PSLRA Class Action Defense Cases–In re Authentidate Holding: New York Federal Court Grants Motion To Dismiss Securities Class Action Holding Class Action Allegations Failed To Satisfy PSLRA

Securities Class Action Warranted Dismissal with Prejudice because Allegations in Second Amended Class Action Complaint Failed to Establish Duty to Disclose New York Federal Court Holds

Plaintiffs filed a class action against Authentidate Holding Corporation and individual defendants (collectively “Authentidate”) alleging violations of federal securities laws; the class action complaint asserted that defendants “failed to make proper disclosures regarding performance metrics in an agreement (‘the Agreement’) the Company had with the United States Postal Service to serve as the preferred provider of the Postal Service’s electronic postmark (‘EPM’), thereby artificially inflating the price of Authentidate common stock in order to, inter alia, attract capital and avoid insolvency.” In re Authentidate Holding Corp. Sec. Litig., ___ F.Supp.2d ___ (S.D.N.Y. March 23, 2009) [Slip Opn., at 1]. The class action alleged that defendants’ misconduct violated Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule 10b-5, _id._ Defense attorneys moved to dismiss the Consolidated Second Amended Securities Class Action Complaint for failure to meet the heightened pleading requirements established by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). _Id._ The district court determined that allegations in the class action complaint failed to satisfy the PSLRA and dismissed the class action with prejudice.

After summarizing the well established law governing Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss securities class action complaints, see In re Authentidate, at 2-3, including Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007), the district court turned first to the duty to disclose and noted that for purposes of Section 10(b) “‘[s]ilence, absent a duty to disclose, is not misleading,’ Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988), and an omission is actionable under the securities laws only when the Defendant was subject to a duty to disclose.” Id., at 3 (additional citation omitted). The class action complaint alleged that defendants were under a duty to disclose Authentidate’s “low level of EPM sales and their continuing or likely failure to meet the revenue metrics.” Id. The federal court disagreed. First, it rejected the claim that Item 303 of SEC Regulation S-K (17 C.F.R. § 229.303) created a duty to disclose. See id., at 4-5. Item 303, entitled “Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations,” requires, inter alia, that a registrant “describe any known trends or uncertainties that have had or that the registrant reasonably expects will have a material favorable or unfavorable impact on net sales or revenues or income from continuing operations.” 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii). Id., at 4. Plaintiffs’ allegations that “virtually nonexistent EPM sales and the likely failure to meet upcoming revenue metrics were ‘known trends or uncertainties’” were not supported by “any particularized factual allegations making it plausible that these omissions caused any piece of existing ‘reported financial information’ to misleadingly indicate a specific future result or financial condition.” Id., at 5. This was particularly true since EPM sales were not “a significant percentage of the reported monthly revenues.” Id. (citation omitted).

Class Action Court Decisions PSLRA/SLUSA Class Actions Uncategorized

PSLRA Class Action Defense Cases–Akerman v. Arotech: New York Federal Court Denies Motion To Dismiss Securities Fraud Class Action Finding Class Action Complaint Adequately Alleged Materiality, Scienter And Particularity

Securities Fraud Class Action Survives Motion to Dismiss because Class Action Complaint Adequately Alleged that Defendants Failed to Timely Discover and/or Disclose Material Adverse Information New York Federal Court Holds

Plaintiffs filed a class action against Arotech Corporation, a defense contractor, and three of its officers alleging violations of federal securities laws; the class action complaint violations Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5, and seeking to hold the individual defendants liable as “control persons” under Section 20(a) of the Act. Akerman v. Arotech Corp., ___ F.Supp.2d ___ (E.D.N.Y. March 30, 2009) [Slip Opn., at 1]. According to the allegations underlying the class action, defendants made materially false statements and withheld materials facts concerning Arotech’s financial condition, _id._ The class action centered on Arotech’s acquisition of Armour of America (AofA) in August 2004 for $19 million in cash “with additional possible earn-outs if AofA is awarded certain material contracts” up to a maximum of $40 million. _Id._, at 2-3. Arotech’s total revenue in 2003 was only $17.3 million, but its revenue in 2004 increased to $50.4 million, _id._, at 3-4. Defense attorneys moved to dismiss the class action complaint “principally on the grounds of materiality, scienter and particularity” as required by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). _Id._, at 1. The district court concluded that the class action complaint adequately alleged securities fraud.

The class action complaint cited various confidential witnesses who alleged that “Arotech’s pre-acquisition due diligence did not reveal all material information about AofA before the acquisition.” Akerman, at 4. In particular, the confidential witnesses cited the federal government’s cancellation of a substantial helicopter contract with AofA based on a “termination for default” (T4D), that is, the government’s belief that AofA had overstated the armor weight of the helicopters. Id., at 4-5. The T4D, together with stigma accompanying the T4D, created a “domino effect” at AofA that seriously impacted sales, id., at 5. The class action alleged that defendants had access to this information, despite the fact that AofA did not disclose it, id., at 5-6. Additionally details may be found in the district court opinion at pages 6 through 11.

