CAFA Class Action Defense Cases–McLoughlin v. People’s United: Connecticut Federal Court Denies Motion To Remand Class Action To State Court Holding Removal Jurisdiction Exists Under Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA)

Class Action Properly Removed to Federal Court under CAFA (Class Action Fairness Act of 2005) because Defendants Established by Preponderance of the Evidence that Class Action Placed more than $5 Million in Controversy Connecticut Federal Court Holds Plaintiffs filed a class action in Connecticut state court against Bank of New York Mellon (“Mellon”) and People’s United Bank (“Bank”) alleging negligence, invasion of privacy, breach of fiduciary duty, and violations of Connecticut’s Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA); the class action complaint asserted that Mellon lost electronic data belong to Bank customers.

Class Action Court Decisions Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) Removal & Remand Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases–Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines: Ninth Circuit Reverses Dismissal Of Class Action For Failure To Arbitrate Under RLA And Holds Class Action Improperly Removed To Federal Court

Defendant Improperly Removed Labor Law Class Action to Federal Court and Therefore District Court Erred in Dismissing Class Action for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Ninth Circuit Holds Plaintiff filed a class action against Alaska Airlines alleging labor law violations; the class action complaint asserted that defendant willfully failed to pay its former employees all wages due upon termination as required by Oregon law. Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., ___ F.

Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized

PSLRA Class Action Defense Cases–Public Employees’ Retirement Ass’n v. Deloitte & Touche: Fourth Circuit Affirms Dismissal Of Securities Class Action Without Leave To Amend For Failure To Adequately Plead Scienter

Securities Fraud Class Action Claims Against Accountants Properly Dismissed for Failure to Plead Scienter Required by Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) because Evidence Showed Company Concealed Information from Accountants Fourth Circuit Holds

Plaintiffs filed a class action against various defendants alleging securities fraud violations; the class action complaint alleged that Royal Ahold, N.V., a Dutch corporation, and U.S. Foodservice, Inc. (USF), a Maryland-based Ahold subsidiary, engaged in improper accounting practices. Public Employees’ Retirement Ass’n of Colorado v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 551 F.3d 305, 306 (4th Cir. 2009). The class action also alleged that Ahold’s accountants, Deloitte & Touche LLP (Deloitte U.S.) and Deloitte & Touche Accountants (Deloitte Netherlands) – which are two legally distinct entities, participated in Ahold’s alleged fraud, id. Defense attorneys for the Deloitte defendants moved to dismiss the class action on several grounds, including for failure to satisfy the heightened pleading requirements established by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). In pertinent part, the PSLRA requires that plaintiffs plead facts alleging a “strong inference” that the defendant in a securities fraud lawsuit acted with the requisite scienter. Id., at 306. The district court granted the defense motion and dismissed the class action complaint as to the Deloitte defendants without leave to amend, id., at 307-08. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding “the inference that the Deloitte defendants lacked the necessary scienter more compelling than any competing inference that they knowingly or recklessly perpetrated a fraud on Ahold’s investors” and that the proposed second amended class action complaint was futile. Id., at 306.

We do not here discuss in detail the nature of the improper accounting practices underlying the class action claims. See Deloitte, at 306-08. In brief, the two frauds Ahold alleged perpetrated involved (1) the improper consolidation of revenue from various joint ventures, in violation of GAAP, that resulted in substantial overstatement of earnings, and (2) the premature recognition of income from promotional allowances. Id., at 307. The actions led Ahold to restate earnings for fiscal years 2001 and 2002, and revealed that Ahold’s accounting practices had overstated earnings by more than $500 million. Id. The announcement led to a 60% drop in stock price, and to SEC civil enforcement actions against Ahold and various individual defendants. Id. Moreover, at least 21 private class action lawsuits were filed alleging securities fraud, and the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation centralized the class actions for pretrial purposes in the District of Maryland, id. The district court appointed Public Employees’ Retirement Association of Colorado and Generic Trading of Philadelphia, LLC as Lead Plaintiffs, and a Consolidated Amended Securities Class Action Complaint was filed against Ahold entities, the Deloitte defendants, and others. Id. Lead Plaintiffs settled the class action as to the non-Deloitte defendants, and then filed a motion to amend the class action complaint to assert new claims against the Deloitte defendants. Id., at 308. The district court denied the motion on the basis of futility, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.

Class Action Court Decisions PSLRA/SLUSA Class Actions Uncategorized

Labor Law Class Action Lawsuits Regain Dominance Among Weekly Class Action Lawsuits Filed In California State And Federal Courts In Week Of Heavy Class Action Activity

In order to allow class defense attorneys anticipate the types of class actions against which they will have to defend in California, we provide weekly, unofficial summaries of the legal categories for new class action lawsuits filed in the California state and federal courts located in Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Jose, Sacramento, San Diego, San Mateo, Oakland/Alameda and Orange County areas. We include only those categories that include 10% or more of the class action filings during the preceding week.

Class Actions In The News Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases— In re Text Messaging Antitrust: Judicial Panel On Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) Grants Plaintiffs’ Motions To Centralize Class Action Litigation But Chooses Northern District Of Illinois As Transferee Court

Faced with Three Motions for Centralization, Judicial Panel Grants Plaintiffs’ Request for Pretrial Coordination of Class Action Lawsuits Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, Unopposed by Responding Class Action Plaintiffs and Defendants, and Transfers Class Actions to Northern District of Illinois Sixteen (16) class actions – filed in federal courts in the District of Columbia, Arkansas, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, and Texas – were filed against various defendants alleging violations of federal antitrust laws; 15 additional and related class actions also were filed, and were treated as potential tag-along class actions.

Class Action Court Decisions Multidistrict Litigation Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases–Solon v. Midwest Medical: Illinois State Appellate Court Holds Statutory Authorization For Reasonable Expenses Up To $20 Did Not Support Charging $20 Flat Fee In Connection With Copy Services

As Matter of First Impression, in Class Action Challenging $20 Flat Fee for “Handling” Copy Requests for Medical Requests, Statute Only Authorized Reimbursement of “Reasonable Expenses” which, by Definition, would Vary Among Copy Requests Illinois State Court Holds

Plaintiffs filed a class action against Midwest Medical Records Association (MMRA) alleging deceptive and illegal practices in violation of Illinois law; specifically, the class action complaint alleged that MMRA “overcharge[ed] patients for requested copies of medical records.” Solon v. Midwest Medical Records Ass’n, Inc., 898 N.E.2d 207, 208 (Ill.App. 2008). According to the allegations underlying the class action, MMRA is retained by health care facilities and practitioners to handle patient requests for copies of medical records; MMRA employees work on-site at the health care offices where they “receive medical records requests, locate and copy the requested records, and send the records to the patient along with a bill for services.” Id. The class action further alleges that MMRA does not charge the health care provider for its services but, rather, charges the patients a fee for providing the records requested, id. Specifically, MMRA negotiates a “price per page” that it will charge the patients, and adds a “flat $20 handling fee, which defendant refers to as a ‘process fee.’” Id., at 208-09. The class action alleged, inter alia, that this charge violated the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act and the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, id., at 209. Defense attorneys moved to strike portions of the class action on the grounds that the flat $20 handling fee did not violate Illinois law, id. at 208. The trial court denied the motion but certified the following question for appellate review: “Is it reasonable per se for a provider of medical record copies under [sections 8-2001 and 8-2003 of the Code] to charge the full amount of the $20 process fee, or is the provider limited to a lesser charge if the evidence shows that the lesser charge is all that is reasonable?” Id., at 209. The appellate court concluded that the $20 fee was not per se reasonable.

In essence, the class action alleged that Illinois law “only permits defendant to charge for the lesser of the ‘reasonable expense of production, Illinois’ statutory price limit for copies applicable to the type of copies [defendant] furnished, or a fair price for the copies.’” Solon, at 209. The gravamen of the class action was that it was improper to charge a flat $20 handling fee in connection with the copy requests. Id. The Illinois appellate court recognized that this presented an issue of first impression, and it began its legal analysis by summarizing the rules governing statutory construction. Id. The relevant statute provides, “Every [health care provider] shall, upon the request of any patient * * *, * * * permit copies of [a patient’s medical] records to be made by him * * * or his * * * physician * * *…. The [health care provider] shall be reimbursed by the person requesting copies of records at the time of such copying for all reasonable expenses, including the costs of independent copy service companies, incurred by the health care facility in connection with such copying not to exceed a $20 handling charge for processing the request for copies * * *.” Id., at 209-10 (quoting 735 ILCS 5/8-2001 (West 2004)). Additionally, “the patient must reimburse health care providers for the cost of the copies at a maximum per-page rate that varies with the number of pages copied, as well as any shipping costs.” Id., at 210(citing 735 ILCS 5/8-2001, 8-2003 (West 2004)). Defense attorneys argued that a flat $20 fee is reasonable per se “because it is within the maximum amount allowed to be charged under the statute”; plaintiffs countered that the statute permits only “‘reasonable expenses’ incurred in connection with copying the records” in addition to the per page cost of the copies themselves, and that the amount of those expenses may not exceed $20. Id.

Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized

FDCPA Class Action Defense Cases–Herkert v. MRC Receivables: Illinois Federal Court Amends Class Definitions And Certifies Class Action In FDCPA (Fair Debt Collection Practices Act) Class Action

Class Action Challenging Defendants Debt Collection Practices Warranted Class Action Treatment Illinois Federal Court Holds

Plaintiffs filed a class action against MRC Receivables and others alleging violations of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and the Illinois Collection Agency Act (ICAA). Herkert v. MRC Receivables Corp., 254 F.R.D. 344, 346 (N.D.Ill. 2008). Defendants are engaged in the business of “purchasing and managing charged-off consumer receivables portfolios.” Id. After defendants filed suit against them to collect on credit card debts, plaintiffs filed their class action lawsuit, id. Specifically, the class action complaint alleged that defendants “had a policy and practice of violating Section 1692e and 1692f of the FDCPA, and Section 425/9(a)(20) of the ICAA,” id., at 346-47. The gravamen of the class action is that defendants filed lawsuits to collect credit card debts without attaching a signed contract to the complaints, and after the expiration of the 5-year statute of limitations. Id., at 347. Plaintiffs moved the district court to certify the litigation as a class action, id., at 346. The district court amended the definition of the class and, as amended, granted plaintiffs’ motion for class action treatment.

The motion for class certification proposed three classes, under the FDCPA and one under the ICAA. Heckert, at 347. The district court readily found Rule 23(a)(1)’s numerosity requirement for class actions to be satisfied because defendants “file…thousands of cases each month in Illinois state court.” Id., at 348. The federal court rejected defendants’ claim that they would not be able “to construct an accurate search of their record-keeping system on a searchable, system-wide basis, and that it would thus be impossible to determine the identity of the class members.” Id. However, the court agreed to amend the class definitions “to ensure that the classes are ascertainable based on objectively identifiable criteria, namely, according to the date of the final statement of account as given in the affidavits attached to the state court complaints.” Id. As so amended, the class definition would not require the parties to rely on defendants’ records in order to ascertain class membership, id., at 349.

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions FDCPA Class Actions Uncategorized

FLSA Class Action Defense Cases–Gortat v. Capala Brothers: New York Federal Court Grants Plaintiffs’ Motion To Dismiss Crossclaims Against Named Plaintiffs In Labor Law Class Actions

In FLSA Class Action, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Dismiss Crossclaims by Defendants Granted because Negligence and Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims could not Survive New York Federal Court Holds, but Conversion Claim not Challenged and Defendants Granted Leave to Amend Tortious Interference Claim

Six plaintiffs filed a class action against their employer, Capala Brothers, a construction company, alleging violations of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the New York Minimum Wage Act; in response to the class action complaint, defendants counterclaimed against the plaintiffs for conversion, negligence, tortious interference with contract, and breach of fiduciary duty. Gortat v. Capala Brothers, Inc., 585 F.Supp.2d 372, 374 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). The counterclaims to the class action were premised on the following: (1) the negligence claims alleged that four plaintiffs were negligent in replacing a roof to a building, resulting in $40,000 in rain damage, that three plaintiffs were negligent in failing to secure electrical motors at the site, which were also damaged by rain, that two plaintiffs were negligent in allowing concrete to harden in a concrete mixer, and that two plaintiffs were negligent in failure to secure two certain equipment resulting in their loss; (2) the tortious interference with contract claim alleged that three plaintiffs interfered with the employment contracts of current Capala employees, “caused lower moral[e], dissent and lower productivity” causing $100,000 in damage to Capala, and that one plaintiff, after quitting, “interfered with the employment contracts of the other four plaintiffs” causing $300,000 in damages to Capala, and (3) the breach of fiduciary duty claim alleged that plaintiffs “fail[ed] to provide ‘adequate and timely notice’ before quitting…as required by their employment contracts” causing Capala to default on certain construction contracts and suffer $400,000 in damages. Id., at 374-75. Plaintiffs answer the conversion counterclaim, but moved to dismiss the remaining counterclaims, id., at 374. The district court granted plaintiffs’ motion.

The district court first addressed the negligence claims, explaining that New York law “prohibits employers from making any deduction from employee wages except as required by law or regulation or as authorized by the employee for his or her benefit,” including claims for negligence or lost profits. Gortat, at 375 (citations omitted). The federal court concluded that while defendants’ crossclaims were not “obvious examples of attempted wage deduction,” they served the same function and so could be “treated as such to prevent employers from circumventing the protection of employee wages” provided for by New York law. Id., at 375-76. Accordingly, it granted the motion to dismiss defendants’ negligence claims against the named plaintiffs, id., at 376. With respect to the tortious interference claims, the district court observed that plaintiffs were terminable at will and that plaintiffs could not be liable unless they engaged in “culpable” conduct. Id. The court found that the allegations failed to allege wrongful conduct adequate to support the interference claim, so those claims, too was dismissed. Id. Turning to the breach of fiduciary duty claim against the plaintiffs, the federal court noted that defendants were required to pleading “both the existence of a duty based on a relationship of trust and confidence and breach of that duty.” Id. (citation omitted). Failing to give advance notice of terminating their employment, standing alone, did not constitute a sufficient basis to support the breach of fiduciary duty claim, id., at 376-77.

Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases–Hauk v. JP Morgan Chase: Ninth Circuit Affirms Summary Judgment On Class Action’s TILA Claim But Reverses As To Class Action’s UCL And False Advertising Claims

District Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment in Favor of Bank as to Claim Alleging Violation of Federal Truth In Lending Act (TILA) because Bank’s Disclosures were Accurate, but Genuine Issue of Material Fact Precluded Summary Judgment as to Unfair Competition Law (UCL) and False Advertising Law (FAL) Claims Ninth Circuit Holds

Plaintiff filed a class action against JP Morgan Chase alleging violations of the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA), the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) and California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA); plaintiff’s amended class action complaint added claims for alleged violations of California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) and False Advertising Law (FAL). Hauk v. JP Morgan Chase Bank USA, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. January 23, 2009) [Slip Opn., at 827]. The class action complaint asserted that plaintiff opened a Chase credit card, subject to a Cardmember Agreement (CMA), and later took advantage of a “balance transfer offer” that promised a promotional fixed 4.99% APR by transferring $10,000 to his Chase card. _Id._, at 825. According to the allegations underlying the class action, the CMA allowed Chase to increase the interest rate if plaintiff made a late payment to Chase or any other creditor, _id._ The class action centered on the allegation that Chase charged plaintiff an APR of 28.74% because it maintained that “he was no longer eligible to receive the promotional 4.99% APR,” _id._, at 825-26; specifically, Chase argued that plaintiff had made a late payment to another creditor three months before he accepted the balance transfer offer from Chase, _id._, at 826. While Chase would have automatically canceled the balance transfer offer to plaintiff had it discovered the late payment as part of its monthly cardmember account review, which includes reviewing Experian credit reports, Chase claimed that it did not discover the late payment until after plaintiff had accepted the offer to transfer a balance to his credit card. _Id._ Defense attorneys removed the class action to federal court, and moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the class action’s state law claims were preempted by federal law and that plaintiff’s TILA and CLRA claims were defeated by the disclosures in Chase’s CMA. _Id._, at 827. The district court rejected the preemption argument, but agreed with the defense that plaintiff could not prove Chase knew of the late payment before accepting the balance transfer offer and so plaintiff’s state law claims could not survive. _Id._ The Ninth Circuit reversed as to the UCL and FAL claims for relief.

The Ninth Circuit noted that plaintiff voluntarily withdrew his FCRA claim and did not appeal from the dismissal of the class action’s CLRA claim; accordingly, the appeal was directed to the grant of summary judgment as to plaintiff’s TILA, UCL and FAL claims. Hauk, at 827. The Circuit Court devoted most of its attention to the TILA claim. The Ninth Circuit summarized TILA and Regulation Z, see id., at 828-29, and the disclosures made by Chase in conjunction with the balance transfer offer, see id., at 830-31. In pertinent part, Chase may waive its right to increase a cardholder’s APR because of a late payment if it knows of, but does not promptly act on, that default, id., at 830-31; however, Chase does not waive its right to increase the APR “based on a late payment it discovered after it mailed the [balance transfer offer], even if that late payment occurred before it mailed the [balance transfer offer],” id., at 831 (citations omitted). The Circuit Court noted further that “TILA is only a ‘disclosure statute’ and ‘does not substantively regulate consumer credit,’” id. In this case, then, the district court properly granted summary judgment on the class action’s TILA claim because “the injury [plaintiff] suffered neither resulted from any lack of TILA disclosures nor gave rise to a claim under TILA.” Id. The Ninth Circuit explained that “while an inaccurate disclosure that itself breaches a credit agreement may also violate TILA…, the breach of a credit agreement based on conduct independent of the disclosures does not necessarily give rise to a TILA claim.” Id., at 832-33 (citation omitted). In affirming the dismissal of the TILA claim, the Ninth Circuit recognized contrary authority out of the Third Circuit, see id., at 833-34 (citing Rossman v. Fleet Bank (R.I.) Nat’l Ass’n, 280 F.3d 384, 399-400 (3d Cir. 2002)), but rejected that circuit’s “expansive reading of Regulation Z,” id., at 833. Rather, the Ninth Circuit concluded at page 835, “We hold that a creditor’s undisclosed intent to act inconsistent with its disclosures is irrelevant in determining the sufficiency of those disclosures under sections 226.5, 226.6, and 226.9 of Regulation Z.” And because defendant’s disclosures complied with TILA and Regulation Z, summary judgment was proper, id.

Class Action Court Decisions FCRA Class Actions RESPA/TILA Class Actions Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases–Dukes v. Wal-Mart: Ninth Grants Rehearing En Banc Of District Court Order Certifying Nationwide Class Action Against Wal-Mart In Labor Law Class Action Alleging Sex Discrimination Covering 1.5 Million Class Members

Wal-Mart’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc of District Court Order Certifying Nationwide Labor Law Class Action Alleging Sex Discrimination Against 1.5 Million Employees Granted by Ninth Circuit We have previously reported on the Ninth Circuit opinion in Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 474 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2007), which affirmed a district court order granting plaintiffs’ motion for class action certification in a nationwide labor law class action alleging sex discrimination; the certified class action covered 1.

Class Action Court Decisions Class Actions In The News Uncategorized