Class Action Defense Cases-In re Motor Fuel: Kansas Federal Court Denies Defense Motion To Dismiss Class Action Challenging Practice Of Selling Gasoline Based On Volume Regardless Of Temperature

Defense Motion to Dismiss Class Action Alleging Gasoline Retailers Overcharged Consumers by Failing to Account for Differences Based on Temperature of Gasoline Sold Denied because Class Action Allegations Adequately Pleaded Claims for Breach of Contract, Violation of Consumer Protection Statutes, and Various Other Claims Kansas Federal Court Holds

Several putative class action lawsuits were filed against various motor fuel retailers in 26 states, the District of Columbia and Guam (“the Region”); the class actions were consolidated in the District of Kansas for pretrial purposes by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (a summary of the Judicial Panel’s order may be found here). Though it alleged numerous causes of action, in essence the consolidated class action complaint alleged that defendants’ sale of gasoline “for a specified price per gallon without disclosing or adjusting for temperature expansion” subjects them to liability “under various state law theories including breach of contract, breach of warranty, fraud and consumer protection.” In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Prac. Litig., 534 F.Supp.2d 1214 (D. Kan. 2008) [Slip Opn., at 1]. Defense attorneys moved to dismiss the class action on ten (10) different grounds, see id., at 13-14, but framed the arguments “in general terms” that did not “identify the elements of each cause of action or discuss whether the laws of each jurisdiction are the same,” id., at 14. The district court denied the motion.

In broad terms, the consolidated class action complaint alleged that gasoline expands when heated and so a given volume has less mass at warmer temperatures than the same fuel would have at cooler temperatures. In re Motor Fuel, at 3. Because of this, the industry has standardized the sale of gasoline based on temperature, defining a “gallon” as 231 cubic inches at 60 degrees Fahrenheit, and this standard – known as D-1250 – is used “at every state of the process except at retail.” Id. Retail gasoline is sold “based solely on volume (i.e. 231 cubic inches) without regard to temperature,” and is advertised without defining for the term “gallon” for the consumer, id. Further, the industry has fought selling gasoline at the D-1250 standard, so “Plaintiffs pay billions of extra dollars every year because retailers deliver fuel which is – on average – at least 10 degrees higher than the industry standard without making any correction in price and/or volume.” Id., at 4. This practice also “generate[s] hidden profits in the form of excess reimbursement for taxes paid on wholesale purchases,” because defendants pay federal and state taxes on the D-1250 standard, but collects reimbursement of those taxes from consumers on the additional gallons sold at higher temperatures, id. Finally, the class action alleges that equipment is available (and in use in Canada) to adjust the retail sale of gasoline to the D-1250 standard, but defendants have opposed putting the equipment into use by falsely claiming the average temperature of gasoline sold in the U.S. is 56◦ F, while the American Petroleum Institute now concedes that it is higher than 60◦ F, and that it would cost more than $6 billion to put the equipment to use, while the industry now estimates that cost to be $2.2 billion. Id., at 4-5. The nine (9) separate claims alleged in the class action complaint are discussed at pages 6 through 13 of the opinion.

Class Action Court Decisions Multidistrict Litigation Uncategorized

Microsoft Vista Class Action Defense Cases-Kelley v. Microsoft: Washington Federal Court Certifies Nationwide Class Action Against Microsoft For Class Action Complaint Challenging OEM Marketing Of Vista Operating System

Class Action Challenging Labeling PCs as “Windows Vista Capable” even if PCs could not Run Premium Vista Properly Certified as Nationwide Class Action and Washington State Law may be Applied to Claims of All Members of Class Action Washington Federal Court Holds

