CLASS ACTION DEFENSE BLOG
Welcome to Michael J. Hassen's Blog. Here you will find over 2,000 articles related to class actions.
District Court Judgment on Discrimination Class Action Complaint Required Reversal and Remand as to Certain Issues Necessitating Remand of Class Action to District Court for Further Proceedings Fifth Circuit Holds
Plaintiffs filed a class action against their employer, Lufkin Industries, alleging violations of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 based on the allegation that Lufkin’s “practice of delegating subjective decision-making authority to its managers with respect to initial assignments and promotions disparately affected them.” McClain v. Lufkin Industries, Inc., ___ F.3d ___ (5th Cir. February 29, 2008) [Slip Opn., at 2]. Among the many named plaintiffs in the class action complaint, only two had filed charges with the EEOC and received right-to-sue letters, _id._ The class action involved all four of Lufkin’s production divisions, and the company has approximately 1,500 hourly and salaried workers. _Id._ The district court granted plaintiffs’ request to certify the litigation as a class action with respect to the disparate-impact claims, but the court refused to give class action treatment to plaintiffs’ disparate-treatment claims. _Id._, at 3. Following a bench trial, at which “the court strictly limited each party to twenty hours for the presentation of its case,” the court found in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded $3.4 million in back pay, together with injunctive relief and attorney fees. _Id._ Both sides appealed: plaintiffs argued the court should have granted class action treatment to the disparate-treatment claims, and defense attorneys argued (1) plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies, (2) lacked standing to represent the class, and (3) the district court committed various errors in finding for plaintiffs and calculating damages. _Id._, at 4. The Fifth Circuit issued an opinion “unfortunately inconclusive of the litigation,” _id._, at 1.
The Fifth Circuit addressed first the defense claim that plaintiffs failed to exhaust their EEOC remedies, which the Circuit Court characterized as the “mainstay of proper enforcement of Title VII remedies.” McClain, at 4. The defense argued that the class action’s disparate-impact claims concerning its hiring and promotional practices, id., at 4-5. Relying on Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S.Ct. 299 (2006), the Circuit Court concluded that the January 1995 letter from plaintiff McClain to the EEOC (relied on by the district court in finding that plaintiffs had exhausted their administrative remedies) complained only about demotion and was thus insufficient to support the hiring and promotion class action claims. See McClain, at 5-8. The Court concluded, however, that plaintiff Thomas’s EEOC charge satisfied the exhaustion requirement, id., at 8-9. However, the Fifth Circuit agreed with defense attorneys that neither McClain nor Thomas adequately complained about Lufkin’s “Foundry” division, and therefore vacated the judgment insofar as it affected the Foundry division, id., at 9. Indeed, the Court noted that “considerable doubt” existed as to whether either of these individuals even had standing to represent a class consisting of Foundry division workers. Id., at 9 n.2.
Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized
Read more...
As Matter of First Impression, FDCPA Permits Consumers to Notify Debt Collectors of Dispute Within 30 Days of Receiving Debt Collectors’ Letter Necessitating Reversal of Summary Judgment in Favor of Defense in FDCPA Class Action Second Circuit Holds
Plaintiff filed a putative nationwide class action complaint against Healthcare Financial Services (HFS), a “debt collector” within the meaning of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), alleging that a debt collection letter he received from HFS violated the FDCPA by failing to advise debtors of their right to dispute the validity of the debt. Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Servs., Inc., 516 F.3d 85, 2008 WL 383060, *1 (2d Cir. 2008). The class action complaint did not allege that plaintiff suffered any actual loss, limiting recover to statutory damages and attorney fees. Id. Defense attorneys moved to dismiss the class action, or in alternative sought summary judgment, on the ground that the debt collection letter did not violate the FDCPA; the defense also sought attorney fees from plaintiff, arguing that he had filed the class action “in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment,” see 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3). Id. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of HFS and awarded HFS attorney fees and costs, id. The Second Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part.
