CLASS ACTION DEFENSE BLOG
Welcome to Michael J. Hassen's Blog. Here you will find over 2,000 articles related to class actions.
Employee Representative Action Under California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) Must Satisfy Class Action Requirements, but Employee Representative Actions Seeking Penalties Under California Labor Code’s Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) Need Not Satisfy Class Action Requirements California Supreme Court Holds
Plaintiff filed a putative class action against his former employer, Angelo Dairy, alleging labor law violations; the class action complaint alleged causes of action for violations of the Labor Code, labor regulations, and an Industrial Welfare Commission wage order, for .breach of contract and “breach of the warranty of habitability on the ground that defendants provided residential units in a defective and dangerous condition,” for violations of California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) “based on defendants’ failures to credit plaintiff for all hours worked, to pay overtime wages, to pay wages when due, to pay wages due upon termination, to provide rest and meal periods, and to obtain written authorization for deducting or offsetting wages.” Arias v. Superior Court, ___ Cal.4th ___, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 588, 2009 WL 1838973, *1 (Cal. June 29, 2009). In addition, the class action complaint sought enforcement under the UCL of penalties provided for in the Labor Code, and alleged under California’s Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), Labor Code § 2698 _et seq._, that “defendants had violated the Labor Code, labor regulations, and an Industrial Welfare Commission wage order by failing to pay all wages due, to provide itemized wage statements, to maintain adequate payroll records, to pay all wages due upon termination, to provide rest and meal periods, to offset proper amounts for employer-provided housing, and to provide necessary tools and equipment.” _Id._ Defense attorneys moved to strike five causes of action in the class action complaint “on the ground that plaintiff failed to comply with the pleading requirements for class actions”; the trial court granted the motion. _Id._ Plaintiff sought a writ of mandate from the Court of Appeal, which held that UCL claims brought in a representative capacity had to satisfy class action requirements, but that representative labor law claims under PAGA need not, _id._ The Supreme Court granted review and held “that an employee who, on behalf of himself and other employees, sues an employer under the [UCL]…for Labor Code violations must satisfy class action requirements, but that those requirements need not be met when an employee’s representative action against an employer is seeking civil penalties under [PAGA].” _Id._
The Supreme Court began in analysis by rejecting plaintiff’s claim that representative actions under the UCL (brought individually and on behalf of others) need not comply with the requirements for class actions. Arias, at *2. After summarizing California’s UCL, including the 2004 amendments thereto, and after noting that California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 does not mention the words “class action,” the Court addressed the issue of whether the UCL, as amended by the voters so as to require that private plaintiffs bringing representative actions comply with Section 382, “imposes a requirement that the action be brought as a class action.” Id. Based on the Supreme Court’s analysis of the statutory language, and recognizing that a “literal construction of an enactment…will not control when such a construction would frustrate the manifest purpose of the enactment as a whole,” id., at *3, the Supreme Court concluded that California voters clearly intended “to impose class action requirements on private plaintiffs’ representative actions” under the UCL, id. The Court therefore held that representative actions under the UCL must comply with class action requirements, id., at *4.
Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized
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The author of the Class Action Defense Blog wishes all of you a very happy Independence Day. The author has been on vacation but anticipates that new class action articles will be published next week.
Class Actions In The News Uncategorized
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To assist class action defense attorneys anticipate the types of cases against which they will have to defend in California, we provide weekly, unofficial summaries of the legal categories for new class action lawsuits filed in the state and federal courts located in Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Jose, Sacramento, San Diego, San Mateo, Oakland/Alameda and Orange County areas. We include only those categories that include 10% or more of the class action filings during the preceding week.
Class Actions In The News Uncategorized
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Class Action Plaintiff not Entitled to Attorney Fee Award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 Following District Court Dismissal of Class Action as Moot because Plaintiff was not “Prevailing Party” within the Meaning of Supreme Court Authority Seventh Circuit Holds
Plaintiff filed a putative class action against Calumet City, Illinois, alleging that she suffered damage because the enforcement of a local ordinance interfered with her ability to sell real property that she owned in the City; the class action complaint alleged that “the ordinance violated her right to procedural due process and unreasonably restrained the alienability of her property.” Walker v. Calumet City, Illinois, 565 F.3d 1031, 1032 (7th Cir. 2009). Specifically, the class action complaint challenged the City’s Point of Sale (POS) ordinance, which provides that real property within the city limits “cannot be sold until it is inspected and deemed in compliance with city codes, a fee is paid, and transfer stamps are issued.” Id. In the normal course of events, while the class action complaint was pending, plaintiff’s property was inspected under the City’s Rental Dwelling Inspection (RDI) ordinance, which requires annual inspections of rental properties to ensure compliance with city health, zoning and building codes. Id., at 1033. The inspection of plaintiff’s property revealed “multiple areas…where repair was necessary”; plaintiff completed the required repairs, and the City “pronounced her property compliant with the City’s building and zoning codes.” Id. Defense attorneys then moved to dismiss the class action as moot because, since plaintiff’s property passed the RDI, “an inspection under the POS ordinance to check for the same violations would be redundant.” Id. Over plaintiff’s objection, the district court dismissed the class action as moot based on the City’s representations that it would not enforce the POS ordinance against plaintiff, id., at 1032, 1033. Plaintiff then moved for an award of attorney fees, arguing that she was the “prevailing party” 42 U.S.C. § 1988; defense attorneys countered that the class action had been dismissed as moot “prior to any judicial determination on the merits.” Id., at 1033. The district court agreed with plaintiff and awarded her $189,000 in attorney fees, id. The Seventh Circuit reversed.
The Circuit Court did not find this to be a difficult case because, while the “catalyst rule” for evaluating attorney fee awards had been used in the Seventh Circuit prior to 2001, the Supreme Court rejected that rule in Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001), holding at page 606 that a party was not a prevailing party unless there was a “material alteration in the legal relationship of the parties.” Walker, at 1033-34 (citations omitted). This “alteration” in the relationship of the parties “must arise from a court order.” Id., at 1034 (citation omitted). The Seventh Circuit explained at page 1034, “In Buckhannon, the Supreme Court gave two examples of when a party should be considered prevailing: first, when ‘the plaintiff has received a judgment on the merits’; second, when the plaintiff has ‘obtained a court-ordered consent decree.’ [Citation.] In general, we have stated that ‘[i]t could not be clearer that a voluntary settlement by the defendant … does not entitle a plaintiff to attorneys’ fees.’ [Citation.]”
Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized
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Summary Judgment in Labor Law Class Action Turned on Issues of First Impression Recurrent in Federal Court Class Action Appeals, Warranting Referral of Questions Underlying Class Action to California Supreme Court for Resolution Ninth Circuit Holds
Plaintiff filed a putative class action against her employer, Bayer Pharmaceuticals, in California state court alleging labor law violations; specifically, the class action complaint asserted that Bayer misclassified pharmaceutical sales representatives (PSRs) as exempt employees, and accordingly failed to pay them overtime or provide them with meal breaks to which they would be entitled as non-exempt employees. D’Este v. Bayer Corp., 565 F.3d 1119, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2009). Defense attorneys removed the class action to federal court, and the district court granted Bayer’s motion for summary judgment “finding that [plaintiff] was exempt under California’s outside sales exemption”’ and based on that finding, the district court did not address whether Bayer also was correct in relying on the “administrative exemption” in its classification of PSRs. Id., at 1122. Plaintiff appealed, id., at 1122. The Ninth Circuit observed that “The question whether PSRs are exempt under California’s outside salesperson and administrative exemptions is the central issue in multiple class action lawsuits in the Ninth Circuit as well as in other circuits.” Id. Accordingly, the Circuit Court – pursuant to Rule 8.548 of the California Rules of Court – certified two questions to the California Supreme Court, id., at 1120.
The Ninth Circuit summarized the relevant facts as follows. Bayer gave plaintiff a list of doctors and hospitals, as well as a list of products, for which she was responsible: “[Plaintiff’s] job was to communicate information about her Bayer products to her roster of doctors and seek their non-binding commitment to write prescriptions for those products. She was also responsible for communicating with hospitals in her territory to influence them to add the Bayer products for which she was responsible to their formularies.” D’Este, at 1121. Plaintiff was “trained on a message” and was required to “adhere closely to the information provided by Bayer about its products”; beyond this, however, “she had the freedom to develop her own strategy for communicating with and influencing doctors.” Id. Additionally, she “had flexibility regarding how she spent her day,” id., at 1122. Specifically, “[Plaintiff] developed her own schedule for meeting with the doctors on her list. She received little or no daily supervision, and saw her manager once every six to eight weeks.” Id. According to the class action complaint, plaintiff regularly worked more than 8 hours per day and more than 40 hours per week, id. For this, she received between $81,000 and $103,000 per year in compensation, id., at 1121. And plaintiff was “not required to keep or maintain set hours.” Id., at 1122.
Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized
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Class Action Improperly Removed to Federal Court under Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) because Defendant Failed to Adequately Establish that the $5 Million Amount in Controversy Requirement Eleventh Circuit Holds Plaintiff filed a class action in Georgia state court against Bank of America and its wholly-owned subsidiary FIA Card Services (collectively “BofA”) alleging insurance fraud, unfair and deceptive acts, bad faith, and violations of the state’s Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); the class action complaint was premised on the allegation that BofA “[sold] a bundled insurance product, known as Credit Protection Plus, to ineligible individuals.
Class Action Court Decisions Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) Removal & Remand Uncategorized
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Class Action Complaint Alleging Deceptive Marketing Practices in Sale of Vioxx not Entitled to Class Action Treatment because Individual Issues will Predominate over Common Questions of Law or Fact California State Trial Court Holds
Various class action lawsuits against Merck were consolidated in the Los Angeles Superior Court under the title In re Vioxx Consolidated Cases; the class action lawsuits alleged that Merck knew of the cardiovascular dangers associated with Vioxx long before it voluntarily pulled it from the market. In re Vioxx Conxolidated Cases, Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. JCCP4247 (April 30, 2009) [Slip Opn., at 1-2]. The consolidated class action complaint alleged that “Merck’s deceptive marketing practices violate the unfair competition law [(UCL)]…and false advertising law…, constitute deceptive trade practices under the Consumers Legal Remedies Act [(CLRA)]…, and resulted in unjust enrichment.” Id., at 2. Interestingly, the class action “[did] not allege that Vioxx itself harmed anyone or was ineffective, only that consumers lost money in purchasing it because it was more expensive than, but not better than less expensive [alternatives].” Id. Plaintiffs’ lawyers moved the trial court to certify the litigation as a class action; defense attorneys opposed class action treatment, arguing that “individual issues of causation and reliance predominate over any common issues because Merck knew different things about Vioxx at different times and class members, physicians and TPPs [third party payors] were exposed to different representations at different times and were influenced by representations to varying extents.” Id., at 3. Additionally, defense attorneys argued that individual issues will predominate as to economic injury, and that the named representatives’ claims are not typical of the claims of the class. Id. The trial court denied the motion for class action certification.
After summarizing the standards governing class action certification of UCL and CLRA claims, see In re Vioxx, at 3-4, and after readily determining that the numerosity and ascertainability requirements for class action treatment had been met, id., at 5, the trial court turned its attention to the question of typicality – that is, “whether a sufficient relationship exists between the injury to the named plaintiff and the conduct affecting the class.” Id., at 5 (citation omitted). The trial court found that the claims of the individual plaintiffs were not typical of the TPPs based on Merck’s evidence that “the decisionmaking that goes into purchasing Vioxx on an individual basis is entirely distinct from the process of putting it into a group formulary.” Id. The trial court found further that plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of providing “substantial evidence” that common questions of law or fact will predominate over individual issues affecting the various class members. Id., at 6. The court did agree with plaintiffs that Merck engaged in a “uniform marketing scheme that was likely to deceive patients and physicians,” id., at 6-7, and that the information available to physicians was susceptible to common proof, id., at 8, but plaintiffs must additionally prove “damage suffered ‘as a result of’ a deceptive practice,” and this element was not subject to common proof, id., at 8-11. As the trial court explained at page 9, “Under all of plaintiffs’ causes of action, a central issue will be whether defendant’s alleged misrepresentations or nondisclosures were material to those who purchased Vioxx.” This means that plaintiffs will have to prove reliance, id., at 10, and the evidence presented in opposition to the motion for class certification demonstrates that class-wide proof of reliance will not exist. Id., at 10-11. And under the circumstances of this case, the necessary proof of reliance cannot be inferred. Id., at 11-12. Nor are the claims of the TPPs subject to common proof, id., at 11.
Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized
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In order to assist class action defense attorneys anticipate the types of class actions against which they will have to defend in California, we provide weekly, unofficial summaries of the legal categories for new class action lawsuits filed in the state and federal courts located in Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Jose, Sacramento, San Diego, San Mateo, Oakland/Alameda and Orange County areas. We include only those categories that include 10% or more of the class action filings during the preceding week.
Class Actions In The News Uncategorized
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Judicial Panel Grants Defense Request for Pretrial Coordination of Class Action Lawsuits Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, Unopposed by Class Action Plaintiffs, and Transfers Actions to District of New Jersey Six class actions – two in Massachusetts and one each in Connecticut, New Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania – were filed against Staples alleging violations of state and federal labor laws; specifically, the class action complaints allege that Staples failed to pay its assistant, operations and/or sales managers overtime pay under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and/or various state wage and hour statutes.
Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Multidistrict Litigation Uncategorized
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Class Action Certification Order of Labor Law Class Action must be Reversed because District Court Failed to Conduct “Rigorous Analysis” of Rule 23’s Requirements for Class Action Treatment Eleventh Circuit Holds
Plaintiff filed a putative nationwide class action against his former employer, T-Mobile, after it fired him for poor attendance; the class action complaint alleged labor law violations. Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., ___ F.3d ___, 1260-61 (11th Cir. 2009). Specifically, the class action alleged that “by charging back commissions advanced on sales of ‘deactivated’ prepaid service plans, T-Mobile violated the terms of the compensation program, failed to pay commissions earned by the sales representatives, and was unjustly enriched by retaining the benefit of its employees’ services without fully compensating them for such services.” _Id._, at 1262. T-Mobile’s compensation package for retail sales representatives consisted of an hourly wage plus commissions. _Id._, at 1261. The commissions were incentive-based, paid on the employee’s “net activations” – if a customer canceled service within 180 days of activation then T-Mobile would “charge-back” the commission previously paid “in order to reclaim that amount from the sales representative.” _Id._ Under T-Mobile’s plan, commissions paid within the 180-day window are “paid as an advance against commissions anticipated to be earned in the future” and “[c]ommissions are not earned until the expiration of the 180-day commission charge back window.” _Id._ Additionally, T-Mobile, in its sole discretion, determined whether sales qualified for commission payments, _id._ The class action complaint was filed in Florida state court, _id._, at 1262, but defense attorneys removed the class action to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), _id._, at 1263. Plaintiff moved the district court to certify the litigation as a class action; defense attorneys opposed class action treatment and moved for summary judgment. _Id._ The district court denied T-Mobile’s summary judgment motion, and granted class action certification on behalf of a Florida class only. _Id._, at 1263-64. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), the Eleventh Circuit granted interlocutory review of the class action certification order and reversed. _Id._, at 1264.
The class action complaint did not impress the Circuit Court, which it characterized as “incomplete and ambiguous.” Vega, at 1263. The vague complaint “simply alleges: (1) that, because prepaid customers paid up-front for their service, T-Mobile ‘bore no risk of non-payment’; (2) that when T-Mobile charged its employees back for commissions on prepaid plans, ‘even though T-MOBILE received the full benefit of its agreement with the prepaid plan customers, T-MOBILE’s commission based employees lost the benefits of those sales and the resulting commissions’; and (3) that ‘T-MOBILE has unfair [sic] and unjustly profited from its internal systems error by unduly charging back its employees on the prepaid plans and retaining its employee’s [sic] wages for its own use and benefit.’” Id., at 1262. The class action asserted two claims – one for “unpaid wages” and one for “unjust enrichment” – arising out of the central allegation that “T-Mobile improperly withheld or charged back from its employees.” Id. The class action did not allege that employees nationwide were subject to the same compensation structure, id. The Eleventh Circuit noted that the district court certified the litigation as a class action despite two concerns: first, that a nationwide class “lacked commonality due to variations in the contract and employment laws of the fifty states,” and second, that the class action complaint’s allegations “focused on charge backs of commissions already paid, but indicated nothing about any failure to pay commissions in the first instance, the inclusion in the class of T-Mobile ‘employees … who … were entitled to receive[ ] commissions … who did not receive their commissions’ would implicate claims falling outside the scope of the complaint, as pled, and, thus, failed the typicality requirement.” Id., at 1263-64.
Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized
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