CLASS ACTION DEFENSE BLOG
Welcome to Michael J. Hassen's Blog. Here you will find over 2,000 articles related to class actions.
Discrimination Class Action Against eHarmony.com Granted Class Action Status as to Claims by Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual People Denied Services on Basis of Sexual Orientation, but Class Action Treatment Denied as to Claims by Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual People who were “Deterred” from using eHarmony because of its Refusal to Serve Homosexual and Bisexual Individuals California State Trial Court Holds
Plaintiffs filed a class action against matchmaking website eHarmony.com alleging discrimination under California state law for failing to serve people who are homosexual or bisexual; specifically, the class action complaint asserted that eHarmony’s policy violates California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code, § 51 et seq., by denying equal treatment on the basis of sexual orientation. Carlson v. eHarmony.com, Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. BC371958 (November 19, 2008) [Slip Opn., at 2]. Plaintiffs moved the trial court to certify the litigation as a class action, defining the general class as all gay, lesbian and bisexual individuals who were denied services on the basis of sexual orientation. Id. Plaintiffs also sought class action treatment on behalf of two subclasses: (1) all gay, lesbian and bisexual people who tried to use eHarmony but were denied service (essentially tracking the definition of the general class), and (2) all gay, lesbian and bisexual people who were deterred from using eHarmony because of its refusal to provide service to homosexual and bisexual individuals. Id. Defense attorneys argued that class action treatment was not warranted because “the proposed class is not ascertainable and individual issues will predominate.” Id. The trial court granted plaintiffs’ motion and certified the lawsuit as a class action with respect to the general class and first subclass, but denied class action treatment to claims brought on behalf of people “deterred” from using eHarmony’s services. Id.
In addressing the ascertainability of the proposed class, the trial court noted that the class definition first limited membership to “gay, lesbian, and bisexual” people, and that “this part of the proposed class is ascertainable” because it falls within the class of people protected by the Unruh Act. Carlson, at 4. The further limitation in the proposed definition, restricting membership to individuals “who allegedly have been ‘denied’ services,” was also ascertainable because defense attorneys “acknowledge that eHarmony.com does not offer same-sex matching services, which is the functional equivalent of denying such services to plaintiffs.” Id., at 5. As to Subclass 1, that group of individuals who “attempted” to use eHarmony’s services but could not was deemed ascertainable, id., at 6, but the group of individuals allegedly “deterred” from even attempting to use eHarmony’s services was not ascertainable because “[d]eterrence is inherently a subjective inquiry” and “individual facts would overwhelm common issues of fact and law,” id., at 6-7. Accordingly, Subclass 2 was not ascertainable, so the trial court refused to certify a class action on behalf of that proposed class. Id., at 7.
Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized
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Securities Class Action Complaint Properly Dismissed because Class Action Failed to Satisfy Heightened Pleading Requirements under Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) Ninth Circuit Holds
Plaintiffs filed a class action against InVision Technologies and two of its officers alleging violations of federal securities law; the class action complaint arose because after InVision announced that it had entered into a merger agreement with General Electric, the company disclosed that the merger may not occur because of the discovery of potential violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act causing an immediate drop in InVision’s stock price, even though the merger eventually went through. Glazer Capital Management, LP v. Magistri, 549 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2008) [Slip Opn., at 15765-66]. The class action alleged that defendants violated Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as well as Rule 10b-5. Id., at 15768. Defense attorneys moved to dismiss the class action for failure to plead adequately falsity or scienter under the heightened standards established by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA); the district court granted the motion and dismissed the class action complaint. Id., at 15766. (Plaintiffs had amended the class action complaint twice, but the district court denied them leave to file a third amended class action complaint. See id., at 15768.) The Ninth Circuit affirmed.
We do not discuss here the facts detailed in the Circuit Court’s opinion, see Glazer Capital, at 15766- 68. The pertinent facts are that, after announcing the merger agreement, (1) “on July 30, 2004, InVision issued a press release stating that an internal investigation had revealed possible violations of the FCPA in connection with certain foreign sales transactions,” and (2) “InVision announced that it had voluntarily reported the activities to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ), but warned that subsequent investigations could potentially delay or terminate the merger.” Id., at 15767. InVision’s stock price plummeted on the news, and only a few days later the class action complaint was filed. Id. Within a few months, InVision settled with DOJ and with the SEC, and the merger with GE went through. Id., at 15767-78.
Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions PSLRA/SLUSA Class Actions Uncategorized
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Putative Class Action Alleging Violations of FACTA not Entitled to Class Action Treatment because Rule 23(b)(3)’s Superiority Requirement for Class Action Certification not Met California Federal Court Holds
Plaintiff filed a putative class action against American Multi-Cinema for violating the federal Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA); specifically, the class action complaint alleged that defendant printed not only the last four digits of a consumer’s credit or debit card on the customer’s receipt, but the first four digits as well. Bateman v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc., 252 F.R.D. 647, 648 (C.D. Cal. 2008). Notably, the class action complaint did not allege that plaintiff, or any putative member of the class action, suffered any harm as a result of the violation. Id. Defendant corrected its sales practices within two weeks of the filing the class action, id. Plaintiff moved the district court to certify the litigation as a class action; the district court denied the motion on the grounds that Rule 23(b)(3)’s superiority requirement had not been met: “The Court found that if certified, the potential statutory damages to be awarded could be enormous and completely out of proportion to any harm suffered by Plaintiff.” Id. (A copy of the district court order denying plaintiff’s initial motion for class action treatment may be found here.) However, the district court denied class action treatment without prejudice pending the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Soualian v. Int’l Coffee & Tea LLC, CV 07-502-RGK (JCx), 2007 WL 4877902 (C.D. Cal. filed June 11, 2007). Soualian, however, was settled so the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal. Id. The district court permitted plaintiff to renew his motion for class action certification, and again denied the motion.
After summarizing the legal standard for class action certification under Rule 23, see Bateman, at 648-49, the district court summarized the legislative history of FACTA and the statutory penalties provided for FACTA violations, see id., at 649. The federal court also discussed the 2007 Congressional amendment to FACTA, which clarified that the statute was not intended to provide for private rights of action based solely on the failure of a merchant to include the expiration date of the credit/debit card on the customer’s receipt. See id., at 649-50. The amendment, however, “does not provide Defendant with a safe-harbor for truncating its credit card receipts to eight (8) digits rather than five (5).” Id., at 650. Plaintiff argued that class action treatment was warranted because Congress essentially reaffirmed that the failure to truncate the credit or debit card account numbers supported such lawsuits. Id. But the district court observed that the purpose of the statute was to prevent identity theft, and that “the congressional record also supports an inference that members of Congress were primarily concerned with credit card receipts displaying the entire credit card account number.” Id. Accordingly, the federal court concluded that “it is far from clear whether Congress intended to approve class actions for printing eight (8) digits rather than five (5).” Id. However, the court found persuasive the purpose of the statute – viz., “The purpose of this Act is to ensure that consumers suffering from any actual harm to their credit or identity are protected while simultaneously limiting abusive lawsuits that do not protect consumers but only result in increased cost to business and potentially increased prices to consumers.” Id. (quoting Pub.L. 110-241, § 2(b), 122 Stat. 1565 (June 3, 2008)). Because no one suffered any harm as a result of the technical violation of the statute, the court denied class action treatment. Id.
Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions FCRA Class Actions Uncategorized
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Labor Law Class Action Dismissed because Class Action Predominance Test of Rule 23(b) could not be Satisfied and, Absent Potential for Class Action Certification, Federal Court Lacked Subject Matter Jurisdiction because Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) was Inapplicable Mississippi Federal Court Holds
Plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit against Wal-Mart Stores alleging violations of Mississippi’s labor laws; specifically, the class action complaint alleged that Wal-Mart required plaintiffs to work hours “off the clock,” and to work through meal and rest periods for which they were not paid in violation of state law. Robinson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 253 F.R.D. 396, 397-98 (S.D. Miss. 2008). The class action sought to represent “all current and former hourly-paid employees of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., in the State of Mississippi that were employed from May 28, 1999 until the present,” and prayed for compensatory and punitive damages. Id., at 398. Defense attorneys moved to dismiss the class action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the district court granted the motion with leave to amend because plaintiffs had failed to allege citizenship as required to establish diversity jurisdiction, id. The amended class action complaint is “virtually identical” to the original class action complaint, and defense attorneys again moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the class action failed to allege the $5 million amount in controversy required for federal court jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). Id. Also, the defense asked the federal court to dismiss the class action allegations in the complaint. Id. The district court granted the defense motion in part, and denied it in part.
Consistent with Fifth Circuit authority, the district court began its analysis with the jurisdictional attack under Rule 12(b)(1): “When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before addressing any attack on the merits.” Robinson, at 398 n.1 (quoting Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir.2001)). After noting that the burden of establishing federal court jurisdiction rested on “the party seeking to litigate in federal court,” id., at 398, the district court turned to Wal-Mart’s argument that CAFA’s $5 million amount in controversy requirement had not been met, id., at 399. Plaintiffs’ argued that the putative class consisted of 80,000 people and, accordingly, “each class member’s claim would only need to equal $62.50 to satisfy the $5,000,000 jurisdictional requirement.” Id., at 399. Plaintiffs’ noted also that they sought punitive damages, id. Defense attorneys made several arguments in support of the position that the $5 million threshold had not been met, but the district court concluded “it is not apparent, to a legal certainty, that Plaintiffs cannot recover the jurisdictional amount of $5,000,000 as claimed in their Amended Complaint.” Id. On this ground, then, the district court denied the motion to dismiss the class action, id. It rejected also Wal-Mart’s claim that the federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the claims of some of the class members arose prior to CAFA’s effective date. Id., at 399-400.
Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized
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The author of the Class Action Defense Blog is taking the day off for the Thanksgiving holiday. A new class action article will be published on Monday, December 1
Class Actions In The News Uncategorized
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The author of the Class Action Defense Blog wishes all of you a very Happy Thanksgiving, and urges class action defense counsel to take the day off! A new class action article will be published on Monday, December 1.
Class Actions In The News Uncategorized
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Securities Fraud Class Action Properly Dismissed by District Court because Class Action Complaint Failed to Adequately Allege Failure to Disclose and because Class Action Complaint Failed to Create Strong Inference of Scienter Sixth Circuit Holds
Plaintiffs filed a class action against Visteon Corporation and certain officers and directors of Visteon, and against its outside auditor, Pricewaterhousecooper, alleging violations of federal securities law; specifically, the class action complaint asserted claims for violations of § 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5, and § 20(a) of the Exchange Act. Ley v. Visteon Corp., 543 F.3d 801, 804-05 (6th Cir. 2008). The class action complaint followed the disclosure by Visteon of “$108 million in accounting errors which understated net losses by in excess of $60 million,” id., at 805. According to the class action, this disclosure “shocked the market” and caused Visteon’s stock to drop dramatically. Id., at 804-05. Defense attorneys moved to dismiss the class action complaint, id., at 804. Defense attorneys moved to dismiss the class action’s § 11 claim as barred by the statute of limitations, id., at 806. The defense motion as to the remaining class action claims focused on the failure of the class action complaint to meet the heightened pleading requirements of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA). The district court granted the motion and dismissed the class action complaint in its entirety, id., at 805. Plaintiffs appealed but did not challenge the dismissal of the class action’s § 11 claim, id., at 806; accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed that portion of the district court’s order without discussion and focused its analysis only on the remaining claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.
After discussing briefly the rules governing its review of the dismissal of the class action complaint, see Ley, at 805-06, the Sixth Circuit summarized the law governing securities fraud claims and the heightened pleading requirements necessitated by the PSLRA, see id., at 806-07. The § 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 class action claim against Visteon alleged that it failed to disclose certain information; specifically, Visteon, a spin-off of Ford Motor, “failed to disclose that ‘Ford so dominated the day to day business affairs of Visteon via the contracts between the two and beholden Visteon management, such that Visteon was essentially no more than a repository for operations of Ford that had built in losses.’” Id., at 807. In the words of the Circuit Court, “Essentially, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants failed to adequately disclose that Visteon may have difficulty shedding unprofitable business lines.” Id. The Sixth Circuit disagreed finding the company’s disclosure to be “rife with such information.” Id. And the Circuit Court similarly rejected plaintiffs’ other claims regarding Visteon’s failure to disclose material information, see id., at 807-08. In fact, the Court found that defendants made numerous disclosures and that Visteon was under no duty to disclose information relative to its competitors, id., at 808. As the Sixth Circuit explained at page 808:
Class Action Court Decisions PSLRA/SLUSA Class Actions Uncategorized
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Class Action Complaint by Car Dealers Against Ford Arising out of Blue Oval Program Erroneously Certified as Class Action because Rule 23(b)(3)’s Predominance and Superiority Requirements not met Third Circuit Holds
Nine plaintiffs filed a putative class action against Ford on behalf of themselves and other Ford dealers; the class action complaint alleged that Ford’s Blue Oval Program violated state and federal law. Danvers Motor Co., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 543 F.3d 141, 142-43 (3d Cir. 2008). The federal court dismissed the class action for lack of standing, and plaintiffs filed an amended class action complaint. Id., at 143. In response to a defense motion to dismiss the amended class action, the federal court again concluded that all but one of the named plaintiffs lacked standing to prosecute the action, id. The Third Circuit reversed. See Danvers Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 432 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2005). Plaintiffs moved the district court to certify the litigation as a class action, and the court granted the motion. Danvers, 543 F.3d at 143. The Third Circuit granted Ford leave to appeal pursuant to Rule 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), and reversed.
Ford’s Blue Oval Program, which ran from April 2000 to March 2005, was a voluntary program extended to all Ford dealers “to improve dealer performance and customer satisfaction” by “provid[ing] cash bonus payments and other benefits to Ford dealers who improved customer satisfaction according to certain criteria.” Danvers, at 143. The class action complaint alleged that the Blue Oval Program violated the Robinson-Patman Act, the Automobile Dealer’s Day in Court Act, and various state franchise laws. Id., at 143-44. The class action alleged further that Ford breached the terms of its Sales and Service Agreement with its dealers, and sought “both injunctive relief and damages on behalf of approximately 4,000 Ford dealers.” Id., at 144. However, the Third Circuit observed that some dealers were “certified” under the Blue Oval Program while other dealers were not certified under the Program, and that “dealers expended different efforts with respect to certification, [and] the dealers were impacted by the [Program] in different ways.” Id. Indeed, the Third Circuit summarized the way in which the specific injuries allegedly suffered by the nine named plaintiffs showed those differences, see id., at 144-45.
Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized
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Securities Fraud Class Action Properly Dismissed for Failure to Adequately Plead Falsity and Scienter because Allegations in Class Action Complaint did not Meet Heightened Pleading Requirements Under Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) Eighth Circuit Holds
Plaintiffs filed a class action against Centene Corporation and three of its officers alleging violations of federal securities law; the class action complaint alleged violations of sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and of Rule 10b-5. Elam v. Neidorff, 544 F.3d 921, 924-25 (8th Cir. 2008). The class action centered on the company’s estimates of costs that had been “incurred but not reported” (IBNR). According to the class action, Centene – a “healthcare enterprise that primarily provides programs and related services to individuals receiving benefits under Medicaid,” acted as “an intermediary between the government and Medicaid recipients in the states” and “receive[d] a monthly amount for each Medicaid recipient in its plan and, in turn, [paid] for the recipient’s healthcare services.” Id., at 925. In filing its quarterly reports, the company “include[d] not only the costs incurred and billed during the quarter but also an estimate of medical costs that have been incurred but not reported (IBNR).” Id. Centene’s calculation of IBNR was necessarily an educated guess: it represented “an estimate of claims liability because some medical events occur before the end of a given reporting period (and Centene is therefore liable to pay them) but have not yet been formally billed to the company,” and Centene calculated the estimate “on a monthly basis employing various factors, including in-patient hospital utilization dates and prior claims experience.” Id. Moreover, “Independent actuaries review Centene’s quarterly estimates.” Id. In April 2006, Centene filed its Form 10-Q with the SEC and issued a press release that “were positive and in line with analyst estimates,” and providing positive guidance for the second quarter as well as the balance of the year. Id., at 925-26. In July 2006, the company disclosed that second quarter earnings would be “substantially lower than expected,” and this securities fraud class action complaint soon followed. Id., at 926. Defense attorneys moved to dismiss the class action complaint on the grounds that it failed to satisfy the heightened pleading requirements established by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA); the district court granted the motion and dismissed the class action “finding that plaintiffs failed to allege facts demonstrating that defendants had misrepresented a material fact or acted with scienter.” Id., at 926. The Eighth Circuit affirmed.
After summarizing the “heightened pleading requirements” imposed by the PSLRA on securities fraud cases (class action and non-class action), Elam, at 926-27, the Eighth Circuit turned its attention to plaintiffs’ claim that the class action complaint “sufficiently alleges both falsity and scienter, satisfying the elevated pleading standard for their securities fraud class action,” id., at 927. The Circuit Court held that the mere fact defendants “monitored” its medical costs was insufficient under the PSLRA to establish that defendants knew of information that contradicted any of the financial statements they made, id. The Eighth Circuit refused plaintiffs’ invitation to infer that defendants’ statements were false “based solely on defendants’ representations as to their ability to estimate medical costs.” Id. On the contrary, the PSLRA’s heightened pleadings standards requires that falsity be pleaded with particularity, and this requirement “cannot be satisfied with allegations that defendants made statements ‘and then showing in hindsight that the statement is false.’” Id. (quoting In re Navarre Corp. Sec. Litig., 299 F.3d 735, 743 (8th Cir. 2002)). Plaintiffs’ failure to “point to any contemporaneous reports, witness statements, or any information that had actually been provided to defendants as of April or June that indicated that Centene would need to increase estimated medical costs” was fatal to the class action. Id. (citation omitted). The Circuit Court therefore affirmed the district court’s conclusion that falsity had not been adequately pleaded. Id., at 927-28.
Class Action Court Decisions PSLRA/SLUSA Class Actions Uncategorized
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As a resource for California class action defense attorneys, we provide weekly, unofficial summaries of the legal categories for new class action lawsuits filed in California state and federal courts in the Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Jose, Sacramento, San Diego, San Mateo, Oakland/Alameda and Orange County areas. We include only those categories that include 10% or more of the class action filings during the preceding week. This report covers November 14 – 20, 2008, during which time 49 new class action lawsuits were filed.
Class Actions In The News Uncategorized
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