The FDCPA provision at issue provides that a debtor has the right to dispute a debt and seek verification of the validity of the debt by notifying the debt collector of the right to dispute the debt. Jacobson, at *2. The Second Circuit recognized that it must view the issue from the perspective of the “least sophisticated consumer,” see id., at *3 (citing Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1318 (2d Cir. 1993)), but observed also that “the objective test we apply [also] protects debt collectors from unreasonable constructions of their communications,” that the Second Circuit has “carefully preserved the concept of reasonableness,” and that “the FDCPA does not aid plaintiffs whose claims are based on ‘bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretations of collection notices.’” Id. (citations omitted). So viewed, the Circuit Court held that the letter sent by HFS clearly advised debtors of their right to dispute the validity of the alleged debt.
Class Action Court Decisions FDCPA Class Actions Uncategorized
Read more...
Trial Court Order Denying Class Action Certification Barred Subsequent Class Action Filed by Absent Class Member of Prior Class Action Oklahoma State Court Holds, Otherwise “Plaintiffs [could] Continue Filing Broad Class Actions…Until a Trial Court Grants Class Certification, Rendering Ineffective the Previous Denials of Other Courts”
Plaintiff filed a putative class action in Oklahoma state court (LeFlore County) against BP America alleging “BP underpaid royalties by wrongfully charging marketing fees and costs of making the gas marketable, including costs for gathering, treatment, compression, and dehydration, to royalty owners.” Rees v. BP America Prod. Co., ___ F. 3d ___ (Okla.App. February 22, 2008) [Slip Opn., at 2]. The complaint purported to be a class action, brought on behalf of “all similarly situated persons and entities who have received royalty payments from [BP] on Gas Substances produced from the Red Oak-Norris Field.” _Id._ Defense attorneys moved to dismiss the class action on the ground that two other class actions were pending against BP alleging underpaid royalties (_Watts_ and _Chockley_); alternatively, defense attorneys requested that the _Rees_ class action litigation be stayed or transferred to the county in which the _Watts_ class action was pending (Pittsburg County). _Id._ The basis for the defense motion was that the _Watts_ class action purported to represent a class of royalty owners in several counties, including LeFlore, _id._, at 2-3. The _Chockley_ class action also was defined broadly enough to arguably include plaintiff’s claims within its scope, _id._, at 3.
The plaintiffs in the Watts class action had moved the court to certify that litigation as a class action, but the trial court denied the motion. Rees, at 3. The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the denial of class action treatment, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court denied certiorari. Id., at 3-4. The trial court in the Rees class action granted a stay, over plaintiff’s objection, pending the appellate court decision in Watts, id., at 3, and then granted BP’s motion to dismiss the Rees complaint, id., at 4. Specifically, “the trial court applied the principle of issue preclusion in ruling Rees, as an unnamed member of the proposed class in Watts, was bound by the decision in Watts denying class action certification.” Id. (citing In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Products Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2003)).
Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized
Read more...
Defense Removal of Class Action to New York Federal Court under CAFA (Class Action Fairness Act of 2005) was not Objectively Reasonable thus Warranting Award of Attorney Fees to Plaintiff Following Remand of Class Action to State Court
Plaintiff filed a putative class action lawsuit in New York state court against Circuit City. Alicea v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 534 F.Supp.2d 432, 2008 WL 344695, *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). The class action complaint, a copy of which may be found here, alleged that Circuit City’s “return policy and imposition of a ‘restocking fee’ in the amount of 15% of the purchase price of certain returned items” violated New York General Business Law § 349. Defense attorneys removed the class action to federal court on the ground that removal jurisdiction existed under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA); plaintiff’s lawyer moved to remand the class action complaint to state court arguing that Circuit City had failed to establish that the $5 million amount-in-controversy requirement had been met for CAFA removal jurisdiction. Alicea, at *1. Plaintiff also sought attorney fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), id. The district court granted the motion to remand the class action to state court, and in the order summarized here, awarded plaintiff attorney fees under § 1447(c). (The order remanding the class action to state court may be found here.)
As a threshold matter, the district court noted that “the standard governing the application of section 1447(c)…is whether the removing party ‘lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.’” Alicea, at *1 (quoting Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005)). The federal court also “‘recognize[d] the desire to deter removals sought for the purpose of prolonging litigation and imposing costs on the opposing party, while not undermining Congress’ basic decision to afford defendants a right to remove as a general matter, when the statutory criteria are satisfied.’” Id. (quoting Martin, at 140). Here, defense attorneys argued that a reasonable basis existed for removing the class action under CAFA because “(1) it was ‘unclear to defendant whether plaintiff was seeking treble damages’…, (2) ‘at the time of removal, it objectively appeared that plaintiff’s claims were not limited to New York State consumers’…, and (3) ‘the costs of compliance would extend in perpetuity,’ and thus ‘CAFA’s jurisdictional limits would have been easily met.’…” Id. The district court rejected each of these arguments.
