Class Action Defense Cases-In re TJX Security Breach: Judicial Panel On Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) Grants Plaintiff’s Motion To Centralize Class Action Lawsuits And Agrees District of Massachusetts Is Appropriate Transferee Court

Judicial Panel Grants Request, Unopposed by Defense, for Pretrial Coordination of Class Action Lawsuits Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 in the District of Massachusetts Six class action lawsuits (four in Massachusetts, and one in Alabama and Puerto Rico) were filed against TJX and others seeking damages arising out of the electronic theft of confidential customer data from TJX’s computer system. In re In re The TJX Cos., Inc., Customer Data Security Breach Litig.

Class Action Court Decisions Multidistrict Litigation Uncategorized

FDCPA Class Action Defense Cases-Meselsohn v. Lerman: New York Federal Court Denies Defense Motion To Dismiss Class Action Under Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) Holding Collection Letter Complied With Statute But Required Transitional Language

District Court Concludes that Validation Notice in Debt Collection Letter was Presumptively Valid because it Tracked Section 1692g of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), but Concluded that Least Sophisticated Consumer could have been Confused by “Subject To” Language in Letter and so Denies Defense Motion to Dismiss Class Action Complaint

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against debt collection law firm alleging that a debt collection letter sent in August 2005 violated the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). Meselsohn v. Lerman, 485 F.Supp.2d 215, 216 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). Defense attorneys moved to dismiss the class action complaint for failure to state a claim on the ground that the letter was presumptively valid. Surprisingly, plaintiff admitted that the letter “properly informs the consumer of his rights to dispute the debt, request verification of the debt and request creditor information within thirty (30) days of the initial communication from the debt collector.” Id., at 217. The class action complaint was premised on the theory that the letter violated the FDCPA because the 30-day validation period required by Section 1692g is “improperly overshadowed by the demand for payment of the debt within the same thirty days.” Id. According to plaintiff, it was unclear that he had the right “to either pay the debt or request validation,” id. (italics added). Defense attorneys argued that dismissal of the class action was warranted because the letter “tracks the statutory language of the FDCPA and is presumptively valid,” and argued further that the demand for payment “is specifically made ‘subject to’ the thirty day notice provisions” and so the validation notice is not “overshadowed” by the payment demand. Id. Plaintiff countered that the letters should have included “transitional language explaining to the consumer that the demand for payment does not override the consumer’s right to seek validation of the debt” and that it is deficient because it is not clear that the consumer may either pay the debt or dispute it. Id. The district court agreed with plaintiff.

Class Action Court Decisions FDCPA Class Actions Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases-Villanueve-Bazaldua v. TruGreen: Delaware Federal Court Denies Conditional Class Action Certification Of FLSA Class Action Holding Plaintiff Not “Similarly Situated” to Putative Class

Plaintiff in FLSA Class Action Must Make “Some Factual Showing” that Similarly-Situated Requirement is met in order to Obtain Conditional Certification of Class Action Treatment Delaware Federal Court Holds

Plaintiff filed a labor law class action against TruGreen – a lawn and landscaping company that hires non-immigrants for seasonal work under the federal H-2B visa program – alleging violations of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and various state law claims. Villanueve-Bazaldua v. TruGreen Ltd. Partners, 479 F.Supp.2d 411, 413 (D. Del. 2007). Plaintiff moved to conditionally certify a class action; defense attorneys objected to class certification on the ground that plaintiff was not “similarly situated” to the putative class members and that, in any event, the company was not legally required to reimburse the expenses underlying the class action claims. The district court agreed with the defense and refused to certify an FLSA class action.

The class action complaint alleged that he was “recruited” in Mexico and that TruGreen promised to pay him $11.34 per regular hour and $17.01 per overtime hour to work for the company, and that in reliance on these promises, plaintiff incurred the expense of obtaining an H-2B visa and of traveling to and from the U.S. TruGreen, at 413. “These expenses included the cost of obtaining a Mexican passport, a $100 visa application fee, a $100 visa issuance fee, a $6 border crossing fee, a $155 administrative fee paid to TruGreen’s agent for processing the visa paperwork, and transportation expenses from the point of recruitment to the place of work in the United States.” Id. According to the class action allegations, these expenses constituted “de facto deductions from the first and last weeks of their wages, causing them to earn less than the wages required by the FLSA.” Id., at 413-14. Plaintiff argued that class action treatment was appropriate because Arriaga v. Florida Pacific Farms, 305 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2002), holds that “visa and transportation costs incurred by foreign visa workers are de facto wage deductions from the workers’ first and last weeks’ wages for purposes of the FLSA” and because “all of TruGreen’s H-2B workers present the same claim that the FLSA requires reimbursement of those costs up to the mandated FLSA wage level,” id., at 414. Defense attorneys opposed conditional certification of a class action arguing that (1) it is not required to bear the visa and transportation costs of its H-2B employees, (2) plaintiff is not “similarly situated” to the putative class members because TruGreen provided him with transportation back to Mexico, and (3) “certain H-2B workers did receive compensation for various incidentals arising from their temporary employment.” Id.

