class’ (a class of consumers whose privacy interests were purportedly intruded upon, but who did not suffer any out-of-pocket damages).” Slip Opn., at 1-2 (citing _Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortgage Corp._, 356 F.3d 781 (7th Cir. 2004) (“_Fleet I_”).

The class action involved claims that Fleet sold mortgage information to third-party telemarketers, and that Fleet “was an active collaborator in drafting the script that the telemarketers used and allowed direct billing of the fees for the telemarketers’ products onto the mortgage bill of its customers, without obtaining pre-approval from customers.” Slip Opn., at 2. The “telemarketing class” consisted of 190,000 people who purchased financial products from the telemarketers; the “information-sharing class” consisted of 1.4 million Fleet borrowers whose information had been sent to telemarketers but who had not purchased any services from them. Id., at 2-3.

The class action settlement approved by the district court in Fleet I provided for payments to the telemarketing class, but the information-sharing class “was left out in the cold and received nothing.” Slip Opn., at 3. (The terms of the class action settlement are detailed in Fleet I and Fleet II; we focus here only on the monetary recovery for each class.) Fleet I reversed the district court’s approval of the class action settlement because “the district court failed to consider with adequate specificity the reasonableness of an entire class receiving a ‘big fat zero’ in the settlement.” Slip Opn., at 4 (citing Fleet I, at 785). “Specifically, the district court did not canvass all potential avenues of recovery to determine whether the information-sharing class’s claims were indeed essentially hopeless (and thus worthless) under the pertinent controlling law.” Slip Opn., at 4.

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The Defense of Class Action Cases: California Issues

California’s Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: A Brief Overview

In 1978, Congress added Title VIII to the Consumer Credit Protection Act entitled the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. Several states, such as California, have enacted consumer protection laws based upon the FDCPA. California’s version of the federal FDCPA is the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. California Civil Code § 1788 et seq.

California Civil Code section 1812.700 provides:

(a) In addition to the requirements imposed by Article 2 . . ., third-party debt collectors subject to the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act . . . shall provide a notice to debtors that shall include the following description of debtor rights:

“The state Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act require that, except under unusual circumstances, collectors may not contact you before 8 a.m. or after 9 p.m. They may not harass you by using threats of violence or arrest or by using obscene language. Collectors may not use false or misleading statements or call you at work if they know or have reason to know that you may not receive personal calls at work. For the most part, collectors may not tell another person, other than your attorney or spouse, about your debt. Collectors may contact another person to confirm your location or enforce a judgment. For more information about debt collection activities, you may contact the Federal Trade Commission at 1-877-FTC-HELP or www.ftc.gov.”

(b) The notice shall be included with the first written notice initially addressed to a California address of a debtor in connection with collecting the debt by the third-party debt collector.

(c) If a language other than English is principally used by the third-party debt collector in the initial oral contact with the debtor, a notice shall be provided to the debtor in that language within five working days.

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FDCPA (Fair Debt Collection Practices Act) Class Actions: Class Action Defense Issues

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: A Brief Overview of Federal Law In 1978, Congress added Title VIII to the Consumer Credit Protection Act entitled the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. Congress intended the FDCPA to make certain that ethical guidelines for the collection of consumer debts, and to provide debtors with a means for challenging payoff demands and determining the validity and accuracy of asserted debts.

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Deveny v. Entropin — California Class Action Defense Cases

California Holds In Class Actions Case That Inquiry Notice Triggers California Securities Law Claims Limitation Period And Website Posting Is Insufficient To Establish Inquiry Notice

On May 10, 2006, a California court published its opinion in a class action case that addressed two issues of first impression in California: (1) whether inquiry notice or actual notice commences the statute of limitations period for alleged violations of California’s securities laws, and (2) whether referring investors to the company website establishes inquiry notice as to all information contained on the website. Deveny v. Entropin, Inc., 139 Cal.App.4th 408 (Cal.App. 2006).

Briefly, from August 1998 through June 2002, Entropin released very reports and press releases touting the progress of its development of “a topical solution intended to treat impaired range of motion associated with shoulder and back injuries.” Id., at 810-11. The press releases issued between February and June 2002 stated that the drug “‘provided statistically significant improvement for soft tissue afflictions for both the shoulders and the lower back.'” Id., at 811-12 (citation omitted). But in September 2002, the company revealed that the clinical trials had been a failure, that the drug was “ineffective,” and that the company was “abandoning the drug.” Needless to say, “the market price of Entropin securities collapsed.” Id., at 812.

In January 2003, a putative class action alleging securities fraud was filed in California state court. The complaint alleged violations of California’s securities laws, as well as a federal law claim for violating Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933. Id., at 812. The company filed a motion for summary judgment, relying in part of the “undisputed fact” that certain information was available on the company’s website. Id., at 813. The trial court granted summary judgment and plaintiffs appealed. Id., at 814.

The California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District, Division 2, first examined whether “inquiry notice rather than actual notice applied to plaintiffs’ claims.” Id., at 815. After observing that the California securities laws at issue were governed by the statute of limitations period contained in California Corporations Code section 25506, Deveny noted that “no published California case has yet addressed whether Corporations Code section 25506 requires actual notice or inquiry notice to trigger the running of the one-year statute of limitations, and our own research has not revealed any such case.” Id. Federal courts that had addressed the issue, however, had held that inquiry notice was sufficient, id. (citations omitted). Deveny ultimately concluded that inquiry notice commenced the running of the limitations period under California Corporations Code section 25506. Id., at 815-17. (By its express terms, inquiry notice triggers the one-year limitations period under federal law, 15 U.S.C. § 77m.)

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Recent Developments In California Class Action Defense

A New Twist On Fair Debt Collection Practices Act Class Actions California courts have been inundated with class actions alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., and its California equivalent, the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, California Civil Code § 1788 et seq. While California class action firms originally named the debt collection companies, the lawsuits were soon expanded to include California and out-of-state lawyers and law firms that assisted such debt collection companies in their efforts.

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General Rules for Appealability of Remand Orders: Class Action Defense Issues

Class action defendants often remove their case to federal court whenever possible. Plaintiffs almost invariably seek to remand the action to state court. Whether a federal district court order remanding an action to state court may be reviewed on appeal thus is important to any defendant. Because the focus of this article is on appellate review of district orders granting motions to remand a lawsuit to state court, removal and remand are not discussed here; discussions of each may be found in separate articles. Also, special rules apply to cases removed to federal court under CAFA (Class Action Fairness Act of 2005), and those are discussed in a separate article.

If an action is remanded to state court, the plaintiff commonly will assert that appellate review is barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). However, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) precludes review of remand orders only when the case is remanded for reasons stated in § 1447(c). Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 350 (1976). A remand order that is not based on statutory grounds is reviewable because there “is no indication whatsoever that Congress intended to extend the prohibition against review to reach remand orders entered on grounds not provided by the statute.” Id. If, for example, the district court remands the action to state court based on the mistaken belief that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the subject matter of the dispute, then the matter is reviewable on appeal because that basis for remand is not among the statutory grounds of 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

A plaintiff may seek to insulate the remand order from review by referencing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) in the order. While that move may strengthen the plaintiff’s case, it does not serve as a talisman to bar appellate review. In the Ninth Circuit, for example, the appealability of a remand order is subject to de novo review. The Circuit Court is not bound by the lower court’s characterization of its bases for remanding a case to state court. Ferrari, Alvarez, Olsen & Ottoboni, v. Home Ins. Co., 940 F.2d 550, 553 (9th Cir. 1991) (“We determine the basis of authority for remand by examining the substance of the remand order.”).

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