Class Action Court Decisions Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) Removal & Remand Uncategorized
Read more...
As a resource to California class action defense attorneys, we provide weekly, unofficial summaries of the legal categories for new class action lawsuits filed in California state and federal courts in the Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Jose, Sacramento, San Diego, San Mateo, Oakland/Alameda and Orange County areas. We include only those categories that include 10% or more of the class action filings during the preceding week. This report covers February 22 – 28, 2008, during which time 29 new class action lawsuits were filed.
Class Actions In The News Uncategorized
Read more...
Judicial Panel Grants Request for Pretrial Coordination of Class Action Lawsuits Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 and Transfers Class Actions to Central District of California Eleven (11) class action lawsuits (5 in California, 2 in New York and Pennsylvania, and 1 in Indiana and South Carolina) against various defendants, including Mattel and Fisher-Price, arising out of the “the production of defendants’ toys in China with surface paints that allegedly contain elevated levels of lead and the sale of those toys in the United States.
Class Action Court Decisions Multidistrict Litigation Uncategorized
Read more...
Class Action Waiver Unconscionable Under Washington State Law and Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) so District Court Properly Denied Defense Motion to Dismiss Class Action Complaint and Order Individual Claims to Arbitration Ninth Circuit Holds
Plaintiffs filed a class action in Washington state court against their cellular telephone service provider, T-Mobile, “alleging that the service provider had improperly charged them for certain fees beyond the advertised price of service, charged them for calls during a billing period other than that in which the calls were made, and charged them for roaming and other services that should have been free.” Lowden v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 512 F. 3d 1213, 1215 (9th Cir. 2008). The service agreements underlying the class action plaintiffs’ claims contained mandatory arbitration provisions that barred class action litigation, id. Defense attorneys removed the class action to federal court, and then moved the federal court to compel arbitration of the claims on an individual rather than class action basis. Id., at 1214. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the arbitration clauses were unenforceable because the class action waivers and the limitation on punitive damages rendered them substantively unconscionable, id., at 1217. Defense attorneys appealed and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
The service agreements signed by the class action plaintiffs stated, directly above the signature line, that any disputes would be submitted to mandatory arbitration. Lowden, at 1215-16. The specific language in the two service agreements underlying the class action complaint differed slightly, but the differences did not impact the district court’s decision: each arbitration clause precluded class action litigation. Id. In ruling on T-Mobile’s motion to compel arbitration, the district court concluded that the arbitration provisions were not procedurally unconscionable, but “held that the prohibition on class relief and the limitation on punitive damages, found in both agreements, were each substantively unconscionable.” id., at 1217. The Ninth Circuit defined the issues on appeal as whether T-Mobile’s arbitration provisions “are enforceable under Washington state law and, if not, whether the state law is preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (‘FAA’), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16.” Lowden, at 1214. It concluded that, in light of the Washington State’s Supreme Court opinion in Scott v. Cingular Wireless, 161 P.3d 1000 (Wash. 2007), “T-Mobile’s arbitration provision is substantively unconscionable and unenforceable under Washington state law,” and that the FAA did not preempt Washington state law. Lowden, at 1214-15.
Arbitration Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized
Read more...
Defense Motion to Dismiss California Class Action Alleging Misclassification of Employees and Seeking Damages under California State Law Fails because Class Action was not Incompatible with Illinois Class Action by Same Plaintiff Lawyer Alleging Misclassification of Same Group of Employees and Seeking Damages under Federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) California Federal Court Holds
Plaintiff filed a putative class action against Abbott Laboratories in California state court on September 25, 2007, and defense attorneys removed the class action complaint to federal court on November 7, 2007, arguing that removal jurisdiction existed under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA). Thorpe v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., ___ F.Supp.2d ___ (N.D. Cal. February 12, 2008) [Slip Opn., at 1]. The class action complaint stated that plaintiff formerly had been employed by Abbott as a Pharmaceutical Representative, and alleged that improperly classified him and other Pharmaceutical Representatives as “exempt” employees and that he was required to work more than 8 hours per day or 40 hours per week without overtime, and was denied meal and rest periods. _Id._, at 2. The class action further alleged that Abbott failed to provide accurate wage statements as required by California law. _Id._ Defense attorneys moved to dismiss the class action or, in the alternative, to strike the class action allegations, _id._, at 1-2. The federal court denied the motion.
