Weekly Filings of Class Action Cases No Surprise – Defense Attorneys To Face More Employment Law Class Actions Than Any Other Category

As a service to California class action defense attorneys, we provide weekly, unofficial summaries of the legal categories for class actions filed in California state and federal courts in the Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Jose, Sacramento, San Diego, San Mateo, Oakland/Alameda and Orange County areas. Our hope is that the class action defense lawyer may better anticipate claims against which they must defend. This report covers the time period from July 21 – July 27, 2006.

Class Actions In The News Uncategorized

Court Approves Google $90 Million Class Action Settlement In Click-Fraud Case

The Los Angeles Times reports that yesterday an Arkansas judge approved the $90 million settlement of the click-fraud class action lawsuit against Google. While more than 70 objections to the proposed settlement had been filed, Google’s class action defense attorneys noted that all but one of Google’s 20 largest advertisers approved of the settlement. The court reportedly downplayed the concerns of small advertisers, and concluded that the terms of the settlement were “fair, reasonable and adequate.

Class Actions In The News Uncategorized

Putkowski v. Irwin Home Equity-FCRA Class Action Defense Cases: Mailer Offering Pre-Approved Equity Line From $15,000-$300,000 At Interest From 5.65%-16.9% Is “Firm Offer Of Credit” Under Federal FCRA (Fair Credit Reporting Act) California Court Holds

California Court Dismisses Class Action Agreeing With Defense Attorneys that Federal Fair Credit Report Act (FCRA) Does Not Require Terms of Equity Line Offer in Mailer to be a Specific Dollar Figure or Interest Rate, and that No Private Right of Action Exists for Alleged Violations of § 1681m’s Disclosure Requirements

A putative class action was filed against a lender for allegedly violating the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq., by sending out unsolicited mailers offering equity lines of credit in broad amounts (in plaintiff’s case, $15,000 – $300,000) at a range of interest rates (in plaintiff’s case, 5.65% – 16.9%), and by failing to include the disclosures required by § 1681m(d). Putkowski v. Irwin Home Equity Corp., 423 F.Supp.2d 1053, 1055-56 (N.D. Cal. 2006). Defense attorneys moved to dismiss the class action; plaintiff’s lawyer argued that the mailer was nothing more than a “sales pitch” and that it did not constitute a “firm offer” under the FCRA because it “failed to state the rate of interest to be charged or the amount of credit to be extended.” Id., at 1057. The class action defense team also argued that no private right of action exists for alleged violations of § 1681m. The district court agreed with the defense.

Defense attorneys argued that “firm offers of credit” under the FCRA may be “conditional” – that it need not specify the amount of the loan offered or the interest rate, and that “the offeror may later withdraw the offer if the consumer does not meet the creditworthiness criteria.” Putkowski, at 1058. The district court distinguished Cole v. U.S. Capital, Inc., 389 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2004) [holding mailer failed to comply with FCRA], and found that the terms of the “offer” set forth in the mailer sent to plaintiff were sufficient “firm” to satisfy FCRA. Id., at 1059-60.

Class Action Court Decisions FCRA Class Actions Uncategorized

Reynolds v. Hartford-Class Action Defense Cases: “Adverse Action” Under Federal FCRA (Fair Credit Reporting Act) Applies To Initial Premium Set By Insurer Ninth Circuit Holds In Case Of First Impression

Federal Court Also Holds that Liability for Violations of Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), and that “Willful” Noncompliance Under FCRA’s Punitive Damage Provision Includes Reckless Disregard

In two class action lawsuits filed against insurance companies for alleged violations of the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act separate statement motion to compel responses, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq., (1) class action defense attorneys representing Hartford moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the initial rate set for a new policy holder cannot constitute an “adverse action” because there is no “increase” in the rate charged; and (2) class action defense attorneys representing GEICO sought summary judgment claiming the class representative lacked standing, that it did not contract to issue the plaintiff a policy, and that the premium charged would have been the same even if it had not considered plaintiff’s credit history. In each case, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurers; the Ninth Circuit consolidated the cases for purposes of its opinion.

In a case of first impression, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that if the rate initially set by an insurance company would have been lower but for its reliance on a consumer’s credit report, then a notice of adverse action must be provided under the FCRA. Reynolds v. Hartford Fin. Serv. Group, Inc., 435 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2006). Congress enacted the FCRA to ensure fair and accurate reporting of credit information affecting consumers. The statutory scheme has been characterized by courts as both comprehensive and complex. One aspect of the FCRA requires that consumers be informed of “adverse actions” taken in reliance on credit reports so that they can dispute or explain any negative information contained in such reports. “Adverse action notices advise consumers that an adverse action has been taken against them, and the nature of that action, and alerts them that they may view a copy of the consumer report that triggered the adverse action free of charge and correct any errors affecting their economic well-being.” Id., at 1085.

Class Action Court Decisions FCRA Class Actions Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases-Roberts v. BJC Health: Defense Appeal Of Order Remanding Class Action To State Court Not Reviewable On Appeal Even Though State Court May Lack Jurisdiction Because Of ERISA Preemption Eighth Circuit Holds

28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) Bars Review of Class Action Defense Appeal of Order Remanding Case to State Court on Grounds that Federal Court Lacked Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Action Roberts v. BJC Health System, 452 F.3d 737 (8th Cir. 2006), concerned a putative class action filed in Missouri state court alleging that certain medical procedures were systematically “miscoded” so that patients were overcharged for the procedures. The defense removed the action to federal court on the grounds of federal question subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that ERISA completely preempted the class action claims.

Class Action Court Decisions Removal & Remand Uncategorized

Chicago Federal Judge Dismisses Warrantless Surveillance Class Action Against AT&T Agreeing With Defense That State Secrets Privilege Applies: Class Action Defense News

On July 21st, we posted an article concerning Hepting v. AT&T Corp., ___ F.Supp.2d ___ (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2006), where a San Francisco federal district court refused to dismiss a putative class action against AT&T for its participation in the government’s warrantless surveillance program. In part, the California federal court rejected a defense argument by AT&T and the federal government (which had intervened in the putative class action) that the claims were barred by the state secrets privilege.

Class Actions In The News Uncategorized

Verizon Class Action Defense Case-Harris v. Verizon: Corporations That Comply With California Unclaimed Property Law (UPL) By Delivering Duplicate Stock Certificates To State Controller Have Absolute Immunity Against Suit From Shareholders

California Court Rejects Putative Class Action by Shareholder Whose Stock Escheated to the State Against Corporation Confirming Absolute Immunity Defense to UPL Claims

In a class action defense case of first impression, on July 19, 2006, a California appellate court upheld a court order sustaining a demurrer to a putative class action complaint against a corporation for alleged violations of California’s Unclaimed Property law (UPL), California Code Civ. Proc., §§1500-1582. Harris v. Verizon Communications, ___ Cal.App.4th ___, 2006 WL 20008884 (Cal.App. July 19, 2006). The putative class action was premised on the corporation’s alleged failure to provide notice required by the UPL. Specifically, plaintiff Gene Harris worked for GTE Corporation in the 1970s and 1980s, receiving shares in the corporation as a “fringe benefit.” Slip Opn., at 3. In 1990, without notice to Harris and without his knowledge, GTE transferred his shares to the State Controller. In accordance with California law, the Controller sold the shares and held the proceeds; eventually Harris submitted a claim and was 1999 the Controller sent him the funds held on his behalf. _Id._

Despite receiving the funds, Harris filed two class actions. In September 2001, Harris filed a putative class action lawsuit against the State Controller for failure to provide notice to shareholders before selling stock that had escheated to the State. Slip Opn., at 3. That case was resolved in favor of the defense in 2004, when a California appellate court held that the UPL “do[es] not require the Controller to provide notice to apparent owners of escheated stock before the Controller sells the stock.” Harris v. Westly, 116 Cal.App.4thh 214, 224 (Cal.App. 2004). In October 2001, Harris filed a putative class action against GTE for delivering his shares of stock to the Controller without notice. Slip Opn., at 4. The defense demurred; the trial court dismissed the class action against GTE, agreeing that GTE had an absolute immunity defense under the UPL. Id.

Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized

McSherry v. Capital One-Class Action Defense Issues: No Right Of Indemnity Under FCRA (Fair Credit Reporting Act) Or TILA (Truth In Lending Act) Federal Court Holds

Federal District Court Grants Motion to Strike Third-Party Complaint for Indemnity/Contribution Against Parent

Plaintiffs Kristen and William McSherry Jr. (“William Jr.”) filed suit against Capital One FSB and others alleging violations of the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), and Truth in Lending Act (TILA), together with Washington state law claims for defamation and invasion of privacy. McSherry v. Capital One FSB, ___ F.R.D. ___, 2006 WL 1420839 (W.D. Wash. 2006). Capital One filed a third-party complaint against plaintiff’s father, William McSherry Sr., (“William Sr.”) for indemnity and contribution because “[a]ccording to several documents in the record, including Plaintiffs’ complaint, it appears that the debt allegedly incurred by [William Jr.], may have been incurred by [William Sr.].” Slip Opn., at 2. The district court granted plaintiffs’ motion to strike, finding that “[w]hile it does appear that Capital One’s allegedly tortuous actions or omissions would not have occurred but for [William Sr.’s] alleged actions, this is not enough.” _Id_., at 1 and 12.

The federal court began with a summary of federal law on impleader actions, noting that it must be based on “an assertion of the third-party defendant’s derivative liability to the third-party plaintiff” and that it “cannot be used to assert any . . . rights to recovery arising from the same transaction or occurrence as the underlying action.” Slip Opn., at 3-4 (citation omitted). Here, the plaintiffs’ complaint was carefully drafted to seek damages solely based on Capital One’s acts or omissions in response to communications from plaintiffs concerning the debt:

Class Action Court Decisions FCRA Class Actions RESPA/TILA Class Actions Uncategorized

15 U.S.C. § 1681b – Permissible purposes of consumer reports: Statutory Language for the Defense Lawyer of Class Action Lawsuits Under the FCRA (Fair Credit Reporting Act)

As a resource for the class action defense lawyer defending against class actions under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., we provide the text of the FCRA on this site for attorneys.

§ 1681b. Permissible purposes of consumer reports

(a) In general.

Subject to subsection (c), any consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer report under the following circumstances and no other:

(1) In response to the order of a court having jurisdiction to issue such an order, or a subpoena issued in connection with proceedings before a Federal grand jury.

(2) In accordance with the written instructions of the consumer to whom it relates.

(3) To a person which it has reason to believe

(A) intends to use the information in connection with a credit transaction involving the consumer on whom the information is to be furnished and involving the extension of credit to, or review or collection of an account of, the consumer; or

(B) intends to use the information for employment purposes; or

(C) intends to use the information in connection with the underwriting of insurance involving the consumer; or

(D) intends to use the information in connection with a determination of the consumer’s eligibility for a license or other benefit granted by a governmental instrumentality required by law to consider an applicant’ s financial responsibility or status; or

(E) intends to use the information, as a potential investor or servicer, or current insurer, in connection with a valuation of, or an assessment of the credit or prepayment risks associated with, an existing credit obligation; or

(F) otherwise has a legitimate business need for the information

(i) in connection with a business transaction that is initiated by the consumer; or

(ii) to review an account to determine whether the consumer continues to meet the terms of the account.

(4) In response to a request by the head of a State or local child support enforcement agency (or a State or local government official authorized by the head of such an agency), if the person making the request certifies to the consumer reporting agency that

(A) the consumer report is needed for the purpose of establishing an individual’s capacity to make child support payments or determining the appropriate level of such payments;

(B) the paternity of the consumer for the child to which the obligation relates has been established or acknowledged by the consumer in accordance with State laws under which the obligation arises (if required by those laws);

(C) the person has provided at least 10 days’ prior notice to the consumer whose report is requested, by certified or registered mail to the last known address of the consumer, that the report will be requested; and

(D) the consumer report will be kept confidential, will be used solely for a purpose described in subparagraph (A), and will not be used in connection with any other civil, administrative, or criminal proceeding, or for any other purpose.

(5) To an agency administering a State plan under Section 454 of Title 42 for use to set an initial or modified child support award.

FCRA Class Actions Statutes & Rules Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Issues–Federal Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA)

Class Action Defense Attorneys Urged to Advise Clients about FACTA Requirements Congress has amended the Fair Credit Reporting Act to include the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act. That statute requires that credit card receipts provided to customers be modified so that the credit card number shown on the receipt is truncated and so that the expiration date is omitted. Defense attorneys are encouraged to be proactive in warning their clients about the statute, which takes effect in December 2006.

Class Actions In The News FCRA Class Actions Uncategorized