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized

FLSA Class Action Defense Case-Sherrill v. Sutherland Global: New York Federal Court Holds Conditional Certification Of FLSA (Fair Labor Standards Act) Collective Action Warranted But Limits Scope Of Proposed Class

Plaintiffs in Class Action/FLSA Collective Action Alleging Labor Law Violations Adequately Supported Motion for Conditional Certification under FLSA of Putative Class Including Non-New York Employees, but Limits Class to Telemarketers Rather than All Hourly Employees

Two plaintiffs filed a class action and FLSA (Fair Labor Standards Act) collective action lawsuit against telemarketing service provider Sutherland Global – which operated 9 call centers in New York, one in California and one in Virginia – alleging various state and federal labor law violations, after which 38 former telemarketing agents sought court approval to “opt in” to the class action/FLSA lawsuit as named plaintiffs. Sherrill v. Sutherland Global Servs., Inc., 487 F.Supp.2d 344, 346-47 (W.D.N.Y. 2007). Plaintiffs moved the court to conditionally certify an FLSA collective action and to provide notice to putative class members of their right to opt in, id., at 346. Defense attorneys did not oppose the motion, but requested the right to approve the notice, asked the federal court to limit the scope of the proposed class, and asked the federal court to set an “opt-in” deadline, id., at 351. The defense also requested that plaintiffs’ lawyer remove “inaccurate statements” from counsel’s website, but plaintiffs “voluntarily agreed to make the necessary corrections” rendering the issue moot, id. at 351 n.4. The district court granted plaintiff’s motion in part, agreeing with defense attorneys that notice should be sent only to current and former telemarketing agents rather than all Sutherland hourly employees, and

The class action/FLSA complaint alleged three labor law violations. First, that Sutherland’s timekeeping system automatically deducted 60 minutes for lunch from each employee’s daily pay, regardless of whether the employee took a lunch break or worked during part of their lunch break. Sherrill, at 347. The complaint further alleged that the workload and the pressure to meet performance goals required that telemarketing agents frequently work during lunch periods, and as part of their motion, plaintiffs submitted declarations supporting these allegations, id. Second, the class action alleged that Sutherland required its telemarketers to work “off the clock” by arriving 15-30 minutes before their scheduled shift but encouraging them not to “log on” until at or near their scheduled start time. Id. Finally, plaintiffs alleged – and in their motion introduced evidence supporting – that Sutherland improperly excluded commissions and bonuses in calculating its employees’ appropriate overtime rates, using instead the “regular rate of pay” for each employee “result[ing] in application of a lower overtime rate than would apply were commissions and bonuses properly included in the rate of pay,” id., at 348.

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized

Arbitration Class Action Defense Case-DiFiore v. American Airlines: Federal Court Rejects Defense Effort To Compel Arbitration With Class Action Plaintiffs Based On Agreement With Co-Defendant

Defense Attempt to Compel Arbitration of Class Action Claims Based on Arbitration Clause in Employment Agreement Between Plaintiffs and Co-Defendant Warranted Only “Passing Attention” and was Rejected by Massachusetts Federal Court Skycaps filed a class action lawsuit against American Airlines and against their direct employer, G2 Secure Staff, LLC, which employs skycaps for airlines, alleging that American Airlines violated the Massachusetts Tips Law by imposing a $2 per bag service charge for passenger luggage checked at curbside.

Arbitration Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized

15 U.S.C. § 78cc—Validity Of Contracts Statutes Under The Federal Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) For Individual And Class Action Securities Lawsuits

As a resource for class action defense lawyers who defend against securities class action litigation, we provide the text of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA). Congress set forth statutory provisions addressing the validity of contracts under the PSLRA in 15 U.S.C. § 78cc, which provides:

§ 78cc. Validity of contracts

(a) Waiver provisions

Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange required thereby shall be void.

(b) Contract provisions in violation of chapter

Every contract made in violation of any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder, and every contract (including any contract for listing a security on an exchange) heretofore or hereafter made, the performance of which involves the violation of, or the continuance of any relationship or practice in violation of, any provision of this chapter or any rule or regulation thereunder, shall be void

Statutes & Rules Uncategorized

Washington State Joins Growing List of Jurisdictions Invalidating Class Action Waivers

Enforcement of Class Action Waiver in Cingular’s Mandatory Arbitration Clause Reversed by Washington Supreme Court and Class Action Reinstated because Class Action Waiver was Unconscionable under the Circumstances A Seattle newspaper reports that the Washington Supreme Court has held that Cingular Wireless cannot enforce a class action waiver as part of an apparently mandatory arbitration clause. As prior articles reveal, class action waivers are frequently part of company-drafted mandatory arbitration provisions.