The defense argued that the class action complaint must be dismissed, or the class action allegations stricken, “because plaintiff’s claims for unpaid overtime for Pharmaceutical Representatives at Abbott are based on the same facts and circumstances as those alleged in a parallel federal action, Jirak v. Abbott Laboratories, et al., 07-03636 (‘Jirak action’), filed by plaintiff’s counsel and currently pending in the District Court in the Northern District of Illinois.” Thorpe, at 2. Defense attorneys argued that even though Thorpe was not a plaintiff in the Jirak action, “the present complaint is an attempt by plaintiff’s counsel to circumvent the requirements for maintaining a class action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (‘FLSA’)… by filing two class actions based on the same circumstances, namely that Abbott mis-classified Pharmaceutical Representatives as exempt employees.” Id., at 2-3. In essence, the defense argued “the opt-out class action that plaintiff seeks to maintain for his claims under California law is incompatible with the FLSA opt-in class action proceeding concurrently in the Northern District of Illinois.” Id., at 3.
Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized
Read more...
Defense Motion to Dismiss Class Action Alleging Gasoline Retailers Overcharged Consumers by Failing to Account for Differences Based on Temperature of Gasoline Sold Denied because Class Action Allegations Adequately Pleaded Claims for Breach of Contract, Violation of Consumer Protection Statutes, and Various Other Claims Kansas Federal Court Holds
Several putative class action lawsuits were filed against various motor fuel retailers in 26 states, the District of Columbia and Guam (“the Region”); the class actions were consolidated in the District of Kansas for pretrial purposes by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (a summary of the Judicial Panel’s order may be found here). Though it alleged numerous causes of action, in essence the consolidated class action complaint alleged that defendants’ sale of gasoline “for a specified price per gallon without disclosing or adjusting for temperature expansion” subjects them to liability “under various state law theories including breach of contract, breach of warranty, fraud and consumer protection.” In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Prac. Litig., 534 F.Supp.2d 1214 (D. Kan. 2008) [Slip Opn., at 1]. Defense attorneys moved to dismiss the class action on ten (10) different grounds, see id., at 13-14, but framed the arguments “in general terms” that did not “identify the elements of each cause of action or discuss whether the laws of each jurisdiction are the same,” id., at 14. The district court denied the motion.
In broad terms, the consolidated class action complaint alleged that gasoline expands when heated and so a given volume has less mass at warmer temperatures than the same fuel would have at cooler temperatures. In re Motor Fuel, at 3. Because of this, the industry has standardized the sale of gasoline based on temperature, defining a “gallon” as 231 cubic inches at 60 degrees Fahrenheit, and this standard – known as D-1250 – is used “at every state of the process except at retail.” Id. Retail gasoline is sold “based solely on volume (i.e. 231 cubic inches) without regard to temperature,” and is advertised without defining for the term “gallon” for the consumer, id. Further, the industry has fought selling gasoline at the D-1250 standard, so “Plaintiffs pay billions of extra dollars every year because retailers deliver fuel which is – on average – at least 10 degrees higher than the industry standard without making any correction in price and/or volume.” Id., at 4. This practice also “generate[s] hidden profits in the form of excess reimbursement for taxes paid on wholesale purchases,” because defendants pay federal and state taxes on the D-1250 standard, but collects reimbursement of those taxes from consumers on the additional gallons sold at higher temperatures, id. Finally, the class action alleges that equipment is available (and in use in Canada) to adjust the retail sale of gasoline to the D-1250 standard, but defendants have opposed putting the equipment into use by falsely claiming the average temperature of gasoline sold in the U.S. is 56◦ F, while the American Petroleum Institute now concedes that it is higher than 60◦ F, and that it would cost more than $6 billion to put the equipment to use, while the industry now estimates that cost to be $2.2 billion. Id., at 4-5. The nine (9) separate claims alleged in the class action complaint are discussed at pages 6 through 13 of the opinion.