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action lawsuit against Microsoft challenging the marketing of its new “Windows Vista Capable” and “Express Upgrade” programs; specifically, the class action complaint alleged that almost a year before its release of the new Vista operating system, Microsoft “authorized original equipment manufacturers…to place a sticker on personal computers… indicating that the PCs had been certified by Microsoft as ‘Windows Vista Capable.’” Kelley v. Microsoft Corp., ___ F.Supp.2d ___ (W.D. Wash. February 22, 2008) [Slip Opn., at 1]. The class action alleged further that a substantial number of PCs that were advertised as “Windows Vista Capable” were limited to “Vista Home Basic” which, according to the complaint, “does not include any of the enhanced features unique to Vista and which make Vista attractive to customers.” _Id._, at 2. Some PCs were labeled as “Premium Ready” rather than “Windows Vista Capable,” _id._, but at that time consumers were unaware of the various Vista operating systems that would be available or the differences between them. The class action also alleged that Microsoft offered an “Express Upgrade Guarantee Program” to PC customers that would allow purchasers to “Windows Vista Capable” PCs to upgrade to Vista for little or no cost, but failed to disclose that the upgrade generally would be limited to Vista Home Basic. _Id._ Plaintiffs moved for the district court to certify the litigation as a nationwide class action and to apply Washington law to the class action. _Id._, at 1. Defense attorneys opposed both motions. The district court granted class action certification and agreed that Washington law governs the lawsuits.

The gravamen of the class action complaint was that “Microsoft eventually released four versions of Vista – Basic, Premium, Business, and Ultimate” – but that “the Premium version that is the ‘real’ Vista.” Kelley, at 2. Computers were advertised as “Windows Vista Capable,” the class action alleged, in order to “boost holiday sales of personal computers after delaying the release of Vista from March 2006 to early 2007” because Microsoft was “concerned that consumers looking to buy a new computer would delay their purchases until the release of Vista (and therefore after the holiday season).” Id. Thus, Microsoft allegedly engaged in the false and deceptive business practice of advertising PCs as “Windows Vista Capable” even if they could only run the Basic version “because Microsoft was concerned that few PCs on the market at the time could run the more premium versions of Vista” and so it “endeavored to assure consumers that their new computers would run the soon-to-be released Vista operating system.” Id. Microsoft countered that while Vista Home Basic “lack[ed] some of the capabilities of the premium versions of Vista, [it] still provides material improvements over Microsoft’s earlier operating system, Windows XP,” id., and pointed to various “marketing materials, sales aids, and training materials that described what features the different Windows Vista editions would provide and explained that not every ‘Windows Vista Capable’ computer would be able to provide every advanced feature available in every edition of Windows Vista,” id., at 3.

At the time plaintiffs sought class action treatment, the complaint sought relief for unjust enrichment and for violation of Washington’s Consumer Protection Act (CPA) or other state consumer protection acts. Kelley, at 4. Plaintiffs sought to certify a nationwide class action, and argued that Washington law applied to the claims of all class members. Id. The district court began its analysis by addressing the choice of law question, id. Defense attorneys argued that “the laws of all 50 states are relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims,” id., at 5. The federal court explained that it must first determine whether applying Washington law would be unconstitutional, and if not, whether applying Washington law would be “appropriate under Washington’s choice of law rules.” Id. (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985)). The district court easily concluded that applying Washington law would not violate the Constitution because “[a]lthough the injury to Plaintiffs and the potential class members may have occurred outside of Washington, application of Washington law is not arbitrary, unfair, or unforeseeable.” Id., at 5-6 (citation omitted). The court’s analysis of Washington’s choice of law rules was much more extensive, see id., at 6-11. Washington law requires a determination first of whether an actual conflict exists between the laws of Washington and other states, and if so, “the forum or fora that have the ‘most significant relationship’ to the action to determine the applicable law.” Id., at 6 (citation omitted).

Certification of Class Actions Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized

Number Of Class Action Lawsuits Drop During Past Week But Class Action Cases Involving Employment Law Claims Continue To Lead Weekly Class Action Filings In California State And Federal Courts

To assist class action defense attorneys anticipate the types of lawsuits against which they will have to defend in California, we provide weekly, unofficial summaries of the legal categories for new class action lawsuits filed in California state and federal courts in the Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Jose, Sacramento, San Diego, San Mateo, Oakland/Alameda and Orange County areas. We include only those categories that include 10% or more of the class action filings during the preceding week.

