15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n and 1681o – Civil liability for Willful and Negligent Noncompliance: Statutory Language of the FCRA (Fair Credit Reporting Act) for Class Action Defense Attorneys

As a resource for defense attorneys who defend against class action under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., we provide the text of the FCRA. The article sets forth the statutory provisions covering statutory liability for willful and negligent noncompliance with FCRA, which is contained in Section 1681n and 1681o, respectively: § 1681n. Civil liability for willful noncompliance (a) In general. Any person who willfully fails to comply with any requirement imposed under this title with respect to any consumer is liable to that consumer in an amount equal to the sum of

FCRA Class Actions Statutes & Rules Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Issues-Clark v. Capital Credit: Ninth Circuit Affirms In Part And Reverses In Part Federal District Court Judgment In Favor Defense In FDCPA (Fair Debt Collection Practices Act) Case

Ninth Circuit Resolves Several Issues of First Impression Concerning Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), Holding Debtor Can Waive “Cease Communication” Directive, Debt Collectors May Rely on Information Provided by Creditors to Verify Debt, FDCPA is a Strict Liability Statute, and One Act Can Support Multiple Violations

Debtors filed suit against a debt collection agency, its employee and its outside counsel alleging various violations of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and Oregon’s Unfair Debt Collection Practices Act. The defense and debtors filed cross-motions for summary judgment; the district court granted the motion brought by the attorney, partially granted the motion brought by the debt collector, and denied the motion brought by the debtors. The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Services, Inc., ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 2441705 (9th Cir. August 24, 2006). We provide a brief summary of the case, which the Ninth Circuit characterized as “present[ing] a complicated web of problems that has required us to address a litany of issues for which there is a dearth of applicable precedent” and for which it “endeavored to adopt a construction of the FDCPA that recognizes ‘there is room within the [FDCPA] for ethical debt collectors to make occasional unavoidable errors,” Slip Opn., at 10165 (citation omitted).

In an effort to collect a debt, a debt collector sent the debtor a collection notice letter. The debtor disputed the debt and detailed billing problems with the creditor. The debt collector sent a second notice, enclosing an itemized statement from the creditor and claiming that the statement adequately verified the debt. The debtor requested “proper verification” and instructed the debt collector to cease making telephone calls. Slip Opn., at 10143. The debt collector then retained counsel who, in response to a demand for verification of the debt and an end to telephone communications, responded with the same itemized statement previously provided to the debtor. The debtor subsequently called the attorney to discuss the debt, but received a return call from the debt collection agency that “so upset [her] that she was required to obtain therapy.” Id., at 10144. The debtors filed suit.

Class Action Court Decisions FDCPA Class Actions Uncategorized

In re AT&T-Class Action Defense Cases: District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Approving $21 Million Attorney Fee Award Out Of $100 Million Securities Fraud Class Action Settlement Fund Third Circuit Holds

District Court Must Examine Class Action Attorney Fee Awards Closely but not According to a Strict Formula and, so Viewed, Approval of Class Action Settlement was Proper

Plaintiffs filed a federal securities fraud class action against AT&T based on allegedly false statements that artificially inflated stock prices. The defense waged an intense battle for several years but ultimately settled the class action claims for $100 million eight (8) days into a jury trial. The district court approved the settlement, which included payment of attorney fees equal to 21.25% of the settlement proceeds ($21.25 million), and four objectors appealed. The Third Circuit affirmed. In re AT&T Corp. Securities Litig., 455 F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 2006).

The July 20, 2006 opinion details the typical procedure for assessing attorney fees in the Third Circuit, and analyzed each of the factors the district court was required to consider when determining whether to approve a class action settlement. In the Third Circuit, those factors are set forth in Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1975), and include:

Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized

Everett v. Verizon-Class Action Defense Cases: Defense Failed To Establish Amount In Controversy For Removal Of Class Action To Federal Court Because Neither Disgorgement Nor Punitive Damage Claims May Be Aggregated Sixth Circuit Holds

Court of Appeals Reverses District Court Denial of Motion to Remand Because Defense Failed to Satisfy $75,000 Amount-In-Controversy Requirement Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and Holds as Matter of First Impression in Sixth Circuit that Punitive Damages may not be Aggregated to Meet Threshold

After plaintiffs filed a putative class action in state court against several cellular telephone companies arising out of the allegedly false representation that customers “would not be charged for unanswered phone calls or those that generated a busy signal,” and praying for “an unspecified amount of compensatory damages, injunctive relief, restitution, [and] disgorgement,” defense attorneys removed the action to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Everett v. Verizon Wireless, Inc., 460 F.3d 818 (6th Cir. 2006). Plaintiffs moved to remand the action to state court on the ground that the defense had not satisfied its burden of establishing that the $75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement, but the district court denied the motion holding that “the size of the disgorgement claim met this threshold.” Id., at 821. Eventually, the federal action involved but a single class representative and a single defendant, and the district court granted a defense motion for summary judgment as to the claims remaining against it. Plaintiff appealed only the district court’s remand order, not the ruling on the merits. Id. The Circuit Court agreed with plaintiff’s argument and reversed.

Class Action Court Decisions Removal & Remand Uncategorized

Barnett v. Experian-Class Action Defense Cases: Texas Court Decertifies Class Action Under Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) Decertified Because Defendant In Bankruptcy

Federal Court Holds Decertification of Class Action Appropriate Where Defense Lacks Financial Ability to Satisfy Claims

Plaintiffs filed a class action against defendants, including The Credit Store, alleging violations of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA); a Texas federal district court certified the class action, but the defense delayed implementation of the certification order by filing a bankruptcy petition. The district court decertified the class action against The Credit Store sua sponte because it lacked the financial ability to satisfy any judgment against it. Barnett v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 236 F.R.D. 307 (E.D. Tex. 2006). The district court summarized the allegations against The Credit Store as follows: “The plaintiffs contend that the defendant purchased old debts and changed the date of last activity on the accounts such that they could be reported to credit reporting agencies under the Fair Credit Reporting Act. This gave the debt collectors leverage to collect the obsolete debts.” Id., at 308.

Class Action Court Decisions FDCPA Class Actions Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases-Kolari v. New York-Presbyterian Hospital: Federal District Court Erred In Exercising Supplemental Jurisdiction And Dismissing Class Action State-Law Claims Second Circuit Holds

Second Circuit Holds that Once District Court Granted Defense Motion to Dismiss Federal Claims that Provided Federal Jurisdiction it Should have Remanded State-Law Class Action Claims to State Court Rather than Dismissing Them with Prejudice

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against asserting various federal and state-law claims based on allegedly inflated heath care treatment rates. The defense moved to dismiss the class action complaint in its entirety. The district court granted the defense motion, and plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of three of their state-law class action claims arguing that (1) the court should have remanded the claims to state court once it disposed of the federal class action claims, and (2) even if the court should have retained jurisdiction, it erred in dismissing the state-law claims. Kolari v. New York-Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2006). Because the Second Circuit agreed with the first argument advanced by plaintiffs, if did not reach the latter argument. Id., at 119.

Class Action Court Decisions Removal & Remand Uncategorized

Qwest Class Action Defense Case-In re Qwest Communications: Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) Judicial Panel Grants Defense Motion To Centralize Securities Cases In District Of Colorado Where Class Action Is Pending

Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) Grants Defense Motion Under § 1407 Motion to Consolidate Cases for Pretrial Purposes Before Class Action Judge even though Court-Approved Partial Settlement of Class Action is Pending

More than two dozen lawsuits – including at least one class action – were filed against Qwest Communications arising out of “alleged financial irregularities in connection with Qwest securities.” Defense attorneys sought to centralize pretrial proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 1407; plaintiffs’ lawyers in several actions objected. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) granted the defense motion. In re Qwest Communications Int’l, Inc., Securities & “ERISA” Litig. (No. II), 444 F.Supp.2d 1343 (Jud.Pan.Mult.Lit. 2006). Objecting plaintiffs argued “transfer should be denied because 1) a partial settlement has been approved in class action proceedings in the District of Colorado that have been pending since 2001; 2) alternatives to 1407 transfer were available to address any common discovery matters and to prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings; and/or 3) transfer would be unduly burdensome or otherwise prejudicial.” Id., at 1345. The Panel rejected these claim, explaining at page 1345:

Class Action Court Decisions Multidistrict Litigation Uncategorized

Jones v. People’s Heritage Bank-Class Action Defense Cases: Lender’s Retention of Portion Of Loan Proceeds As “Administrative Charge” Does Not Violate Federal Truth In Lending Act Georgia Court Holds

Georgia Federal District Court Holds that TILA (Truth in Lending Act) and Regulation Z do not Require Disclosure of “Administrative Charges”

A putative class action was filed in state court alleging inter alia that a dental fee payment plan violated the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq., and Regulation Z because the lender kept a portion of the loan proceeds to cover an “administrative charge” rather than forwarding all sums borrowed to the dentist. Jones v. People’s Heritage Bank, 433 F.Supp.2d 1328 (S.D. Ga. 2006). The district court agreed with defense attorneys that the terms of the loan were fairly disclosed, and so dismissed the federal TILA claim in the class action complaint and remanded the balance of the action to state court.

Plaintiff required $10,000 in dental work, half of which was covered by insurance. To pay the remaining $5,000, plaintiff elected to finance the dental work through a dental fee plan offered by her dentist through a lender, AmeriFee. The loan contract stated that the $5,000 would be paid to the dentist; AmeriFee, however, kept 7.5% of the loan amount ($375) as an “administrative charge.” Plaintiff’s class action complaint alleged that the failure to disclose the “administrative charge” for loan transactions violated TILA. Jones, at 1329. Specifically, the class action complaint alleged that this conduct violated state law and constituted a breach of contract, and that it also violated TILA and Reg Z “by failing to disclose and by making a misrepresentation of the amount financed and to whom the amount of the loan was paid.” Id., at 1331. In essence, plaintiff argued that her loan amount should have been only $4,625 – the amount the dentist received – and that the $375 administrative fee qualified as a “finance charge,” id., at 1333.

Class Action Court Decisions RESPA/TILA Class Actions Uncategorized

In re Bausch & Lomb-Class Action Defense Cases: Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) Judicial Panel Transfers Putative Nationwide Class Action Cases To District Of South Carolina

Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) Grants Motion To Centralize Litigation for Pretrial Purposes and Selects District Where Manufacturing Facility is Located as Transferee Court A multitude of lawsuits, including several putative nationwide class action lawsuits, were filed against Bausch & Lomb arising out of its ReNu contact lens solution, which Bausch & Lomb (“B & L”) withdrew from the market after it was associated fungal keratitis (a type of eye infection).

Class Action Court Decisions Multidistrict Litigation Uncategorized

15 U.S.C. § 1681m – Requirements on Users of Consumer Reports: Statutory Language of the FCRA (Fair Credit Reporting Act) for the Class Action Defense Lawyer

As a resource for defense attorneys who defend against class action under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., we provide the text of the FCRA. The article sets forth the statutory provisions concerning requirements placed on users of consumer reports:

§ 1681m. Requirements on users of consumer reports

(a) Duties of users taking adverse actions on the basis of information contained in consumer reports.

If any person takes any adverse action with respect to any consumer that is based in whole or in part on any information contained in a consumer report, the person shall

(1) provide oral, written, or electronic notice of the adverse action to the consumer;

(2) provide to the consumer orally, in writing, or electronically

(A) the name, address, and telephone number of the consumer reporting agency (including a toll-free telephone number established by the agency if the agency compiles and maintains files on consumers on a nationwide basis) that furnished the report to the person; and

(B) a statement that the consumer reporting agency did not make the decision to take the adverse action and is unable to provide the consumer the specific reasons why the adverse action was taken; and

(3) provide to the consumer an oral, written, or electronic notice of the consumer’ s right

(A) to obtain, under section 1681j of this title, a free copy of a consumer report on the consumer from the consumer reporting agency referred to in paragraph (2), which notice shall include an indication of the 60-day period under that section for obtaining such a copy; and

(B) to dispute, under section 1681i of this title, with a consumer reporting agency the accuracy or completeness of any information in a consumer report furnished by the agency.

(b) Adverse Action Based on Information Obtained from Third Parties Other than Consumer Reporting Agencies

(1) In general.

Whenever credit for personal, family, or household purposes involving a consumer is denied or the charge for such credit is increased either wholly or partly because of information obtained from a person other than a consumer reporting agency bearing upon the consumer’s credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living, the user of such information shall, within a reasonable period of time, upon the consumer’ s written request for the reasons for such adverse action received within sixty days after learning of such adverse action, disclose the nature of the information to the consumer. The user of such information shall clearly and accurately disclose to the consumer his right to make such written request at the time such adverse action is communicated to the consumer.

(2) Duties of Person Taking Certain Actions Based on Information Provided by Affiliate

(A) Duties, generally.

If a person takes an action described in subparagraph (B) with respect to a consumer, based in whole or in part on information described in subparagraph (C), the person shall

(i) notify the consumer of the action, including a statement that the consumer may obtain the information in accordance with clause (ii); and

(ii) upon a written request from the consumer received within 60 days after transmittal of the notice required by clause (i), disclose to the consumer the nature of the information upon which the action is based by not later than 30 days after receipt of the request.

(B) Action described.

An action referred to in subparagraph (A) is an adverse action described in section 1681a(k)(1)(A) of this title, taken in connection with a transaction initiated by the consumer, or any adverse action described in clause (i) or (ii) of section 1681a(k)(1)(B) of this title.

(C) Information described. Information referred to in subparagraph (A)

(i) except as provided in clause (ii), is information that

(I) is furnished to the person taking the action by a person related by common ownership or affiliated by common corporate control to the person taking the action; and

(II) bears on the credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living of the consumer; and

(ii) does not include

(I) information solely as to transactions or experiences between the consumer and the person furnishing the information; or

(II) information in a consumer report.

FCRA Class Actions Statutes & Rules Uncategorized