Class Action Court Decisions Multidistrict Litigation Uncategorized
Read more...
Class Action Challenging Labeling PCs as “Windows Vista Capable” even if PCs could not Run Premium Vista Properly Certified as Nationwide Class Action and Washington State Law may be Applied to Claims of All Members of Class Action Washington Federal Court Holds
Plaintiffs filed a putative class action lawsuit against Microsoft challenging the marketing of its new “Windows Vista Capable” and “Express Upgrade” programs; specifically, the class action complaint alleged that almost a year before its release of the new Vista operating system, Microsoft “authorized original equipment manufacturers…to place a sticker on personal computers… indicating that the PCs had been certified by Microsoft as ‘Windows Vista Capable.’” Kelley v. Microsoft Corp., ___ F.Supp.2d ___ (W.D. Wash. February 22, 2008) [Slip Opn., at 1]. The class action alleged further that a substantial number of PCs that were advertised as “Windows Vista Capable” were limited to “Vista Home Basic” which, according to the complaint, “does not include any of the enhanced features unique to Vista and which make Vista attractive to customers.” _Id._, at 2. Some PCs were labeled as “Premium Ready” rather than “Windows Vista Capable,” _id._, but at that time consumers were unaware of the various Vista operating systems that would be available or the differences between them. The class action also alleged that Microsoft offered an “Express Upgrade Guarantee Program” to PC customers that would allow purchasers to “Windows Vista Capable” PCs to upgrade to Vista for little or no cost, but failed to disclose that the upgrade generally would be limited to Vista Home Basic. _Id._ Plaintiffs moved for the district court to certify the litigation as a nationwide class action and to apply Washington law to the class action. _Id._, at 1. Defense attorneys opposed both motions. The district court granted class action certification and agreed that Washington law governs the lawsuits.
The gravamen of the class action complaint was that “Microsoft eventually released four versions of Vista – Basic, Premium, Business, and Ultimate” – but that “the Premium version that is the ‘real’ Vista.” Kelley, at 2. Computers were advertised as “Windows Vista Capable,” the class action alleged, in order to “boost holiday sales of personal computers after delaying the release of Vista from March 2006 to early 2007” because Microsoft was “concerned that consumers looking to buy a new computer would delay their purchases until the release of Vista (and therefore after the holiday season).” Id. Thus, Microsoft allegedly engaged in the false and deceptive business practice of advertising PCs as “Windows Vista Capable” even if they could only run the Basic version “because Microsoft was concerned that few PCs on the market at the time could run the more premium versions of Vista” and so it “endeavored to assure consumers that their new computers would run the soon-to-be released Vista operating system.” Id. Microsoft countered that while Vista Home Basic “lack[ed] some of the capabilities of the premium versions of Vista, [it] still provides material improvements over Microsoft’s earlier operating system, Windows XP,” id., and pointed to various “marketing materials, sales aids, and training materials that described what features the different Windows Vista editions would provide and explained that not every ‘Windows Vista Capable’ computer would be able to provide every advanced feature available in every edition of Windows Vista,” id., at 3.
At the time plaintiffs sought class action treatment, the complaint sought relief for unjust enrichment and for violation of Washington’s Consumer Protection Act (CPA) or other state consumer protection acts. Kelley, at 4. Plaintiffs sought to certify a nationwide class action, and argued that Washington law applied to the claims of all class members. Id. The district court began its analysis by addressing the choice of law question, id. Defense attorneys argued that “the laws of all 50 states are relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims,” id., at 5. The federal court explained that it must first determine whether applying Washington law would be unconstitutional, and if not, whether applying Washington law would be “appropriate under Washington’s choice of law rules.” Id. (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985)). The district court easily concluded that applying Washington law would not violate the Constitution because “[a]lthough the injury to Plaintiffs and the potential class members may have occurred outside of Washington, application of Washington law is not arbitrary, unfair, or unforeseeable.” Id., at 5-6 (citation omitted). The court’s analysis of Washington’s choice of law rules was much more extensive, see id., at 6-11. Washington law requires a determination first of whether an actual conflict exists between the laws of Washington and other states, and if so, “the forum or fora that have the ‘most significant relationship’ to the action to determine the applicable law.” Id., at 6 (citation omitted).
Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized
Read more...