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions PSLRA/SLUSA Class Actions Uncategorized

Cintas Class Action Defense Cases–Serrano v. Cintas: Michigan Federal Court Denies Class Action Treatment Of Labor Law Class Action Against Cintas Holding Commonality, Typicality And Adequacy Of Representation Elements Not Met

Labor Law Class Actions did not Warrant Class Action Treatment because Hiring Process Involved too many Individual Questions to Meet Requirements for Class Action Certification under Rule 23 Michigan Federal Court Holds

Plaintiffs filed two separate class actions against Cintas Corporation, a company that provides uniforms and other supplies to various businesses across the United States, alleging labor law violations; the class action complaints asserted that Cintas discriminated against employees in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Serrano v. Cintas Corp., ___ F.Supp.2d ___ (E.D. Mich. March 31, 2009) [Slip Opn., at 1-2]. According to the allegations underlying one class action (_Serrano_), Cintas discriminated against Michigan employees who applied for position of Service Sales Representative (SSR) on the basis of gender; according to the other class action (_Avalos_), Cintas discriminated against employees nationwide on the basis of race. _Id._, at 2. The two class actions were consolidated for pretrial purposes, _id._, at 1. Plaintiffs in the companion cases filed motions with the district court to certify each lawsuit as a class action. _Id._ The district court determined that class action treatment was not warranted in either lawsuit and therefore denied both plaintiffs’ class action certification motions.

Cintas SSRs perform a wide range of duties, and are used by the company as entry-level sales and customer service representatives. Serrano, at 2. Each SSR reports to a Service Manager, who in turn reports to a General Manager; and in addition to a “common corporate structure,” Cintas also “uses common orientation manuals and policy statements throughout its facilities” and “has standard courses and training sessions for managers and SSRs.” Id. Importantly, the class action complaints allege further that Cintas “has a standard system for hiring SSRs.” Id. The district court summarized the hiring process as including “an initial screening of the application, a series of interviews, a route ride with another SSR, standardized tests, an exchange of information among hiring managers, and a final hiring decision made by the General Manager of the Cintas facility.” Id., at 2-3. Finally, the federal court explained that “[t]he hiring process has both objective and subjective components,” and that some criteria are required while others are preferred. Id., at 3.

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases–Cole v. Asarco: Oklahoma Federal Court Denies Class Action Treatment Of Class Action Seeking Medical Monitoring And Finds Proposed Property Owner Class Did Not Define A Cognizable Class

Class Action Certification not Warranted where Putative Class Action Complaint Prayed for Medical Monitoring of Individuals who had “Disavowed” any Present Injury and where Proposed Definition of Property Owner Class was not Administratively Feasible Oklahoma Federal Court Holds Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against various defendants, including Asarco Incorporated and Gold Fields Mining, alleging nuisance and praying for medical monitoring of individuals covered by the class action; the class action complaint asserted that defendants mined lead and zinc along a 40-square mile stretch of Tar Creek in Oklahoma, and that the byproducts caused by that mining activity “caused air, surface and ground water and soil contamination of [plaintiffs’] property, exposing residents to unsafe levels of lead, heavy metals and other toxins.

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized

Labor Law Class Actions Maintain Grip On Top Spot Among Weekly Class Action Lawsuits Filed In California State And Federal Courts

In order to assist class action defense attorneys anticipate the types of cases against which they will have to defend in California, we provide weekly, unofficial summaries of the legal categories for new class action lawsuits filed in the state and federal courts located in Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Jose, Sacramento, San Diego, San Mateo, Oakland/Alameda and Orange County areas. We include only those categories that include 10% or more of the class action filings during the preceding week.

Class Actions In The News Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases—In re Regions Morgan Keegan: Judicial Panel On Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) Grants Defense Motion To Centralize Class Action Litigation In Western District of Tennessee

Over Objection of Three Class Action Plaintiffs, Judicial Panel Grants Defense Request for Pretrial Coordination of 20 Class Action Lawsuits Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (Excepting One Class Action from Centralization Order) and Transfers Class Actions to Western District of Tennessee Twenty-one (21) class actions – 18 in the Western District of Tennessee, and one class action each in the Northern District of Alabama, the Southern District of Indiana and the Middle District of Tennessee – were filed against Regions Financial Corp.

Class Action Court Decisions Multidistrict Litigation Uncategorized

Arbitration Class Action Defense Cases–Vaden v. Discover Bank: Supreme Court Reverses District Court Order Under Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) Compelling Arbitration Of Class Action Counterclaims On Individual Basis

FAA does not Enlarge Federal Court Jurisdiction but Simply Permits District Court to Entertain Petition to Compel Arbitration where Jurisdiction Exists but for Arbitration Clause, and while District Courts may “Look Through” Pleadings to Decide Petition under FAA Section 4, Counterclaims are not Removable if Complaint is not Subject to Federal Court Jurisdiction Supreme Court Holds

Discover Card filed a “garden-variety, state-law-based contract action” against a cardholder in Maryland state court to collect $10,610.74, plus interest and attorney fees; the cardholder agreement provided for arbitration of “any claim or dispute” between Discover and the cardholder, and included a class action waiver in that it prohibited “any claims as a representative or member of a class.” Vaden v. Discover Bank, 129 S.Ct. 1262, 1268-69 and n.2 (2009). The cardholder answered and filed a putative class action counterclaim that also asserted only state law claims, id., at 1268. According to the allegations underlying the class action counterclaim, “Discover’s demands for finance charges, interest, and late fees violated Maryland’s credit laws.” Id. Neither Discover nor the cardholder invoked the arbitration clause in the cardholder agreement. Id., at 1268-69. In response to the class action counterclaim, Discover petitioned the federal court for an order compelling arbitration under § 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), id., at 1269 (9 U.S.C. § 4). Though the class action claims were brought under state law, Discover argued that the counterclaims were governed by § 27(a) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA), which “prescribes the interest rates state-chartered, federally insured banks like Discover can charge, ‘notwithstanding any State constitution or statute which is hereby preempted.’” Id. Discover’s argument was that the cardholder’s state law claims were preempted by the FDIA and, accordingly, the federal court had jurisdiction to rule on Discover’s petition under the FAA. Id. The district court granted Discover’s petition and ordered arbitration of the cardholder’s individual claims. Id. The cardholder appealed: the Fourth Circuit questioned whether the district court had federal question jurisdiction over Discover’s FAA petition; the Circuit Court remanded the case to the district court with instructions to “‘look through’ the § 4 petition to the substantive controversy between the parties” and to make “an express determination whether that controversy presented ‘a properly invoked federal question.’” Id. (citations omitted). On remand, the cardholder conceded that his state law claims were completely preempted by the FDIA because Discover was a federally insured bank; based on this concession, the district court held it had federal-question jurisdiction and again granted the petition compelling arbitration. Id. This time, the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Id. The Supreme Court reversed.

Under Section 4 of the FAA, a district court may consider a petition to compel arbitration “if the court would have jurisdiction, ‘save for [the arbitration] agreement,’ over ‘a suit arising out of the controversy between the parties.’” Vaden, at 1267-68. The petition for certiorari presented the Supreme Court with two questions “concerning a district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over a § 4 petition”: First, “Should a district court, if asked to compel arbitration pursuant to § 4, ‘look through’ the petition and grant the requested relief if the court would have federal-question jurisdiction over the underlying controversy?” And second, “[I]f the answer to that question is yes, may a district court exercise jurisdiction over a § 4 petition when the petitioner’s complaint rests on state law but an actual or potential counterclaim rests on federal law?” Id., at 1268. The High Court summarized its holding at page 1268 as follows, “A federal court may ‘look through’ a § 4 petition and order arbitration if, ‘save for [the arbitration] agreement,’ the court would have jurisdiction over ‘the [substantive] controversy between the parties.’” But the Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit’s decision because it had “misidentified the dimensions of ‘the controversy between the parties’ by ignoring that the lawsuit originated with “Discover’s claim for the balance due on Vaden’s account” – “Given that entirely state-based plea and the established rule that federal-court jurisdiction cannot be invoked on the basis of a defense or counterclaim, the whole ‘controversy between the parties’ does not qualify for federal-court adjudication.” Id. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed.

Arbitration Class Action Court Decisions Removal & Remand Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases–Love v. Blue Cross: Florida Federal Court Grants Defense Motion To Dismiss RICO Class Action Holding Class Action Complaint Failed To Satisfy Rule 9(b)’s Pleading Requirements

Class Action Complaint Alleging Violations of RICO Failed to Satisfy Heightened Pleading Requirements of Rule 9(b) Thus Warranting Dismissal Florida Federal Court Holds Plaintiffs, a group of doctors, filed a putative class action against certain health insurance companies alleging that defendants violated RICO in that they “conspired to inflate profits by systematically denying, delaying, and diminishing payments due to them as physicians.” Love v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass’n, ___ F.

Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized

PSLRA Class Action Defense Cases–In re Downey: California Federal Court Dismisses Securities Class Action Holding Class Action Complaint Failed To Adequately Plead Actionable Misrepresentations By Individual Defendants

Class Action Complaint Alleging Securities Laws Violations Failed to Satisfy Heightened Pleading Requirements of Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) California Federal Court Holds

Plaintiffs filed a class action against Downey Financial and certain current and former officers and directors alleging violations of federal securities laws; the class action complaint asserted that defendants violated Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10(b)-5, and of Section 20(a) of the Act. In re Downey Securities Litig., ___ F.Supp.2d ___ (C.D.Cal. March 18, 2009) [Slip Opn., at 1-2]. The class action was consolidated with a similar class, and lead plaintiff filed a first amended consolidated class action complaint. _Id._, at 2. According to the allegations underlying the class action, “the decline in Downey’s shareholder value resulted from alleged misrepresentations made to the investing public by Downey’s current and former officers and/or directors, and not from the current economic climate,” _id._ Defense attorneys for the individual defendants moved to dismiss the class action, _id._, at 1-2; defendants argued that the complaint failed to meet the heightened pleading requirements of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), _id._, at 4. The district court agreed and dismissed the class action.

After discussing the PSLRA, the district court turned to the misstatements or omissions attributed to the individual defendants. See In re Downey, at 4-5. The federal court noted that generally “only those defendants who actually make a false or misleading statement will be liable under section 10(b) or Rule 10(b)-5,” id., at 5 (citation omitted), but under Ninth Circuit authority “‘an individual may become a primary violator through “substantial participation or intricate involvement in the preparation of fraudulent statements” even if he did not actually make the statements,’” id., at 5-6 (citation omitted). And based on the Supreme Court opinion in Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlantic, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 761 (2008), courts “dismiss actors (including insiders) who have not made any misleading statements, either explicitly or implicitly because plaintiffs could not prove reliance on their actions.” Id., at 6 (citation omitted). The district court found that the complaint failed to state claims against the individual defendants because “there is not a single actionable misrepresentation or omission in the 161 pages of the [class action complaint] attributed to the Individual Defendants.” Id. The district court further concluded that the class action complaint failed to adequately plead scienter. See id., at 8-15. And finally, the court found that plaintiff failed to adequately plead loss causation. See id., at 15-16.

Class Action Court Decisions PSLRA/SLUSA Class Actions Uncategorized

TILA Class Action Defense Cases–McCoy v. Chase: Ninth Circuit Reverses Dismissal Of TILA Class Action Holding Lender Must Give Notice Of Interest Rate Increase Based On Late Payments To Other Creditor

District Court Erred in Dismissing TILA Class Action because Regulation Z Required Lender to Notify Credit Card Holder of Increase in Interest Rate Based on Late Payments to Other Creditor Ninth Circuit Holds

Plaintiff filed a class action against Chase Manhattan Bank alleging violations of the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA); the class action complaint asserted that Chase violated TILA by “increase[ing] his interest rates retroactively to the beginning of his payment cycle after his account was closed to new transactions as a result of a late payment to Chase or another creditor,” but failing to give him notice of the increase until after it had already taken effect. McCoy v. Chase Manhattan Bank, USA, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. March 16, 2009) [Slip Opn., at 3325, 3328]. Defense attorneys moved to dismiss the class action on the grounds that Chase was not required to give notice of the rate increase because it had disclosed in its Cardmember Agreement the highest rate that the Bank could apply in the event of a cardmember default. _Id._, at 3328. The district court agreed and dismissed the class action, _id._ Plaintiff appealed. The Ninth Circuit explained at page 3328, “This case presents the question of whether the notice requirements of [TILA] and Regulation Z…, as interpreted by the Federal Reserve Board’s Official Staff Commentary, apply to discretionary interest rate increases that occur because of consumer default. We hold that Regulation Z requires a creditor to provide contemporaneous notice of such rate increases.” The Circuit Court therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part.

The Ninth Circuit began its discussion by noting that “Congress enacted TILA to ‘assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit, and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card practices.’” McCoy, at 3329 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a)). Toward that end, the Federal Reserve Board adopted Regulation Z, which addresses when and how notice of changes in terms must be given and which provides, in part, that written notice is required “[w]henever any term required to be disclosed under § 226.6 is changed or the required minimum periodic payment is increased,” 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(c)(1). Section 226.6, in turn, requires that creditors to disclose “each periodic rate that may be used to compute the finance charge.” 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(a)(2). The Circuit Court explained that the parties “dispute the meaning of the phrase ‘any term required to be disclosed under § 226.6’”; defense attorneys argued that “the phrase applies only to the contractual terms of Chase’s Cardmember Agreement,” while plaintiff argued that “the phrase also applies to the list of specific ‘items’ § 226.6(a)(2) requires be disclosed, which includes the interest rate that may be used.” McCoy, at 3329. The Ninth Circuit found the language of Regulation Z to be “ambiguous,” and noted that it would defer to the Federal Reserve’s “interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation” so long as that interpretation is not “‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’” Id., at 3330 (citation omitted).

Class Action Court Decisions RESPA/TILA Class Actions Uncategorized