Class Actions In The News Uncategorized

Toy Lead Class Action Defense Cases-In re RC2 Corp.: Judicial Panel On Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) Grants Defense Motion To Centralize Class Action Litigation In Northern District of Illinois

Judicial Panel Grants Defense Request for Pretrial Coordination of Class Action Lawsuits Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 in Northern District of Illinois, Rejecting Motion of California Class Action Plaintiff to Centralize Litigation in the Central District of California Fourteen (14) class action lawsuits (9 in Illinois, and 1 in Arkansas, California, Indiana, New Jersey and New York) were filed against various defendants, including RC2 Corp. and Learning Curve Brands, “stem[ming] from certain toys that were manufactured and/or distributed by defendants and recalled due to the presence of elevated levels of lead in surface paints.

Class Action Court Decisions Multidistrict Litigation Uncategorized

BP CAFA Removal Class Action Defense Cases-Eatinger v. BP: Kansas Federal Court Refuses To Remand Class Action To State Court Holding Removal Jurisdiction Exists Under Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA)

Amount in Controversy Required for Removal Jurisdiction under CAFA (Class Action Fairness Act) not Defeated by Plaintiff’s Statement in Class Action Complaint that Damages “May” not Exceed $5 Million Kansas Federal Court Holds

Plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit in Kansas state court against BP America on behalf of royalty owners alleging that BP engaged in self-dealing and “failed to properly account and pay royalties to the plaintiff and the class”; defense attorneys removed the class action to federal court arguing that removal jurisdiction existed under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). Eatinger v. BP America Prod. Co., 524 F.Supp.2d 1342, 2007 WL 4395068, *1 (D. Kan. 2007). Plaintiff’s lawyer moved to remand the class action to state court on the ground that the amount in controversy failed under either test because the class action complaint specifically pleads amounts in controversy below the jurisdictional requirements. Id. The district court denied the motion to remand.

The district court noted plaintiff did not dispute diversity,” Eatinger, at *5; accordingly, the jurisdictional issue is whether the amount in controversy requirement is met. Accordingly, “the single matter in dispute” is whether “the requisite amount in controversy” had been shown, id., at *1. Defense attorneys submitted that, based on the definition of the proposed class, “the minimum amount of total royalty payments alleged to be in controversy to be at least $693,000,000” so unless the alleged underpayment is less than .7215009% the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000. Id. Moreover, the defense argued that plaintiff’s individual claim places in excess of $440,000 at issue, so unless he claims less than a 16% underpayment his amount in will exceed $75,000. Id. Plaintiff’s lawyer responded that central to BP’s arguments is the claim that plaintiff has “refused to stipulate to an amount of damages at stake,” and advanced various objections to this reasoning, id., at *2. Defense attorneys countered that requiring more than its percentage-based calculations of damages “would create a virtually impossible standard of proof,” id. Additionally, plaintiff’s “vague statement in the initial complaint that the amount in controversy ‘may’ exceed $5 million,” combined with his refusal to stipulate otherwise, “is sufficient to establish jurisdiction in federal court.” Id.

Class Action Court Decisions Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) Removal & Remand Uncategorized

PSLRA Class Action Defense Cases-In re H&R Block: Missouri Federal Court Dismisses Securities Class Action Against H&R Block Concluding Class Action Allegations Failed To Satisfy PSLRA’s Heightened Pleading Requirements

Defense Motion to Dismiss Securities Class Action Against H&R Block and Individual Defendants Granted because Class Action Complaint Failed to Meet Heightened Pleading Requirements Mandated by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) Missouri Federal Court Holds

Plaintiffs filed a class action against H&R Block and various individual defendants alleging violations of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Commission, and seeking derivative “controlling persons” liability under section 20(a) of the 1934 Act. In re H&R Block Securities Litig., ___ F.Supp.2d ___ (W.D. Mo. February 19, 2008) [Slip Opn., at 1]. The class action alleged that H&R Block failed to attribute its financial success to “deceptive consumer practices” which “thereby artificially inflating its reported earnings,” failed to properly account for its effective income tax rate thereby “requiring a restatement of reported financial results,” and failed to implement “a system of safeguards and procedural controls” to ensure that financial statements and reports were reliable rather than “materially overstated.” _Id._, at 2. Defense attorneys moved to dismiss the class action complaint; the district court granted the motion but granted leave to amend as to the restatement of financials claim if plaintiffs could plead with specificity “that the Company knew, not just that it had internal control weaknesses, but that it was releasing materially false financial information as a result.” _Id._, at 2-3. Plaintiffs filed an amended class action complaint, _id._, at 3, alleging that defendants “misled the Company’s public investors by disseminating a series of materially false and misleading statements concerning the Company’s revenues, earnings, profitability, and financial condition,” and defense attorneys again moved to dismiss the class action. _Id._, at 1-2. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the securities class action complaint.

Analyzing the allegations of the class action complaint under the heightened pleading requirements dictated by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), In re H&R Block, at 4, the federal court turned first to the Section 10(b) claim. Defense attorneys claimed that the amended class action complaint failed to cure the deficiencies in the original class action complaint; specifically, it failed to “plead facts giving rise to a strong inference that the Defendants acted with scienter when accounting errors caused inaccurate financial statements to be released.” Id., at 4-5. Relying on the test enunciated by the Supreme Court in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2499 (2007), a summary of which may be found here, the district court held that plaintiff’s “four confidential sources” were insufficient — not because the sources were unnamed, but because plaintiffs had failed to establish that the information from these sources was reliable, _id._, at 6 (citation omitted). The federal court also concluded that even if the information from the unnamed sources was reliable, the allegations failed to satisfy the PSLRA’s heightened pleading requirements because the company had issued warnings of possible problems with its financial statements and had conducted an investigation in conjunction with an independent auditor, thus undermining a claimed intent to deceive. _Id._, at 7-8. As the court summarized at page 9, “[T]he Court is left with statements by confidential informants suggesting that Defendants knew they had problems involving corporate tax accounting controls. The Company repeatedly disclosed the problems to investors beginning in July 2004. The Company continued to evaluate and work towards remedying the problems, including by hiring the help of an independent third-party. The culmination of the investigation led to a Restatement. Thus, Plaintiff has still not pled facts giving rise to a strong inference that Defendants acted with an intent to deceive the investing public by releasing incorrect financial statements.”

Class Action Court Decisions PSLRA/SLUSA Class Actions Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases-In re Tyco: New Hampshire Federal Court Approves Class Action Settlement And Awards Class Counsel Record $464 Million For Prosecuting Securities Fraud Class Action Lawsuit

Proposed $3.2 Billion Settlement Of Securities Fraud Class Action Fair, Reasonable and Adequate, and Request By Class Action Plaintiffs’ Counsel for $464 Million Fee Award Reasonable New Hampshire Federal Court Holds

Plaintiffs filed a securities fraud class action lawsuit against Tyco International, its former auditor, PricewaterhouseCoopers, and five individual defendants; the gravamen of the class action was that defendants “misrepresented the value of multiple companies that Tyco acquired and misreported Tyco’s own financial condition in ways that artificially inflated the value of Tyco stock,” thereby permitting the individual defendants “to reap enormous profits by looting the company through a combination of unreported bonuses, forgiven loans, excessive fees, and insider trading.” In re Tyco Int’l, Ltd., ___ F.Supp.2d ___, 2007 WL 4462593, *1 (D. N.H. December 19, 2007). The district court granted plaintiffs’ motion for class action treatment, and the parties eventually negotiated and sought district court approval of a proposed $3.2 billion settlement of the class action. _Id._ Specifically, the terms of the class action settlement requires that Tyco pay $2.975 billion in cash, plus interest, and that PricewaterhouseCoopers pay $225 million in cash, plus interest, _id._, at *5. The district court stated at page *5: “Tyco’s payment will be the largest cash payment ever made by a corporate defendant in the history of securities litigation. [PricewaterhouseCoopers’] payment will be the second-largest auditor settlement in securities class action history. In all, the proposed settlement is the third largest securities class action recovery in history, behind only Enron and WorldCom.” As part of the motion for approval of the class action settlement, plaintiffs’ lawyers sought an attorney fee award of 14.5% of the $3.2 billion settlement, _id._, at *1, together with almost $29 million in costs, _id._, at *14. The district court approved the class action settlement and awarded the attorney fees requested.

We do not here discuss the district court’s analysis of the proposed settlement, or its conclusion that the terms of the class action settlement were fair, reasonable and adequate. See Tyco, at *7-*11. We do note, however, that the court stated it would be “difficult to overstate the complexity of this case,” id., at *8, and that the case was “risky…for both sides,” id., at *9. The court further highlighted the expense involved, noting that more than 488,000 hours of attorney time had been devoted to prosecution of the class action, id., at *10. The court’s analysis and rejection of the various objections to the proposed settlement may be found at pages *11-*14. The attorney fee award bears mention because it represents the single largest attorney fee award in class action history.

Class Action Court Decisions PSLRA/SLUSA Class Actions Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases-In re Dynamic Random Access Memory: California Federal Court Grants Motion To Dismiss Certain Antitrust Class Action Claims Finding Plaintiffs Lack Antitrust Standing

Antitrust Class Action Complaint Failed to Adequately Establish Antitrust Injury thus Warranting Dismissal of Certain Antitrust Claims in Class Action Complaint for Lack of Standing California Federal Holds

Plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit against various defendants for allegedly conspiring to artificially inflate and fix the prices of dynamic random access memory (DRAM) in the market: plaintiffs are indirect purchasers of DRAM, and filed the class action on behalf of other indirect purchasers; the class action named as defendants foreign corporations, or U.S. subsidiaries of foreign corporations, that manufacture and sell DRAM in the U.S. In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig., ___ F.Supp.2d ___ (N.D. Cal. January 29, 2008) [Slip Opn., at 1-2]. Defense challenges to the class action led to the filing of a second amended class action complaint, and defense attorneys moved to dismiss certain claims therein. _Id._ The district court granted the motion in part and denied the motion in part.__

By way of background, the district court explained at page 2 that in August 2006, defense attorneys moved for judgment on the pleadings with respect to the original class action complaint, and in June 2007, the court granted the motion in part in an order that enunciated “two overarching conclusions”: (1) that “under the standing test enunciated in Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983)(‘AGC’), plaintiffs lacked antitrust standing to assert their claims under both the California Cartwright Act and 13 state antitrust statutes, for all claims based on purchases of products in which DRAM is a component,” and “further granted defendants’ motion for lack of standing with respect to 3 more state antitrust statutes, regardless whether those claims were based on purchases of non-component DRAM, or products in which DRAM is a component”; and (2) that the class action claims “under various states’ consumer protection statutes failed, on grounds that the claims were untimely, had procedural deficiencies, or else failed to state a valid claim for relief.” The district court granted plaintiffs’ leave to amend, “but only as to three specific state laws – South Dakota, New York, and Rhode Island.” In re DRAM, at 2. Plaintiffs did so, but then sought leave to further amend the class action complaint believing they could overcome the concerns expressed by the court in its June 2007 order; defense attorneys opposed the motion on the ground of futility, but the court granted leave to amend and a second amended class action complaint was filed. Id., at 2-3. Defense attorneys moved to dismiss certain claims therein, id., at 3.

Class Action Court Decisions Uncategorized

Labor Law Class Action Lawsuits Dominate Weekly Class Action Filings In California State And Federal Courts

As a resource to California class action defense attorneys, we provide weekly, unofficial summaries of the legal categories for new class action lawsuits filed in California state and federal courts in the Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Jose, Sacramento, San Diego, San Mateo, Oakland/Alameda and Orange County areas. We include only those categories that include 10% or more of the class action filings during the preceding week. This report covers February 8 – 14, 2008, during which time 40 new class action lawsuits were filed.

Class Actions In The News Uncategorized

Class Action Defense Cases-In re Peregrine Systems: Judicial Panel On Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) Grants Joint Defense/Plaintiff Motion To Centralize Class Action Litigation In Southern District of California

Judicial Panel Grants Defense Request for Pretrial Coordination of 35 Class Action and Individual Lawsuits Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, Joined by Sole Plaintiff Outside California, and Transfers Actions to Southern District of California Thirty-five (35) individual and class action lawsuits (34 in California and 1 in New Jersey) were filed against various defendants, including Arthur Andersen, “arising out of alleged misrepresentations or omissions relating to improper accounting practices at Peregrine Systems, Inc.

Class Action Court Decisions Multidistrict Litigation Uncategorized