Class Actions In The News Uncategorized

New Employment Law Class Action Cases Yet Again Lead List Of Class Actions Filed In California State And Federal Courts During Past Week

In an effort to assist California class action defense attorneys anticipate the claims against which they will have to defend, we provide weekly, unofficial summaries of the legal categories for new class action lawsuits filed in California state and federal courts in the Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Jose, Sacramento, San Diego, San Mateo, Oakland/Alameda and Orange County areas. We include only those categories that include 10% or more of the class action filings during the relevant timeframe.

Class Actions In The News Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases-In re Mirapex: Judicial Panel On Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) Grants Defense Motion To Centralize Class Action Litigation But Selects District of Minnesota As Transferee Court

Judicial Panel Grants Defense Request, Opposed by Plaintiffs, for Pretrial Coordination of Class Action Lawsuits Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 but Rejects Defense Request to Transfer Class Actions to Southern District of New York or to District of Connecticut More than fifty (50) products liability class action lawsuits were filed, the vast majority in the District of Minnesota, against various defendants alleging adverse side effects from use of the drug Mirapex, and challenging the timeliness and adequacy of defendants’ warnings concerning those side effects.

Class Action Court Decisions Multidistrict Litigation Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases-McAdams v. Monier: California Circuit Holds Class Action May Be Certified Based On “Inference” Of Reliance By Class Members So Trial Court Erred In Denying Motion To Certify Class Action

“Concept of Interest of Common Reliance” Applies to Class Action Alleging Violations of CLRA (Consumers Legal Remedies Act) and UCL (Unfair Competition Law) and Supports Certification of Class Action California Appellate Court Holds

Plaintiff filed a putative class action in California state court against Monier alleging violations of the state’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) and Unfair Competition Law (UCL) arising out of its “failure to disclose that the color composition of its roof tiles would erode away, leaving bare concrete, well before the end of the tiles’ represented 50-year life.” McAdams v. Monier, Inc., 151 Cal.App.4th 667, 60 Cal.Rptr.3d 111, 112-13 (Cal.App. 2007), reh’g den. and opn. mod. (June 25, 2007). The class action complaint alleged that Monier warranted its roof tiles for 50 years, and represented that it had a permanent color glaze and required no care. McAdams, at 113. The class action claims were based on the allegation that, contrary to the above, Monier knew that the tiles lose their color “well in advance of their warranted 50-year useful life,” id. Plaintiff sought to prosecute a class action on behalf of a “CLRA” class, consisting of all people who own homes with Monier tile roofs or who paid to replace or repair such tiles, and an “ownership” class, consisting of people who own buildings other than homes with Monier tile roofs or who paid to replace or repair such tiles. Id., at 113-14. In denying plaintiff’s class certification motion, the trial court explained that each class member would be required to prove actual reliance, raising individual fact issues as to the particular representations relied on and the damage suffered, and that plaintiff claims were not “typical” of class because he purchased his tiles through a third party distributor rather than through Monier directly. Id., at 114. Plaintiff appealed, and the appellate court reversed.

The Court of Appeal first addressed class action certification under the CLRA, which is governed by Civil Code section 1781. The appellate court readily concluded that the class action complaint sufficiently alleged a violation of the CLRA, McAdams, at 115, the issue was whether the trial court correctly determined that individual issues predominated. The appellate court found, “The class action is based on a single, specific, alleged material misrepresentation: Monier knew but failed to disclose that its color roof tiles would erode to bare concrete long before the life span of the tiles was up.” Id. With respect to the trial court’s conclusion that class members must individually prove reliance and consequent damage, thus defeating commonality as required by section 1781(b)(2), the appellate court recognized the CLRA requires a plaintiff show both that the defendant’s statements were deceptive and that the representations caused them damage, id., at 116 (citation omitted), but held that under the facts of this case reliance by members of the putative class could be “inferred” based on the allegation that “Monier made a single, material misrepresentation to class members that consisted of a failure to disclose a particular fact regarding its roof tiles” when Monier allegedly knew “that the color composition of its roof tiles would erode to bare concrete well before the end of the tiles’ represented 50-year life.” Id., at 117. The appellate court found that, if these allegations were true, the failure to make the requisite disclosure “would have been material to any reasonable person who purchased tiles in light of the 50- year/lifetime representation, or the permanent color representation, or the maintenance-free representation” so as to “permit an inference of common reliance among the class on the material misrepresentation comprising the alleged failure to disclose.” Id. The Court of Appeal further held that this conclusion meant plaintiff did not have to purchase his tiles directly from Monier in order to prosecute a CLRA class action claim against it on behalf of the class. See id., at 118-19.

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized