Watson v. Philip Morris-Class Action Defense Issues: U.S. Supreme Court Rejects Tobacco Company Argument That Heavily Regulated Industry Falls Within Scope of Federal Officer Removal Statute

In Decision with Significant Impact on Defense of Class Action Lawsuits, U.S. Supreme Court Holds that Private Party cannot Remove Lawsuit to Federal Court under Federal Officer Removal Statute Merely because it Complies with Federal Laws

Plaintiffs filed a suit in Arkansas state court against Philip Morris alleging violations of the state’s unfair and deceptive business practices statutes arising out of its marketing of “light” cigarettes, which plaintiffs argued suggested that they were “safer” – i.e., lower in tar and nicotine – than regular cigarettes. Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 551 U.S. __, 127 S.Ct. 2301 [Slip Opn., at 1-2] (2007). Defense attorneys removed the action to federal court on the basis of the federal officer removal statute, which the district court agreed authorized removal, id., at 2. The Supreme Court explained that the district court reasoned the lawsuit “attacked Philip Morris’ use of the Government’s method of testing cigarettes” and that plaintiffs “had sued Philip Morris for ‘act[s]’ taken ‘under’ the Federal Trade Commission, a federal agency (staffed by federal ‘officer[s]’).” Id. The district court certified the question for interlocutory review, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed “emphasiz[ing] the FTC’s detailed supervision of the cigarette testing process” and relying upon cases authorizing removal “by heavily supervised Government contractors.” Id., at 2-3. The Eighth Circuit held that Philip Morris was “acting under” the FTC with respect to its marketing of “light” cigarettes, thus authorizing removal. Id., at 3. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.

The federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), permits removal of suits brought against the “United States or any agency thereof or any officer (or any person acting under that officer) of the United States or of any agency thereof, sued in an official or individual capacity for any act under color of such office” (italics added). The Supreme Court recognized that the phrase “acting under” are “broad” and that “the statute must be ‘liberally construed,’” but added that “broad language is not limitless.” Watson, at 3 (citations omitted). The High Court’s analysis of the legislative history led it to conclude that the Congressional intent was to cover persons “aiding or assisting” federal officers in the performance of their duties, or acting directly “under or by authority of any such officer.” Id., at 3-7. So viewed, the Supreme Court held that the words “acting under” in the federal officer removal statute must be a reference to “a relationship that involves ‘acting in a certain capacity, considered in relation to one holding a superior position or office.’” Id., at 7. “In our view, the help or assistance necessary to bring a private person within the scope of the statute does not include simply complying with the law.” Id., at 8 (italics in original).

Class Action Court Decisions Removal & Remand Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases-Belaire-West v. Superior Court: California Appellate Court Subordinates Employees’ Privacy Rights To Class Action Plaintiff’s Request For Their Personal Contact Information

Court Expands Holding in Pioneer Electronics to Employer-Employee Relationship and Essentially Grants Class Action Plaintiffs Unrestricted Access to Personal Contact Information of Putative Class Members Prior to Certification of Class Action and Without any Showing of Likelihood that Class Action will be Certified

Plaintiffs filed a labor law class action against their former employer, Belaire-West Landscaping, alleging wage and hour violations. Belaire-West Landscape, Inc. v. Superior Court, __ Cal.App.4th __, 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 197, 198 (Cal.App. 2007). Prior to certification of the litigation as a class action, plaintiffs moved to compel Belaire to produce the names and addresses of all current and former employees; defense attorneys objected on the grounds of the absent class members’ right to privacy under the California Constitution. Id. The trial court granted the motion, and approved a proposed notice to putative class members that required them to affirmatively object in writing to the production of their contact information to plaintiffs, id. The defense sought a writ of mandate, and the Court of Appeal issued an order to show cause why the letter to absent class members should not require an “opt-in privacy notice procedure,” id., at 199-200. Ultimately, the appellate court denied the writ, holding that “the opt-out notice adequately protects the privacy rights of the current and former employees involved.” Id., at 199.

We have previously reported on the recent opinion by the California Supreme Court in Pioneer Electronics (USA), Inc. v. Superior Court, 40 Cal.4th 360 (Cal. 2007) – that summary, and the text of the Court’s opinion, may be found here. In brief, Pioneer approved of the type of notice at issue in Belaire-West because the class members already had taken the step of affirmatively contacting the defendant and providing their contact information for the express purpose of having someone contact them to redress their concerns. The Court of Appeal summarized the Pioneer decision as holding that “under the circumstances presented, an opt-out notice was sufficient to protect the privacy rights of the DVD purchasers.” Belaire-West, at 200 (citation omitted). The question is whether the facts of Belaire-West are similar to “the circumstances presented” in Pioneer.

The appellate court recognized the significant differences between the cases. For example, the Court of Appeal stated that the Supreme Court “focused on the fact that the consumers in question had voluntarily disclosed their contact information to Pioneer in seeking redress of their grievances concerning a Pioneer DVD player,” Belaire-West, at 200-01, and at page 201 quoted the Supreme Court’s reasoning as follows:

Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases-Berenson v. National Financial: First Circuit Dismisses Interlocutory Appeal In Class Action For Lack Of Jurisdiction

Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) Provision Allowing Appeals from Orders Denying Petitions to Compel Arbitration Inapplicable Where District Court Granted Defense Motions Dismissing Class Action Allegations in Putative Class Action Complaint and then Granted Defense Motion Compelling Arbitration

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action in the District of Columbia federal court against their broker, National Financial Services and Fidelity Brokerage Services (both subsidiaries of Fidelity Investments), alleging violations of the federal Electronic Funds Transfer Act (EFTA) and various state laws arising out of Fidelity’s failure to pay customers interest on the “float” of their funds from date they requested electronic transfer of funds to the date the funds were in fact transferred. Berenson v. National Fin. Servs. LLC, 485 F.3d 35, 36 (1st Cir. 2007). The class action complaint alleged that plaintiffs opened an account with Fidelity in the 1980s, id. The Fidelity account agreement contained an arbitration clause requiring arbitration of “all controversies” but forbidding either party in a putative class action from seeking to compel arbitration unless (1) class action treatment is denied, (2) the class action is decertified, or (3) the court excludes the customer from participating in the class action, id., at 37-38. After the class action complaint was transferred to the Massachusetts federal court, id., at 37 n.3, defense attorneys filed a series of motions attacking the pleadings and the class action allegations but “reserved the right to compel arbitration if class certification is denied,” id., at 38. Ultimately defense attorneys succeeded in defeating the class action allegations and moved to compel arbitration of the plaintiffs’ non-class claims. After the district court compelled arbitration, Fidelity sought appellate review of the court’s order granting summary judgment; the First Circuit dismissed the interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Plaintiffs began using the company’s electronic bill payment service in the mid-1980s, but after a period of time Fidelity contracted out this service and in 2000 entered into an agreement with CheckFree to handle the bill payment service using the “good funds” method, which the First Circuit summarized at page 37 as follows:

Arbitration Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized

15 U.S.C. § 78y–Congressional Provisions Regarding Court Review Of Orders and Rules Pursuant To The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA)

To assist class action defense lawyers who defends against securities class action litigation, we provide the text of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA). Congress provided for court review of orders and rules under the PSLRA in 15 U.S.C. § 78y, which provides as follows:

§ 78y. Court review of orders and rules

(a) Final Commission orders; persons aggrieved; petition; record; findings; affirmance, modification, enforcement, or setting aside of orders; remand to adduce additional evidence

(1) A person aggrieved by a final order of the Commission entered pursuant to this chapter may obtain review of the order in the United States Court of Appeals for the circuit in which he resides or has his principal place of business, or for the District of Columbia Circuit, by filing in such court, within sixty days after the entry of the order, a written petition requesting that the order be modified or set aside in whole or in part.

(2) A copy of the petition shall be transmitted forthwith by the clerk of the court to a member of the Commission or an officer designated by the Commission for that purpose. Thereupon the Commission shall file in the court the record on which the order complained of is entered, as provided in section 2112 of title 28 and the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.

(3) On the filing of the petition, the court has jurisdiction, which becomes exclusive on the filing of the record, to affirm or modify and enforce or to set aside the order in whole or in part.

(4) The findings of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive.

(5) If either party applies to the court for leave to adduce additional evidence and shows to the satisfaction of the court that the additional evidence is material and that there was reasonable ground for failure to adduce it before the Commission, the court may remand the case to the Commission for further proceedings, in whatever manner and on whatever conditions the court considers appropriate. If the case is remanded to the Commission, it shall file in the court a supplemental record containing any new evidence, any further or modified findings, and any new order.

Statutes & Rules Uncategorized

Labor Law Class Action Cases Reclaim Top Spot Among New Class Action Filings In California State And Federal Courts

As a resource to California defense attorneys, we provide weekly, unofficial summaries of the legal categories for new class action lawsuits filed in California state and federal courts in the Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Jose, Sacramento, San Diego, San Mateo, Oakland/Alameda and Orange County areas. We include only those categories that include 10% or more of the class action filings during the relevant timeframe. This past week, 43 new class action cases were filed in these courts, and after a one-week break labor law class action lawsuits returned to its familiar spot atop the list of new weekly class action filings.

Class Actions In The News Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases-In re Pilgrim’s Pride: Judicial Panel On Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) Grants Defense Motion To Centralize Class Action Litigation And Selects Western District of Arkansas As Transferee Court

Judicial Panel Grants Defense Request, Unopposed by Plaintiffs, for Pretrial Coordination of Class Action Lawsuits Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 but Elects to Transfer Class Actions to Western District of Arkansas Five class action lawsuits (two in Alabama, and one in Arkansas, Tennessee and Texas) were filed against Pilgrim’s Pride by current and former employees alleging violations of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). In re Pilgrim’s Pride Fair Labor Standards Act Litig.

Class Action Court Decisions Multidistrict Litigation Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Case-Brieger v. Tellabs: Illinois Federal Court Denies Defense Motion For Summary Judgment In ERISA Class Action

General Release Executed by Employees at Termination was Valid Under ERISA but Class Action Claims Fell Within Carve-Out Provision in Release, and Former Plan Participants have Standing to Prosecute Class Action Alleging Breach of Fiduciary Duty Against Plan Administrators Illinois Federal Court Holds

Plaintiffs filed a putative ERISA class action lawsuit against Tellabs alleging breach of fiduciary duty “by permitting investments in Tellabs securities when it was imprudent to do so and by disseminating misleading information to Plan participants about the prudence of investing in Tellabs securities.” Brieger v. Tellabs, 473 F.Supp.2d 878, 880 (N.D. Ill. 2007). Defense attorneys moved for summary judgment on two grounds: (1) the putative members of the class action had executed general releases which barred them from prosecuting the class action complaint, and (2) plaintiffs lacked standing to prosecute the class action because they had cashed out of the Plan. Id., at 883. The district court denied the motion.

Briefly, in December 2000, Tellabs announced a $100 million sales agreement with Sprint, and in January 2001 announced increased sales and expressed optimism about the future. For purposes of the period covered by the class action complaint, in February 2001 Tellabs common stock hit a high of $67 per share. However, the following month Tellabs lowered its revenue and earnings expectations for 2001, and in April 2001 it announced that it would not meet its lowered expectations. “By April 16, 2001, Tellabs stock had declined to $35.50 per share.” Brieger, at 881. The stock recovered to $42 per share in May 2001, but fell to $16 by June 2001 and plunged to under $1 by April 2003. Id., at 881-82. Tellabs implemented workforce reductions, and in exchange for severance benefits each employee executed a general release which provided that the employee released Tellabs – including its “officers, directors, agents, employees, employee benefit plans (and their plan fiduciaries and administrators)” – “from any and all claims of any kind relating to or arising out of Employee’s employment or the termination of that employment with Tellabs, Inc. or any of its subsidiaries or affiliates.” Id., at 882.

Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized

FCRA Class Action Defense Cases-Safeco Insurance v. Burr: U.S. Supreme Court Holds Willful Misconduct Under Fair Credit Reporting Act Includes Reckless Disregard But Insurers Did Not Violate FCRA

In Seminal FCRA (Fair Credit Reporting Act) Class Action Cases, Supreme Court Holds (1) “Willful” Failures Under FCRA § 1681n(a) Include Acts of “Reckless Disregard,” (2) “Adverse Action” in Determining Insurance Premiums Includes Setting First-Time Insurance Rates, (3) Review of Credit Report must have Impacted Rate Charged Consumer, and (4) Insurers did not Violate FCRA

Plaintiffs filed two separate putative class action lawsuits against GEICO and Safeco Insurance, respectively, alleging willful failure to give notice of adverse actions under the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) in violation of § 1681m(a). Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Burr, __ U.S. __, 2007 WL 1582951 (June 4, 2007) [Slip Opn., at 4]. The questions before the United States Supreme Court in the consolidated cases were “whether willful failure covers a violation [of the FCRA] committed in reckless disregard of the notice obligation, and, if so, whether … Safeco and GEICO committed reckless violations.” Id., at 1. The Supreme Court held that a “willful” violation of the FCRA included “reckless disregard,” but that neither GEICO nor Safeco recklessly violated the FCRA, id., at 1-2.

The class action complaints were filed by individuals who purchased car insurance from GEICO and Safeco, each of which rely upon credit reports in setting insurance premiums. Safeco, at 4-5. In these consolidated class actions, defendants allegedly offered plaintiffs auto insurance at rates that were higher than the most favorable rates offered by the companies. Id., at 4. However, the insurers did not send plaintiffs notices of adverse action, id., at 4-5. The FCRA requires that “any person [who] takes any adverse action with respect to any consumer that is based in whole or in part on any information contained in a consumer report” must provide notice to the consumer. 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a). For these purposes, an “adverse action” includes “a denial or cancellation of, an increase in any charge for, or a reduction or other adverse or unfavorable change in the terms of coverage or amount of, any insurance, existing or applied for.” § 1681a(k)(1)(B)(i). The Supreme Court explained that these notices “must point out the adverse action, explain how to reach the agency that reported on the consumer’s credit, and tell the consumer that he can get a free copy of the report and dispute its accuracy with the agency.” Safeco, at did not allege actual damages; rather, it sought statutory and punitive damages under § 1681n(a). Id.

Class Action Court Decisions FCRA Class Actions Uncategorized

FCRA Class Action Defense Cases-Gillespie v. Equifax: Seventh Circuit Reverses Summary Judgment In Favor Of Defense In FCRA Class Action Holding Disclosures Were Accurate But Not Clear

As Matter of First Impression, Seventh Circuit Holds that FCRA (Fair Credit Reporting Act) Requires Consumer Reporting Agency to do More than Make Accurate Disclosures because Statute Requires that Disclosures also be “Clear”

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against credit reporting agency Equifax Information Services alleging violations of the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). Gillespie v. Equifax Information Services, LLC, 484 F.3d 938, 939 (7th Cir. 2007). The class action complaint asserted that Equifax’s disclosures failed to comply with the FCRA; specifically, the class action complaint alleged that consumers could not properly calculate the date by which negative credit information must be removed from their reports. Id. Defense attorneys moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the information it provided to consumers was clear and accurate. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the defense; based on this ruling, the court found it unnecessary to address plaintiffs’ motion to certify the lawsuit as a class action. The Seventh Circuit reversed.

Plaintiff Heather Gillespie opened a credit account with Direct Merchants Bank in 1999 and defaulted on the account in 2001; plaintiff Angela Cinson opened an account with Sears in 1993 and defaulted on the account in 1996 or 1997. Gillespie, at 939. The delinquent accounts were sold to a collection agency, and information on the delinquencies made it to the Equifax credit files of each plaintiff, id. In 2004, each plaintiff requested their credit file from Equifax and Equifax complied. Gillespie, at 939. Plaintiffs objected to the “Date of Last Activity” entry in their credit files. Id. The court explained at page 939 the manner in which the field is completed:

Class Action Court Decisions FCRA Class Actions Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases-Sanford v. MemberWorks: Ninth Circuit Holds District Court Erred In Failing To Determine Existence of Membership Contract Prior To Compelling Arbitration But Correctly Dismissed Class Action Complaint Against Co-Defendants

District Court must Resolve Issues Regarding Existence of Contract before Compelling Arbitration and Dismissing Class Action Allegations, but Class Action Complaint Against Co-Defendant Properly Dismissed Ninth Circuit Holds

Plaintiff filed a putative class action in federal court against MemberWorks and West Telemarketing alleging she was charged a membership fee for joining the “Essentials program” – a service that, for an annual fee, offers members a 20% discount at certain retailers – in violation of 39 U.S.C. § 3009 (prohibiting mailing unordered merchandise) and various state laws because she had not heard of, and did not join, the program. Sanford v. MemberWorks, 483 F.3d 956, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2007). Defense attorneys for MemberWorks moved to compel arbitration based on a clause in the membership agreement and to strike the class action allegations; defense attorneys for West joined in the motion to compel arbitration. Id., at 959. Plaintiff objected to the arbitration demand on the ground that she never enrolled in the Essentials program, id. The district court granted the motion to compel arbitration as to MemberWorks, holding that a determination as to the enforceability of the contract as a whole must be made by the arbitrator; but the court denied the motion as to West because it was not in privity with plaintiff, and instead dismissed the class action complaint as to West because West had not mailed plaintiff any merchandise that she had not ordered and because the court refused to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law class action claims – namely, conversion, unjust enrichment and fraud – against West. Id. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the class action complaint as against West, but reversed the district court order compelling arbitration and reinstated the class action allegations as against MemberWorks.

Plaintiff purchased by telephone Tae-Bo fitness tapes through West Telemarketing. Sanford, at 958. Sales agents were instructed to read purchasers a script at the conclusion of the transaction stating that, with the purchaser’s consent, they would be sent a “risk-free 30-day membership” in the Essentials program, and that the $72 annual fee would be billed to their credit card if membership was not canceled within 30 days. Id. Plaintiff denied hearing the script or agreeing to the trial membership; MemberWorks’ records showed that plaintiff enrolled in the program and received a membership kit that included a membership agreement containing an arbitration clause. Id., at 958-59. Plaintiff did not cancel the membership so a $72 fee was charged to her card, and the next year a renewal fee of $84 was billed to her card. Id., at 959. Plaintiff disputed the renewal fee and MemberWorks reversed the charge, id. Plaintiff then filed her putative class action against MemberWorks and West.

Arbitration Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized