Class Action Defense Cases–In re Dynamic Random Access Memory: Ninth Circuit Affirms Dismissal Of Antitrust Class Action For Lack Of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act (FTAIA)

Congressional Amendments in Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act (FTAIA) to Sherman Act’s Jurisdiction Barred Foreign Plaintiff Corporation’s Antitrust Class Action Claims Ninth Circuit Holds

Plaintiff, a British computer manufacturer, filed a class action complaint against “U.S. and foreign manufacturers and sellers of DRAM, a type of high-density memory used in personal computers and other electronic devices” for violations of federal antitrust laws and Section 1 of the Sherman Act; the class action complaint alleged violations of Sections 4(a), 12 and 16 of the Clayton Act, and sought injunctive relief and damages In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig., 538 F.3d 1107, 1109 (9th Cir. 2008). Plaintiff alleged a “global conspiracy to fix DRAM prices, raising the price of DRAM to customers in both the United States and foreign countries.” Id., at 1109-10. Defense attorneys moved to dismiss the class action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act of 1982 (FTAIA), which amended the Sherman Act; plaintiff’s theory was that “defendants could not have raised prices worldwide and maintained their global price-fixing arrangement without fixing the DRAM prices in the United States.” Id., at 1110. The district court granted the motion and denied plaintiff leave to file an amended class action complaint, finding that plaintiff did not meet the jurisdictional prerequisites under the FTAIA “because it had not sufficiently alleged that its foreign injury was directly linked to the domestic effect of higher U.S. prices for DRAM.” Id. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.

The Ninth Circuit explained that Congress amended the jurisdictional language of the Sherman Act in 1982 by enacting the FTAIA: the FTAIA amended the Sherman Act so as to exclude “anti-competitive conduct that causes only foreign injury.” In re DRAM, at 1110 (citation omitted). The FTAIA accomplished this purpose by declaring that the Sherman Act “shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce … with foreign nations.” Id. (citing § 6a). It carves out an exception, known as the “domestic injury exception,” for foreign conduct that “(1) has a ‘direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect’ on domestic commerce,” id. (citation omitted). Quoting the U.S. Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit explained at page 1111 that the FTAIA’s language as:

Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized

PSLRA Class Action Defense Cases–Silverman v. Motorola: Illinois Federal Court Grants Defense Motion To Dismiss Certain Claims In Securities Class Action Finding Some Class Action Allegations Inadequate Under PSLRA

Defense Motion to Dismiss Securities Class Action Claims Granted in Part, but Class Action Plaintiffs Adequately Alleged Existence of Certain Omissions or Misrepresentations as to Most Defendants as well as Control Person Liability as to All Individual Defendants Illinois Federal Court Holds

Plaintiffs filed a class action against Motorola and some of its officers and directors alleging violations of federal securities law; the class action complaint alleged that defendants artificially inflated the company’s stock price by issuing statements that omitted important facts or contained material misrepresentations in violation of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5. Silverman v. Motorola, Inc., ___ F.Supp.2d ___ (N.D.Ill. September 23, 2008) [Slip Opn., at 1-2]. Count I of the class action complaint was premised on the Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violations (material misrepresentations and omissions); Count II of the class action complaint was premised on the Section 20(a) violation (asserting control person liability). _Id._, 1-2. The allegations in the class action centered on Motorola’s development of its third generation cell phones, or “3G” cell phones. _Id._, at 3. Defense attorneys moved to dismiss the class action complaint for failure to satisfy the heightened pleading requirements under the PSLRA (Private Securities Litigation Reform Act), _id._, at 2. The federal court granted defendants’ motion in part, but refused to dismiss the class action in its entirety.

After detailing the statements underlying the class action complaint, see Silverman, at 3-12, the district court noted that plaintiffs’ misrepresentation claims fall into two categories: (1) the drop in price of the company’s RAZR cell phones, and (2) the delayed rollout of the company’s new 3G cell phones, id., at 15. The federal court readily rejected the RAZR category, noting that the company had expressly discussed the price drop in the RAZR line and the reasons for the price reductions. See id. “Therefore, any allegations of fraud based on statements regarding the RAZR price decrease are dismissed.” Id. With respect to the 3G cell phone claims in the class action complaint, the district court agreed that some of the alleged misrepresentations were “mere puffery,” see id., at 15-16, and that company representations concerning projected sales and revenue were protected as “forward-looking statements,” see id., at 18-19. However, the federal court rejected the puffery defense as to other company statements, finding that representations such as whether new products will be “competitive” and “on track” would be material if defendants knew these statements to be untrue, id., at 16-17, and found that the “forward-looking” safe harbor did not apply to statements of present or future facts that could have materially affected an investor’s decisions, id., at 18-19. Similarly, omissions concerning potential delays in the 3G rollout could be actionable, id., at 17-18, particularly as the delay severely impacted sales during the Christmas holiday season, see id., at 27.

Class Action Court Decisions PSLRA/SLUSA Class Actions Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases–Rhodes v. DuPont: West Virginia Federal Court Denies Class Action Certification In Putative Medical Monitoring Class Action Holding Individualized Inquiries Would Predominate

Class Action Seeking Medical Monitoring due to Exposure to Contaminated Drinking Water Denied Class Action Treatment because Plaintiffs Failed to Demonstrate Existence of Common Proof as to Each Class Member’s Injuries West Virginia Federal Court Holds

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action in West Virginia state court against E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company seeking damages for harm allegedly caused by drinking water contaminated with perfluoroctanoic acid, also known as “C-8,” which is a chemical that does not degrade and is “used in the manufacture of many industrial and consumer products including non-stick cookware coatings and architectural coatings.” Rhodes v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., ___ F.Supp.2d ___ (S.D.W.V. September 30, 2008) [Slip Opn., at 1-2]. Specifically, the class action complaint alleged that DuPont’s Washington Works plant in West Virginia released C-8 into the drinking supply of the Parkersburg Water District, and that because C-8 “is not a naturally occurring substance[,] … all C-8 found in human blood is attributable to human activity.” _Id._, at 2. Defense attorneys removed the class action to federal court, _id._, at 5. Plaintiffs moved the court to certify the litigation as a class action; defense attorneys opposed class action treatment. _Id._, at 1. The district court denied plaintiffs’ motion explaining that while plaintiffs “presented compelling evidence that exposure to C-8 may be harmful to human health,” the class action is premised on “some potential harm to the general public” rather than on “specific injuries to each member of the proposed class.” _Id._ The federal court explained at page 1, “The fact that a public health risk may exist is more than enough to raise concern in the community and call government agencies to action, but it does not show the common individual injuries needed to certify a class action.” Accordingly, the district court denied plaintiffs’ class action certification motion.

We summarize the facts only briefly. DuPont has used C-8 at its plant for more than 50 years, and has released C-8 into the air and into the Ohio River. Rhodes, at 2-3. The class action alleges that C-8 emissions from the DuPont plant contaminated the public water supply and that in 1984 “detectable levels of C-8 were discovered in the tap water of [certain] communities.” Id., at 3. While the precise effect of C-8 exposure “remains uncertain,” several studies have associated such exposure to various health problems, including several types of cancer. Id. There have been calls for “precautionary measures such as removing C-8 from drinking water supplies and using alternative drinking water sources, especially for children and the elderly,” id., and various state and federal agencies have directed attention to the regulation of C-8 emissions and exposure, see id., at 3-4. A prior class action involving C-8 emissions from the Washington Works plant was filed in West Virginia state court against DuPont in 2002 entitled Leach v. E.I. Du Pont Nemours & Co.; the state court certified that lawsuit as a class action and the class action settlement ultimately approved in Leach defined the class as “all individuals who, for a period for at least one year, consumed drinking water containing .05 ppb (parts per billion) or greater of C-8 attributable to releases from the Washington Works plant from any of six specified Public Water Districts or any eligible private sources and who did not opt out of the class or waive their class member rights.” Id., at 4. Parkersburg Water District was not part of that class action because at the time its water contained less than .05 ppb of C-8; at the time the new class action was filed, the C-8 levels exceed that amount. Id., at 5.

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized

Labor Law Class Action Lawsuits Dominate New Class Action Filings In California State And Federal Courts

To assist class action defense attorneys anticipate the kinds of class actions against which they will have to defend in California, we provide weekly, unofficial summaries of the legal categories for new class action lawsuits filed in California state and federal courts in the Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Jose, Sacramento, San Diego, San Mateo, Oakland/Alameda and Orange County areas. We include only those categories that include 10% or more of the class action filings during the preceding week.

Class Actions In The News Uncategorized

ERISA Class Action Defense Cases–In re Mutual Funds: Maryland Federal Court Grants Motion To Compel In ERISA Class Action Holding Fiduciaries Waived Attorney-Client/Work Product Doctrines By Producing Documents To Regulators

Production of Documents to Regulators Pursuant to Confidentiality Agreement Constituted a Waiver of Attorney-Client/Work Product Doctrines Entitling Class Action Plaintiffs to Documents in ERISA Class Action Maryland Federal Court Holds

Plaintiffs, former employees of Scudder/Deutsche Former who had participated in defined contribution retirement plans, filed a class action against various defendants for violations of ERISA (Employee Retirement Income Security Act); specifically, the class action complaint alleged that defendants breached fiduciary duties owed under ERISA by engaging in market timing and late trading in connection with the plans’ investment in mutual funds. In re Mutual Funds Investment Litig., 251 F.R.D. 185, 186 (D.Md. 2008). The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation coordinated the class action litigation for pretrial purposes in the District of Maryland. Id. During the course of the MDL litigation, class action plaintiffs sought from defendants the production of certain documents “previously disclosed by the Scudder/Deutsche defendants to regulatory officials, specifically the SEC and the New York Attorney General’s Office, in connection with those agencies’ investigation of similar allegations against the defendants.” Id. Defendants refused on the grounds that the documents were protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege and/or attorney work-product protection, and that the documents had been disclosed to regulators “subject to a confidentiality agreement.” Id. In essence, defense attorneys relied on the doctrine of “selective waiver” in opposing plaintiffs’ document request, id.; the district court rejected the defense arguments and ordered defendants to produce the documents requested.

The documents had been produced to regulators “subject to ‘non-waiver’ and ‘confidentiality’ agreements” that expressly stated that “Deutsche Bank does not intend to waive the protection of the attorney work product doctrine, attorney-client privilege, or any other privilege applicable as to third parties” and required regulators to “maintain the confidentiality of the Confidential Materials pursuant to this agreement and…not disclose them to any third party”; ultimately, defendants settled with the regulatory agencies and paid more than $100 million in civil penalties. In re Mutual Funds, at 186. The class action plaintiffs sought production of all documents given to the SEC or other regulatory agencies with regard to market timing or late trading; defendants withheld 36,000 pages, asserting the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. Id., at 186-87. In their motion to compel, plaintiffs did not dispute whether the documents generally would fall within the scope of those doctrines; rather, they argued that the privileges had been waived. Id., at 187. The district agreed: “There is no question that the defendants have disclosed otherwise protected material, voluntarily, to an adversary, for their own benefit in negotiating a settlement with the regulators.” Id. After discussing Fourth Circuit and Tenth Circuit authority concerning disclosures that constitute a subject-matter waiver of attorney-client and work product documents and of the validity of “selective waiver” as a defense to such waiver, the district court granted plaintiffs’ motion. The district court concluded at pages 187 and 188, “The defendants’ voluntary disclosure of otherwise protected material to the [regulatory agencies], despite the entry of a confidentiality agreement, results in waiver.” However, the district court held that the waiver applied only to those documents “actually disclosed” to regulatory agencies; specifically, the court rejected class action plaintiffs’ claim that defendants’ production constituted a “subject matter waiver as to any attorney-client and non-opinion work product, not simply waiver as to the actual documents disclosed.” Id., at 188.

Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized

Wal-Mart Class Action Defense Cases–Salvas v. Wal-Mart: Massachusetts Reverses Decertification Of Labor Law Class Action (And Grant Of Summary Judgment On Class Action Claims) Holding Predominance Test Had Been Satisfied

Labor Law Class Action Erroneously Decertified because Evidence Submitted by Class Action Plaintiffs Concerning Nationwide Practices was Relevant to Predominance of Class Action Claims of Massachusetts Employees Supreme Judicial Court Holds

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against their former employer, Wal-Mart, alleging labor law violations; the class action complaint alleged that Wal-Mart “wrongfully withheld compensation for time worked and denied of cut short rest and meal breaks to which they were entitled.” Salvas v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 452 Mass. 337, 338-39 (Mass. September 23, 2008). The trial court certified the litigation as a class action on behalf of roughly 67,500 current and former employees who worked for Wal-Mart in Massachusetts during a ten-year period, id. Wal-Mart subsequently moved for summary judgment on the class action claims; Wal-Mart also moved to exclude as unreliable the testimony of plaintiffs’ main expert witness, and to decertify the class action. Id. The trial court granted summary judgment with respect to the class action’s meal breaks claims, and with respect to some of the wage claims; the trial court also granted Wal-Mart’s motions to exclude the expert testimony and to decertify the class action. Id. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reversed. We address here only that portion of the Supreme Judicial Court’s opinion concerning class action certification.

The Supreme Judicial Court found that Wal-Mart’s home office established and directed corporate-wide policies, including payroll controls. Salvas, at 339. Under these procedures, each hourly employee “adhere[d] to stringent timekeeping procedures, including clocking in and out at the beginning and end of each shift and at other prescribed times.” Id., at 340. According to Wal-Mart policy, “hourly employees should never be required to work ‘off-the-clock’” and hourly employees were generally prohibited from working overtime. Id., at 340-41. Employees were repeatedly warned that they could be terminated for working off-the-clock or for failing to take breaks, and store managers were required to investigate “every instance” of off-the-clock work. Id., at 341. Individual store managers also worked under a competing pressure: “the responsibility for payroll came with considerable pressure from the home office to boost profits by, among other things, minimizing labor costs, one of the corporation’s largest controllable expenses.” Id., at 342. Further, “Store managers were rewarded for keeping payroll costs low. Conversely, if they exceeded Wal-Mart’s stringent labor cost guidelines, they might lose their bonuses or lost their jobs.” Id. And at least as early as 1989, Wal-Mart knew that “despite the written policy directives to the contrary, store managers were sometimes ‘[a]ltering time cards to decrease reported payroll expenses’ and ‘[i]nstructing associates to work off the clock.’” Id. Wal-Mart knew also that some hourly employees were missing meal and rest breaks, id., at 342-43.

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized

FDCPA Class Action Defense Cases–Barany-Snyder v. Weiner: Sixth Circuit Affirms Judgment On The Pleadings on FDCPA Class Action Holding Attachment Of Entire Contract To Debt Collection Complaint Was Not An Effort To Enforce Each Term In Contract

Class Action Complaint Failed to Adequately Allege Violations of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) because Mere Attachment of Entire Contract with Unenforceable Attorney Fee Clause to Debt Collection Complaint Underlying Class Action was not an Attempt to Collect Attorney Fees where Debt Collection Complaint did not Pray for Such Fees Sixth Circuit Holds

Plaintiff filed a class action complaint in Ohio federal court against two debt collection attorneys and the law firm where they worked, Keith D. Weiner & Associates; defendants had filed a lawsuit against plaintiff in Ohio state court seeking to recover $8,146.53, plus interest at the rate of 16% per annum and costs alleged owed a college under a revolving credit agreement that contained the following attorney fees clause: “I/We understand that upon default of any, or all of the terms and conditions of this credit agreement and upon proper service of a NOTICE OF DEFAULT by the College, all signers immediately become, at the option of the college, liable for attorney fees and/or actual or reasonable collection costs which may be added to the Total Amount Due.” Barany-Snyder v. Weiner, 539 F.3d 327, 330 (6th Cir. 2008). The collection action did not seek attorney’s fees, and the court entered in favor of the college did not award attorney fees because the college did not seek such an award. Id., at 331. Plaintiff filed for bankruptcy protection, and the college’s debt ultimately was discharged. Id. Plaintiff’s class action complaint alleged that defendants violated the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and Ohio’s Consumer Sales Practices Act; the class action alleged that Ohio law “prohibits creditors from recovering attorney’s fees in connection with the collection of a consumer debt,” and that defendants violated state and federal law by attaching the college’s credit agreement with the attorney fees clause to the state court complaint. Id. Defense attorneys moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the class action failed to state a claim; the district court granted the motion and plaintiff appealed. Id. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Plaintiff’s theory of the case was that “all signers immediately become, at the option of the college, liable for attorney fees and/or actual or reasonable collection costs” and that this violated the FDCPA’s prohibition against making false, deceptive, or misleading representations in connection with the collection of a debt. Barany-Snyder, at 332. The Sixth Circuit disagreed, holding that because the credit agreement was attached in its entirety, and because the attorney fee clause was not “drawn to the consumer’s attention,” even the “least sophisticated debtor” would not have interpreted the debt collection lawsuit as one seeking attorney fees. Id., at 334-35. The Circuit Court explained at page 335, “Indeed, as the district court noted, adopting [plaintiff’s] position leads to the untenable conclusion that the attachment of a contract to a complaint or dunning letter is equivalent to a present threat to exercise every provision of that contract.” Additionally, “while attachment of an affidavit asserting a possible entitlement to attorney’s fees might have been misleading and deceptive to the least sophisticated consumer, this conduct simply did not amount to a false representation in violation of § 1692e(2).” Id., at 335 (citation omitted). Accordingly, defendants’ debt collection action failed to state a claim under § 1692e(2). Id., at 335-36. Finally, the Circuit Court further affirmed that the debt collection action did not attempt to collect a debt in excess of the amount lawfully owed, so defendants did not violate § 1692f(1) as alleged in the class action complaint. Id., at 336. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court judgment dismissing the class action complaint, id.

Class Action Court Decisions FDCPA Class Actions Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases–Lee v. Dynamex: California Court Reverses Denial Of Class Action Certification Holding Erroneous Discovery Ruling Precluded Plaintiff From Meeting Burden Of Showing Commonality And Typicality Of Claims

Trial Court Erroneous Order in Labor Law Class Action Denying Motion to Compel Discovery of Contact Information of Putative Class Members Deprived Plaintiff of Opportunity to Develop Evidence Required to Support Motion for Class Action Certification thus Requiring Remand California Court Holds

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against parcel delivery company, Dynamex, alleging labor law violations; specifically, the class action complaint alleged that Dynamex, a nationwide courier and delivery service, “had improperly reclassified the drivers from employees to independent contractors in violation of California law.” Lee v. Dynamex, Inc., ___ Cal.App.4th ___ (Cal.App. August 26, 2008) [Slip Opn., at 2]. Prior to seeking class action certification, plaintiff sought to compel Dynamex to identify and provide contact information for putative class members; the trial court denied the motion, and subsequently denied class action treatment of the lawsuit. _Id._ The California Court of Appeal reversed, holding that “the trial court’s discovery ruling directly conflicts with the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in _Pioneer Electronics (USA), Inc. v. Superior Court_ (2007) 40 Cal.4th 360 (_Pioneer_), as well as our decisions in _Belaire-West Landscape, Inc. v. Superior Court_ (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 554 and _Puerto v. Superior Court_ (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1242 (_Puerto_), and that ruling improperly interfered with [plaintiff’s] ability to establish the necessary elements for class certification….”_Id._, at 2.

Since 2001, Dynamex has employed approximately 800 drivers and has operated out of four locations in California; and in December 2004, the company reclassified its drivers as independent contractors “after management concluded such a conversion would generate economic savings for the company.” Lee, at 2. We do not go into greater detail as to the facts underlying the class action allegations, as they are not material to the issue resolved by the appellate court. In brief, plaintiff worked for Dynamex for 15 days, and filed his class action complaint three months after he stopped working for the company. Id., at 3. In essence, the class action alleged that as independent contractors, Dynamex drivers “performed the same tasks in the same manner as they did when they were classified as employees,” id. Soon after filing his class action, plaintiff sought from Dynamex discovery of the names and addresses of all drivers who had worked as independent contractors for the company; Dynamex objected on the ground that its employees should be given the right to “opt-in” to the request, relying on the then-recent appellate opinion in Pioneer Electronics (USA) Inc. v. Superior Court (Mar. 30, 2005, B174826), which held that “opt-in” letters protected consumer privacy rights by giving them the right to choose whether they wished to have their personal contact information shared with class action plaintiff lawyers. Id., at 3-4. The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion to compel as “premature,” and stated personal contact information would not be ordered disclosed unless and until the litigation had been certified as a class action. Id., at 4.

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Employment Law Class Actions Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases–In re Merck: Third Circuit Reinstates Class Action Against Merck Holding District Court Erred In Dismissing Securities Class Action Because Class Action Plaintiffs Were Not On Inquiry Notice Sufficient To Time Bar Claims

Fact Stock Price did not React to “Storm Warnings” Contradicted District Court Finding that Class Action Plaintiffs were on Inquiry Notice of Class Action Claims so as to Commence Statute of Limitations Third Circuit Holds

“[Plaintiffs], purchasers of Merck & Co., Inc. stock, filed the first of several class action securities fraud complaints on November 6, 2003, alleging that the company and certain of its officers and directors…misrepresented the safety profile and commercial viability of Vioxx, a pain reliever that was withdrawn from the market in September 2004 due to safety concerns.” In re Merck & Co., Inc. Securities, Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., 543 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2008) [Slip Opn., at 3]. The class action complaint alleged that defendants violated Sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933, Sections 10(b), 20(a), and 20A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule 10b-5 by “materially misrepresent[ing] the safety and commercial viability of VIOXX,” id., at 15. Defense attorneys moved to dismiss the class action claims on the ground that they were barred by the statute of limitations, and that the allegations in the class action complaint failed to meet the heightened pleading requirements under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA); the district court granted the motion to dismiss on the first ground, and did not reach the PSLRA argument. Id., at 15-16 and n.8. Plaintiffs appealed, challenging the district court’s finding that “there was sufficient public information prior to November 6, 2001 to trigger Appellants’ duty to investigate the alleged fraud.” Id. The Third Circuit reversed.

We do not discuss the Circuit Court’s 36-page majority opinion in detail, and we do not here summarize the history of Vioxx, leading up to the first class action lawsuit in May 2001, see In re Merck, at 4-9. The FDA sent Merck a warning letter on September 21, 2001, regarding the “marketing and promotion” of Vioxx and stating in part “that Merck’s ‘promotional activities and materials’ for the marketing of Vioxx were ‘false, lacking in fair balance, or otherwise misleading in violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the Act) and applicable regulations.’” Id., at 9. The FDA’s letter “received widespread coverage by the media and securities analysts,” id., at 10; nonetheless, securities analysts “all maintained their ratings for Merck stock at ‘buy’ or ‘hold’ and/or continued to project increased future revenues for Vioxx,” id., at 11-12. Merck’s stock price did decline in the days immediately following the FDA warning letter, it quickly rebounded and by October 1, 2001 the stock price closed higher than before the announcement of the FDA warning letter a week before. Id., at 12. More product liability class action lawsuits were filed against Merck on September 27, 2001, see id., and the New York Times reported on the health risks of Vioxx in early October 2001, see id., at 12-13. Cutting to the chase, Merck withdrew Vioxx from the market in September 2004, and securities analysts began recommending that Merck stock be sold. See id., at 14-15.

Class Action Court Decisions PSLRA/SLUSA Class Actions Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases—In re Epogen & Aranesp: Judicial Panel On Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) Grants Plaintiff’s To Centralize Class Action Litigation But Send Class Actions Back To Central District Of California

Judicial Panel Grants Plaintiff Request for Pretrial Coordination of Class Action Lawsuits Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, Over Objection of Certain Class Action Plaintiffs and Defendants and Objection of Common Defendant, but Transfers Class Actions Back to Central District of California, Where Class Actions Originally had been Filed Five nationwide class actions were filed in five different federal courts against common defendant Amgen and various other defendants; the class action lawsuits “concern[ed] Amgen’s marketing of its Epogen and Aranesp anemia drugs, and they also all involve alleged violations of California statutory law.

Class Action Court Decisions Multidistrict Litigation Uncategorized